467 A.2d 439 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1983
This action has been brought against the defendants, Surrendra K. Chawla, Joseph P. Sappington and Saint Francis Hospital, for alleged malpractice which resulted in the death of the plaintiff's decedent, Fred H. Leland. The first three counts of the complaint assert a cause of action for wrongful death in favor of the plaintiff as administratrix of his estate. The fourth count, which incorporates all of the allegations of the first three counts, states that "[a]s a further result of said incidents," the plaintiff, individually, as the wife of the decedent, "was, and in the future will be, deprived of the moral and financial support, care, companionship, society, affection, and consortium of her husband, the decedent, Fred H. Leland."
The defendants Saint Francis Hospital and Chawla have moved to strike the fourth count of the complaint because the plaintiff "has no cause of action as an individual for any damages resulting from the death of her husband. . . ." The plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that she has stated a separate common law cause of action for loss of consortium which is "separate from, and in addition to, any cause of action which is possessed by her husband or his estate" under §
In Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital,
Under the common law, death was not a recoverable element of damages. Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc.,
It is only by virtue of §
Under our statute, damages are not measured in terms of the loss sustained by the decedent's survivors.Chase v. Fitzgerald,
A recent decision of the Supreme Court indicates that the Hopson decision has not yet effected any changes in the legal principles governing actions for wrongful death. In Keogh v. Bridgeport,
Loss of consortium is a loss suffered by a survivor of the decedent and, therefore, damages for this loss are generally not recoverable under a wrongful death statute that compensates the estate's loss or the losses suffered by the decedent. Comment, "Wrongful Death and Loss of Consortium in Connecticut," 14 Conn. L. Rev. 631, 639 (1982). Conversely, most states which measure damages by the loss sustained by the beneficiaries permit recovery for loss of consortium either by express statutory provision or by judicial construction.Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,
It seems clear that the court decisions which have refused to allow claims for loss of consortium in wrongful death actions are consistent with the historical development of the right of action for wrongful death in this state. See comment, supra, 632-34. So long as the exclusive remedy for wrongful death in Connecticut is statutory, "[a] consistent line of cases, and the statutory language itself, prohibit the surviving spouse from maintaining a cause of action for loss of consortium under section
This court recognizes that the underlying policy considerations supporting compensation for loss of consortium, as enunciated in Hopson, provide persuasive reasons for effecting a change in the law with respect to wrongful death cases. As the author of the above-cited law review comment suggests, however, any such modification should be initiated by the legislature, either through an amendment of §
For the foregoing reasons, this court declines the plaintiff's invitation to recognize a common law cause of action on behalf of the surviving spouse for permanent loss of consortium due to the wrongful death of his or her marital partner because "[a]ny cause of action or, indeed, remedy predicated upon the loss of one's spouse must be founded in statutory authority." SeeLiff v. Schildkrout,
Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike the fourth count of the plaintiff's complaint is granted.