MEMORANDUM OPINION
LaShawn Lemmons (“the plaintiff’) brings this action against .Georgetown University Hospital (“the Hospital”) and Debbie Ellerby (“the defendants”),
I. Background
The facts of this case are set forth in detail in this Court’s prior opinion. Opinion at 2-11. However, it is helpful to recite them briefly here.
As a result of its investigation into the plaintiffs allegations of harassment, the Hospital discovered that the plaintiff was not fully trained as a laboratory technologist. Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot. 1125; see also Am. Compl. 1121(d). This discovery led the Hospital to request that the plaintiff either undergo further training to become a qualified, full-time technologist or retain her present duties in a part-time capacity under a new title and a lower pay grade. Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot., Ex. 16 (August 30, 2002 letter from Debbie Ellerby to LaShawn Lemmons) at 1; see also Am. Compl. HH 21(f)-(i). The plaintiff refused to participate in the additional training “because she felt she was being railroaded into an unfair training regime that would ultimately lead to her termination.” PL’s Sum. Judg. Opp. 1141. Instead, the plaintiff elected, “with great reservations,” to transfer to the part-time technologist position, where she remains to this date. Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot., Ex. 15 (September 23, 2002 letter from La-Shawn Lemmons to Debbie Ellerby) at 2.
The plaintiff and the defendants also clashed over the Hospital’s policy that all District of Columbia employees involved in direct or indirect patient care receive an annual health examination, including a tuberculin Purified Protein Derivative (“PPD”) skin test, also known as a Mantoux test. Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot., Ex. 18 (Georgetown University Hospital Health Policy 501) at 1, 3. The defendants contend that the Hospital’s health clearance policies are “strictly enforce[d]” and that “an employee’s failure to take the required PPD test presents a significant risk of liability for the Hospital.” Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot. 1147. Nevertheless, after receiving notes from the plaintiffs physician, the Hospital granted the plaintiff a deferral from the PPD skin test for medical reasons in the spring of 2002 and 2003. Id.
Despite these religious and medical objections, Hospital personnel ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs continued refusal to submit to a PPD skin test was “unacceptable.” Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot., Ex. 29 (November 4, 2003 e-mail from Paula Sullivan to Dr. Princy Kumar). Consequently, on November 19, 2003, the Hospital’s Director of Health Services issued a Statement of Work Status, which indicated that the plaintiff was “not able to perform the essential functions of [her] job” due to her refusal to take the PPD skin test. Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot., Ex. 30 (Statement of Work Status). On that same day, Ellerby mailed the plaintiff a letter informing her that she was suspended without pay as of November 21, 2003, because of her “failure to comply with the health care requirements at Georgetown University Hospital.” Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot., Ex. 31 (November 19, 2003 letter from Debbie Ellerby to LaShawn Lemmons). The letter further stated that the plaintiff had thirty days from the effective date of her suspension to complete all elements of her annual physical clearance or she would be terminated.
On September 22, 2003, before her suspension for refusing to take the PPD skin test, the plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a lawsuit against the defendants in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 30 (Complaint). Following her suspension, the plaintiff retained counsel and filed an amended complaint on May 9, 2004. Am. Compl. at 8. In her amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation under the DCHRA, which “provid[es] for a private right of action against employment discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race, color, sex, national origin and religion,” and Section 1981. Id. Hit 1-2. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants “engaged in a concerted pattern of discrimination and retaliation against her,” which included: (1) reducing her hours, “thus denying [her] the opportunity to continue working in a full-time capacity, causing [her] to lose her health insurance and other benefits”; (2) refusing to allow her to work overtime; (3) demoting her one grade in salary; and (4) telling her “that she was no longer qualified to perform the duties she had been performing satisfactorily for almost three years.” Id. H 21. The plaintiff therefore claims that the defendants “have intentionally engaged in discrimination and retaliation against [her] because of her race and because of her protected activity.” Id. HH26, 29. The plaintiffs amended complaint expressly states that she “refused to take the Mantoux PPD tuberculosis test on religious and medical grounds” and that she was suspended from her employment based on this refusal. Id. HH 21(j)-(k). However, the plaintiff does not specifically set forth a cause of action for religious discrimination in the Statement of Claims section of her amended complaint. See id. HH 24-34.
