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Leis v. Flynt
439 U.S. 438
SCOTUS
1979
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*1 438 FLYNT

LEIS v. еt al. et al. January 15, 1979 Decided 77-1618.

No. Curiam. Per of Pleas Common of Court of the judges Petitioners, County prosecutor, Hamilton Ohio, and County, Hamilton of Court States United of decision relief seek upheld Appeals of Court Circuit. the Sixth Appeals prosecu- further forbids injunction Court District a Federal Inc., Magazine, Hustler Flynt and Larry respondents of tion are Paul Cambria Fahringer and Herald respondents until hac pro appear applications hearing tendered Hustler Flynt and of on behalf Pleas of Common in the the asserted contend Petitioners Magazine. court vice in appear lawyer to an out-of-state Due by the protected interests those among fall does we Because Amendment. Fourteenth Process Clause for certiorari petition grant we contention, this with agree Circuit.1 Sixth judgment reverse principles violates injunctiоn contend also Petitioners Harris, S. 37 Younger 401 U. v. decisions in our embodied abstention City Douglas (1951); and Minard, U. S. (1971); Stefanelli disposition of our (1943). Because Jeannette, U. S. that issue. unnecessary to consider case, it think we merits Flynt and Hustler Magazine were indicted on February 8, 1977, for multiple violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.31 *2 (1975), which prohibits the dissemination of harmful material to minors. At the arraignment on February 25, local counsel Flynt and Hustler presented an entry of counsel form listed Fahringer and Cambria as counsel for both defendants. Neither lawyer was admitted to practice law in Ohio.2 The form was the one used by members of the Ohio Bar, and it neither constituted an application for admission pro hac vice nor alerted the court that Fahringer and Cambria were not to practice admitted in Ohio. The judge presiding the arraignment routinely endorsed the form but took no othеr action with respect to the two out-of-state lawyers.3 practice The of law in governed Ohio is by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (1977), §4705.01 provides which pertinent part: person “No shall permitted practice as an.attorney and counselor at law, or to commence, conduct, or any defend action or proceeding in which he is not a party concerned, either using or subscribing name, his own or the name another person, he unless has been admitted to the bar order of supreme court in compliance prescribed with its published and rules.” I, Rule 8 (C), of § the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio determines when attorneys out-of-state may-appear pro hac vice in Ohio courts: “Admission Without Examination. “(C) An applicant under this section shall not engage in the

law in this prior state filing application. his To do so cоnstitutes the unauthorized practice of and law will result in a applica- denial of the tion. This paragraph (C) does not apply to participation by a non- resident of Ohio in a cause being litigated in this state when such participa- tion is with leave judge hearing such cause.” 3The District Court found that Fahringer and appeared Cambria had on Flynt behalf of Magazine Hustler in other criminal proceedings before the Hamilton County Court of Pleas, Common apparently being without required to do more they than did here. 434 Supp. (SD Ohio Judge of course a matter transferred as case was indictment him another active before who had Morrissey, and Cambria Fahringer Magazine. Hustler Flynt against him or vice to pro hac application admission no made 9 Judge March pretrial conference At a judge. other lawyer neither out-of-state counsel that Morrissey local advised Magazine. Flynt or Hustler represent be allowed to would Mor- Judge before appeared person and Cambria Fahringer April 8, where hearing on motions first time at a rissey for the defendants. representing they expressed Respond- request. summarily Morrissey dismissed Judge Supreme in the mandamus action commenced a ents then *3 They also admission. the overturn denial seeking to Court Judge to remove prejudice seeking of bias filed affidavit the court The Ohio Morrissey the case. dismissed stating Morrissey, Judge did remove but action mandamus trial prejudice, of bias it no evidence found that while appearance of the would avoid even judge different before a Supreme the Ohio judge ruled that The new trial impropriety. deny him to action bound of the mandamus Court’s dismissal Flynt and represent permission Fahringer and Cambria with them to work he did both of but allow Magazine, Hustler case. preparing counsel the in-state Dis- in the United States filed suit Respondents next further enjoin of Ohio to for the District Southern trict explain why lawyer did not might prior experience local 1977). This not Fahringer and were admitted Cambria alert the court that Judge’s first Ohio, indicate endorsement it not but does appearance. more, pro hac vice leave for a entry form, constituted without Fahringer the manner in found that which Although District Court comported the “cus- with sought appearance leave for an and Cambria ibid., court, finding that these tomary” it made no procedures of the procedures any explanation of these lawyers justifiably relied on official -they actually leave ground believing had received or had other appear. of the court to

