— Defendants George and Sally Owner (Owner), appeal from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs Frank and Ruth Lenci (Lenci). We hold that the trial court did not err in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirm the judgment.
In December 1976, Owner leased real property from Lenci for a 3-year term beginning January 1, 1977. The lease provided:
Lessee shall have the right of extending this lease for a term of an additional three years at the same terms and conditions provided that lessee shall have fulfilled completely and timely all of the terms and conditions of this lease.
Over the term of the lease the rent, due on the first day of the month, was paid an average of 48 days late each month. On five separate occasions Lenci served Owner with a notice to pay rent or vacate, citing failure to pay rent, taxes, and insurance premiums required by the lease. On October 25, 1979, Owner gave notice of intent to renew the lease for another 3-year term to begin January 1, 1980.
Lenci brought an unlawful detainer action against Owner on January 18, 1980. Owner filed no responsive pleadings, and Lenci moved for summary judgment on the issue of possession. The motion was granted based on the complaint and affidavits submitted by both sides. Owner timely moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment. Following trial on the issue of damages, judgment was entered affirming the summary judgment and awarding damages to Lenci in the amount of double the fair market rental, attorney fees, and costs.
Waiver of Condition to Option of Renewal
Owner does not contend that he "fulfilled timely and completely all the terms and conditions of this lease," and the evidence clearly shows that he did not. Owner argues, relying on
Henry v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc.,
[T]he lease should be construed in such way that the right of the lessee to a renewal was independent of the covenants to pay rent; the rule in such cases being that:
"Where the payment of rent is not expressly declared to be a condition precedent to the exercise of a privilege to have a renewal, the fact that the lessee is in arrears for rent when he elects to take a renewal taken alone does not deprive him of his right to a renewal." 2 Underhill, Landlord and Tenant, p. 1386, § 812.
Henry, at 184.
Waiver is essentially a question of intent, express or implied.
Birkeland v. Corbett,
We believe that
Hindquarter Corp. v. Property Dev. Corp.,
Lenci's acceptance of late rent payments made by Owner did not constitute a waiver of the renewal condition. Owner failed to come forward with any evidence which would raise a genuine issue of material fact tending to establish his right to renewal.
Equitable Relief
Neither is Owner entitled to equitable relief, on the facts before the court. He cites no special circumstances such as permanent improvements to the property to justify the application of equitable principles.
See Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle,
Measure of Damages
Owner next contends that the trial court used an improper measure of damages. He argues that the damages should be based on the monthly rent which would have been in éffect if the lease had been renewed, rather than on the fair rental value of the premises. The case law, however, is to the contrary. The amount of damages occasioned by an unlawful detainer and holding over is based upon the fair value of the use of the premises rather than the amount of rent agreed upon by the parties under a lease no longer in effect.
Owens v. Layton,
Attorney's Fees
Owner finally contends that Lenci is not entitled to attorney's fees. The lease provides, in pertinent part:
[I]n case Lessor shall bring suit... to recover possession of the leased premises . . . and Lessor shall prevail in such action, then . . . Lessee shall pay Lessor a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs and expenses expended or incurred by the Lessor in connection with such . . . action.
The judgment of liability and damages, including attorney's fees and costs, was not in error, and is affirmed. We award Lenci the sum of $4,000 as attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1.
Andersen and Durham, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied February 10, 1982.
Review denied by Supreme Court April 28, 1982.