On May 20, 2005, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs ra
On May 4, 2006, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order which granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Opinion at 32. First, the Court found that the plaintiff “ha[d] completely failed to demonstrate that any of the unfavorable employment decisions alleged in the complaint give rise to an inference of intentional [racial] discrimination.” Id. at 15. Second, the Court found that the plaintiffs retaliation claims “are not based on any activity statutorily protected by the DCHRA or Section 1981.” Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks and, citation omitted). The Court therefore concluded that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination or retaliation and granted summary judgment to the defendants on these claims. See Id. at 13-24, 32. However, the Court also concluded that the plaintiff had articulated a cause of action for religious discrimination under the DCHRA in the amended complaint, based on her representation that she was suspended for refusing to take the PPD skin test despite her stated religious objections. Id. at 24-26; see also id. at 25-26 (concluding “that the plaintiffs complaint, when read as a whole under the liberal pleading standards of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8], provided the defendants with sufficient notice of the plaintiffs claim of religious discrimination under the DCHRA”) (internal quotation marks, bracketing, and citations omitted). Because the parties failed to address this claim in their summary judgment pleadings, id. at 24, and because the plaintiffs federal and constitutional claims had been resolved, id. at 26, the Court remanded this action to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, id. at 26-32.
On May 18, 2006, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs complaint advanced a claim of religious discrimination. Defs.’ Mot. at 1. Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) the plaintiffs amended complaint “does not state a claim for religious discrimination under the Federal Rules,” id. at 8; (2) “[t]he natural narrowing of claims and issues through the pretrial process made clear that [the][p]laintiff was not pursuing a religious discrimination claim,” id. at 6; see also id. at 10 (contending that “[the][p]lain-tiff s subsequent descriptions of her claims in both her Joint Statement of the Case ... [and] her sworn deposition testimony[ ] made it clear that [she] was not bringing a [claim of religious discrimination]”); and (3) to the extent the plaintiff did articulate a religious discrimination claim in her complaint, she “unequivocally abandoned that claim in her deposition,” id. at 9.
On May 31, 2006, having retained new counsel, the plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the Court’s order granting summary judgment as to her claim of retaliation.
II. Standards of Review
The parties disagree as to the precise standard under which their respective motions for reconsideration should properly be evaluated. See Defs.’ Mot. at 5-6; Defs.’ Opp. at 3-4; Pl.’s Reply at 2-4. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs motion, although filed pursuant to Rule 59(e), should be treated as a motion for relief from entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Defs.’ Opp. at 3-4; see also PL’s Reply at 2-4 (disputing the defendants’ contention). The defendants also claim that their own motion for reconsideration is properly brought neither as a Rule 59(e) motion nor a Rule 60(b) motion, but rather as a Rule 54(b) motion for relief from an interlocutory order. Defs.’ Mot. at 5-6. As discussed further below, the Court concludes that both parties’ motions should be denied regardless of whether they are treated as filed under Rule 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b). However, a recitation of each standard is nonetheless appropriate.
Rule 54(b) permits a court to revise or reconsider any order “which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties”—that is, any order of interlocutory judgment—“at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all parties.”
A motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) is also subject to the Court’s discretion and “need not be granted unless the [Court] finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Messina v. Krakower,
Under Rule 60(b), the Court may grant a party relief from an adverse judgment on grounds, inter alia, of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, ... excusable neglect[,] ... [or] newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time [for the filing of a Rule 59 motion].”
Here, the defendants • argue that the Court’s order granting summary judgment as to the plaintiffs racial discrimination and retaliation claims and remanding the plaintiffs religious discrimination claim to the Superior Court is not a final judgment but an interlocutory order. Defs.’ Mot. at 5-6. As such, the defendants contend that their motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order is properly brought pursuant to Rule 54(b), rather than Rules 59(e) or 60(b). Id.; see 12 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.23 (4th ed.2006) (stating that “Rule 60(b) does not govern relief from interlocutory orders, that is to say any orders in which there is something left for the [C]ourt to decide after issuing the order”). The defendants further argue that even if their motion is properly considered under Rules 59(e) or 60(b), it “[njonetheless ... meets [the] requirements of [those rules].”
The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment was filed untimely under Rule 59(e) and should thus be denied or, at the very least, converted into a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment and considered on that basis.
III. Analysis
A. The Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration
The plaintiff proffers two pieces of documentary evidence in support of her motion for reconsideration, both of which purportedly “demonstrate] that [she] did engage in protected activity” sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under the DCHRA and Section 1981.
The plaintiffs arguments are unpersuasive. To begin with, the plaintiff fundamentally misstates the grounds for the grant of summary judgment as to her retaliation claim when she asserts that “the [C]ourt specifically concluded [in its May 2006 opinion] that the retaliation claim failed because there was only one incident of protected activity.” Id. On the contrary, the Court held unambiguously that the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that she has been subjected to a pattern of retaliatory acts because of activity protected under the DCHRA or Section 1981.” Opinion at 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). While the Court did go on to say that “the sole [allegedly] protected activity that the plaintiff identifies in this case is her May 2002 complaint of harassment against her supervisor, Marcia Betaharon,” it was not the quantity but the quality of this alleged activity—specifically, the fact that the May 2002 complaint clearly “[did] not refer to harassment or discrimination based on race or any other protected category recognized by either the DCHRA or Section 1981”—which led the Court to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs retaliation claim. Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Had the plaintiff provided three dozen examples of “protected activity” in the same vein as her May 2002 complaint, the Court’s conclusion would have been no less warranted. See Broderick v. Donaldson,
Moreover, neither document submitted by the plaintiff in support of her motion for reconsideration amounts to anything resembling “new evidence that is likely to change the outcome of the case.” Pl.’s Reply at 7. That is, even if the Court had not already considered the September 2002 memorandum in making its decision, and even if equitable concerns merited an examination of the August 2002 memorandum at this late date, the plaintiff still fails to demonstrate “that she had complained of discrimination based on race, or otherwise engaged in activity protected by the DCHRA or Section 1981[,] before the allegedly retaliatory actions occurred.” Opinion at 24 (emphasis added). The August 2002 memorandum expresses the plaintiffs concerns that she is “being made to go back into a hostile work environment” after complaining of harassment. August 2002 Memo at 1. It further states her belief that “[her] employer is discriminating against [her] and retaliating against [her] for coming forward to report the workplace abuses that [she] suffered.” Id. The memo does not mention race or any other category protected by the DCHRA or Section 1981. See generally id. Indeed, it is entirely backward-looking, referring only to retaliation allegedly incurred as a result of the plaintiffs May 2002 complaint and the subsequent harassment investigation. See generally id. Similarly, the September 2002 memorandum goes into great detail regarding the May 2002 complaint and the subsequent retaliation, see September 2002 Memo at 1 (stating that “after [the plaintiff] filed a complaint in May 2002, [she] experienced retaliation”); id. (stating the plaintiffs belief that the July 2002 requirement that she undergo additional training “was both retaliatory and discriminatory”); id. at 2 (stating that comments made during the meeting at which the plaintiffs May 2002 complaint was medi
B. The Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration
The defendants contend, “[b]ased on facts unknown to the Court at the time,” that the Court should reconsider its conclusion that the plaintiffs amended complaint stated a claim of religious discrimination under the DCHRA. Defs.’ Mot. at 1; see Opinion at 24-26. Specifically, the defendants argue that (1) the plaintiffs complaint fails to provide “a short and plain statement ... giv[ing] the defendant fair notice” of a religious discrimination claim, Defs.’ Mot. at 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); (2) “[the] plaintiffs subsequent descriptions of her claims in both her Joint Statement of the Case ... [and] her sworn deposition testimony[ ] make it clear that [she] was not bringing a [claim of religious discrimination],” id. at 10; and (3) any religious discrimination claim asserted in the complaint was “unequivocally abandoned ... in [the plaintiffs] deposition,” id. at 9. None of the facts submitted by the defendants alter the Court’s conclusion “that the plaintiffs [amended]
“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Dura Pharm., Inc.,
These rules of pleading “are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.” Dura Pharm.,
The liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a) has been made clear in the specific context of religious discrimination claims. As the District of Columbia Circuit has observed, “all that a Title VII complaint has to say to survive dismissal under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) is: ‘The plaintiff was terminated from his job because of his religion.’ ” Ciralsky v. CIA,
Furthermore, the District of Columbia Circuit has recently reemphasized the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome.” Ciralsky,
In Hanson v. Hoffmann, for example, the Circuit held that the plaintiff had stated a claim under the First Amendment even though the complaint itself “did not explicitly do so,” where (1) the plaintiff had made “the basic factual allegation” that her exercise of free speech had led to her dismissal, and (2) “[a] generous reading of her present complaint ... encompass[ed] a free speech claim.” Hanson,
The defendants further argue that “[t]he natural narrowing of claims and issues through the pretrial process”—specifically, the parties’ Joint Statement of the Case and portions of the plaintiffs deposition testimony—“made [it] clear that [the][p]laintiff was not pursuing a religious discrimination claim.” Defs.’ Mot. at 6; see id., Ex. A (Joint Statement of Case) at 1-2 (“Joint Statement”); id., Ex. B (excerpts of August 26, 2004 deposition of LaShawn Lemmons) (“Deposition”). The Joint Statement, which was filed by the parties prior to the initial scheduling conference in this case in accordance with Local Civil Rule 16.3, makes no mention of any claims arising from the plaintiffs religious beliefs. Joint Statement at 1-2; see also LCvR 16.3 (requiring parties to confer prior to a scheduling conference and submit to the Court a report concerning various scheduling issues likely to arise in the litiga
[The][p]laintiff is a Laboratory Technician for the Hospital. She is suing the Hospital for discrimination and retaliation under the [DCHRA] and [Section 1981].... Her claims arise from her assertions that the [defendants retaliated and discriminated against her because of her race and her alleged protected activity of reporting OSHA violations she believed the Hospital was committing in its handling and storage of tuberculosis samples. Id. at 1. In addition, the deposition testimony cited by the defendants purports to demonstrate that the plaintiff intended only to bring a claim for retaliation—and not for religious discrimination—in connection with her 2003 suspension.18 Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot. at 7-8; see Deposition at 208-09, 211. However, it is undisputed that neither the Joint Statement nor the plaintiffs deposition testimony contain any express statement that the plaintiff had chosen to narrow her legal claims by abandoning her cause of action for religious discrimination under the DCHRA, whether by formally amending her complaint or otherwise. See generally Joint Statement; Deposition.
It is true that the pretrial procedures set forth in the Federal Rules are intended “to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues,” Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams,
The Court begins by noting that nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides for the abandonment of an individual legal claim through deposition testimony or joint filings setting
Although the plaintiff cannot technically withdraw or dismiss fewer than all of the claims from her complaint without availing herself of the formal Rule 15 process,
Indeed, in eases where abandonment has occurred, courts have almost uniformly founded such a determination on (1) an explicit and unambiguous statement by the plaintiff that a particular claim was no longer being brought or (2) factual assertions made in discovery, usually during deposition testimony, that contradict or otherwise fatally undermine the factual predicate for one or more of the plaintiffs legal claims as articulated in the complaint. See, e.g., Versarge,
In Cooks v. Potter, for example, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff “had abandoned her claims of race and gender discrimination by conceding when deposed that her reassignment had not been due to her race or gender.” Cooks v. Potter,
Moreover, because “the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the standard by which claims of religious discrimination—particularly those such as the plaintiffs—are to be analyzed under the DCHRA,” Opinion at 27; see also id: at 27-31 (discussing distinction between disparate treatment claims and failure to accommodate claims in District of Columbia law), it remains a novel issue of state law, and thus it is not for this Court to decide, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2000), what statements the plaintiff could have made in her deposition, absent an explicit declaration that she had “abandoned that claim,” Versarge,
IY. Conclusion
In evaluating the parties’ respective motions for reconsideration, the Court is mindful that its discretion to modify or otherwise revisit its prior conclusions is “limited by the law of the case doctrine and subject to the caveat that, where litigants have once battled for the [C]ourt’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Judicial Watch, at 123 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this matter, after carefully reviewing the arguments of both sides, the Court concludes that neither party has presented any compelling reason why its May 4, 2006 Order should be disturbed. The Court therefore denies the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of its grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs retaliation claim. It also denies the defendants’ motion for reconsideration of its conclusion that the plaintiffs amended complaint stated a viable cause of action for religious discrimination under the DCHRA. Further
SO ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2007.
Notes
. Debbie Ellerby is the Administrative Director of the Department of Laboratory Medicine at the Hospital. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 2 (Declaration of Debbie Ellerby) ("Ellerby Decl.”) 111.
. The memorandum opinion is published as Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
. The following papers have been submitted in connection with these motions: (1) Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment ("Defs.' Opp.”); (2) Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment ("Pl.'s Reply”); (3) Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment (“Pl.'s Opp.”); and (4) Defendants' Reply in Further Support of Their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's May 4, 2006 Order ("Defs.’ Reply”).
. The plaintiff currently works as a part-time accessioning technologist in the Hospital's Chemistry Laboratory. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.’ Sum. Judg. Mot.”), Ex. 2 (Declaration of Debbie Ellerby) ("Ellerby Decl.”) 11112, 11. Previously, the plaintiff had been employed as a part-time laboratory technologist in both tire Chemistry and Microbiology Laboratories. Id. HH 4-5, 10. The difference between the laboratory technologist positions and the accessioning technologist position is explored in the Court’s prior opinion. Opinion at 2-5; see also Ellerby Decl. 11114-10.
. Dissatisfied with the Hospital’s lack of response, the plaintiff then contacted the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA”) and again expressed her concerns regarding the TB samples. Am. Compl. 1119. According to the plaintiff, as a result of her complaint to the OSHA, "the matter was investigated, and the TB samples were returned to the proper negative pressure incubator.” Id. 1120.
. Specifically, the first letter states that (1) under the tenets of the plaintiffs church, "[t]he injection into the body of medication or other matter or substance that defy natural law” is sacrilegious, and (2) because ”[t]he Mantoux Test is an intradermal injection of tuberculin,” it is specifically forbidden. Defs.' Sum. Judg. Mot., Ex. 27. The second letter confirms that the plaintiff is a member of the Congregation of Universal Wisdom and reiterates that “[n]o member of the Congregation shall have injected, ingested, or infused into the body any foreign materials of unhealthy or unnatural composition.” Defs.' Sum. Judg. Mot., Ex. 28.
. As discussed in the Court’s prior opinion, there is little indication in the record whether, or when, the plaintiff ultimately submitted to the PPD skin test and was reinstated from her suspension. Opinion at 9.
. The plaintiff's opposition was accompanied by 189 pages of exhibits and supporting material. See Table of Exhibits in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition at 1.
. The defendants also contend, albeit in cursory fashion, that the plaintiff's religious beliefs are "not bona fide.” Defs.' Mot. at 9 n. 2. The plaintiff disputes this contention. Pl.'s Opp. at 9-10. However, because the proper inquiry at this time is whether the amended complaint "provide[s] the defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's [religious discrimination] claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
. The plaintiff does not challenge the Court's grant of summary judgment as to her discrimination claims.
. The denial of a motion to dismiss, for example, may properly be revisited by the Court pursuant to Rule 54(b) upon request of the moving party. See Ogunfiditimi v. McDonald Corp., Civ. No. 04-7015,
. The catchall provision of Rule 60(b) also authorizes relief from a judgment for "any other l'eason” for which such relief is justified. Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). This provision applies only to "extraordinary circumstances” not otherwise covered in Rule 60(b), Plant v. Spendthrift Farm,
. The defendants do not elaborate.
. The defendants contend that because the Court issued its order granting summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff's racial discrimination and retaliation claims on May 10, 2006, the plaintiffs May 31, 2006 motion to alter or amend judgment was filed outside of the ten-day period prescribed by Rule 59(e). Defs.’ Opp. at 3. The plaintiff responds that her motion was timely filed under the computation of time provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6. Pl.’s Reply at 2-3. The plaintiff further states that she is entitled to relief even if the Court were to treat her motion to alter or amend judgment as filed under Rule 60(b) rather than Rule 59(e). Id. at 8.
. For the first time in her reply, the plaintiff also argues that her motion for reconsideration should be granted due to "an intervening change of controlling law.” Messina,
. To the extent that the plaintiff might claim that her November 2003 suspension was in retaliation for allegations of racial discrimination made in her September 2002 memorandum, such a claim must fail. Not only has the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence suggesting a causal connection between the memorandum and the suspension, see generally Am. Compl.; PL's Mot.; PL's Reply, but the lack of "close temporal proximity” between the two events itself essentially forecloses an inference of causation strong enough to state a prima facie retaliation claim. Holcomb v. Powell,
. Notably, the defendants do not contend that the plaintiff has abandoned all claims relating to this suspension. See, e.g., Defs.' Sum. Judg. Mot. at 23 (arguing that "[the][p]laintiff's retaliation and discrimination claims based on her 2003 suspension for refusing to take her PPD test are the only timely DCHRA claims alleged in her Amended Complaint”).
. The plaintiff disputes the defendants’ contention that her statements during the deposition could be construed, even implicitly, as an abandonment of her claim of religious discrimination. PL’s Opp. at 6-9. Instead, the plaintiff asserts that in her deposition testimony, she “explained her religious beliefs, her efforts to obtain an accommodation for her religious beliefs, and how she believed the requirement that she take the PPD test violated her religious beliefs.” Id. at 6. As further discussed below, in the absence of an express statement during the deposition that the plaintiff was abandoning her religious discrimination claim, it is unnecessary to delve into the patchAork deposition record provided by both sides to assess the truth and accuracy of the parties’ respective representations. At the very least, however, it is clear from the deposition that the defendants never asked the plaintiff directly whether she was bringing a religious discrimination claim, nor did she expressly indicate that she was no longer articulating a cause of action based on religious discrimination. See generally Deposition; ' cf. Jones v. HSBC Bank USA, Civ. No. 00-532A,
. The only other avenue under the Federal Rules by which fewer than all claims may be dismissed from a complaint is pursuant to the involuntary dismissal provision of Rule 41(b). However, while the Court has discretion to deem that Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate if a plaintiff has failed to prosecute a given claim, this is an extreme remedy which is employed “only after less dire alternatives have been explored without success.” Gardner v. United States,
. This is true even if the plaintiff now represented to the Court that she intended at the time to seek leave to amend her complaint in this manner, which, of course, she does not.
. Although all of the plaintiffs other claims have now been dismissed, her complaint consisted of multiple claims at the time the events occurred that the defendants now assert amounted to an abandonment of her claim of religious discrimination.
. An Order consistent with the Court's ruling accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.