441 prosecution of the criminal until case the state court trial a hearing held on the application. contested hac vice The court ruled lawyers’ representing Flynt and Hustler Magazine was constitutionally protected property right petitioners which infringed had without according lawyers procedural process. due 434 Supp. (1977). 481 prosecution Further Flynt Maga- Hustler zine enjoined therefore was petitioners until tendered Fah- ringer and requested Cambria the hearing. The Circuit Sixth affirmed, holding lawyers could be denied the privilege of appearing pro hac meaningful vice “without a hearing, application reasonably legal clear standard and the statement of a rational basis exclusion.” 574 F. 2d (1978). 879 874,

As this Court has observed on numerous occasions, Constitution does property not create interests. Rather it extends procedural various safeguards to certain interests “that independent stem from an source such as law.” state Board Regents Roth, 408 U. 564, (1972); S. see Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Memphis Graft, U. 1,S. (1978); Wood, Bishop v. 341, (1976); S. Paul v. U. Davis, 424 U. S. 419 U. S. 709-710 (1976); Lopez, Goss v. 565, 572-574 (1975); Perry Sindermann, 408 U. S. (1972). n. 7 Appeals The Court of evidently believed that lawyer’s an out-of-state *4 appearing interest in in pro hac vice an Ohio court stems some independent such source. It cited no authority state-law for this however, and proposition, indeed noted that “Ohio specific has no regarding standards pro admissions . . . .” 574 F. at 879. 2d, Rather the court prevalence referred to the of practice hac vice in American courts and history instances in our where counsel appearing pro hac vice distinguished have rendered service. question We do not practice that the of in courts most States is to allow an lawyer out-of-state the privilegе of appearing upon motion, especially when he is associated with a member of and high mobility bar, In of the local bar. view of the practice perhaps this is a specialization, the trend toward also by either right granted But it is encouraged. to be not founding or the Constitution. Since statute has been lawyers licensing regulation and Republic, of Columbia exclusively and the District to the States left prescribe respective jurisdictions. The States within standards and the qualifications admission to They responsible are conduct. also professional lawyers.4 discipline of enforceable, to be law,

A claim of under state entitlement through legal rule or must derived from statute Perry, at 601- mutually explicit understanding. supra, See an indication that The record here is devoid Ohio, lawyer may claim an out-of-state entitlement Spanos dissenting heavily v. Skouras opinion The relies on dictum in 1966). Corp., (CA2 that case were Theatres 364 F. 2d 161 The facts of holding quite here, precise the court was different from those and the sought a client to defend on the narrow. The court ruled that where attorney’s fee, ground illegality against an action for his out-of-state entirely illegality stemmed from the failure of the client’s where attorney attorneys appear in-state to obtain leave for the out-of-state Court, escape from the Federal District the client not be allowed to would Id., through 168-169. The balance of the contract his own default. at opinion, privileges and immunities clause which declared that “under prohibit of the Constitution no state can a citizen with a federal claim lawyer engaging or defense from an out-of-state to collaborate with lawyer concerning id., give legal state,” it in-state advice within rejected limited, entirely, if at must be considered to have been by (1975). Beatty, & Western R. Co. v. 423 U. S. Norfolk dissenting opinion suggests having that a client’s also out-of- Post, implicated 445-446, state counsel is decision. n. 2. The below, however, court “did not reach the issue of whether the constitutional rights Flynt Magazine violated,” and Hustler ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‍had also been 574 F. 2d (CA6 1978), recognizing injunction as it did that a federal-court enjoining prosecution ground a state criminal on a that could be asserted proceeding the defendant in the state would conflict with this Court’s Younger holding Harris, (1971). U. S. 37 *5 where the rules of the Supreme Court expressly consign the authority to approve hac vice appearance discretion of the trial court. 2, N. Even supra. if, as the Court of Appeals believed, respondents Fahringer and Cam- bria had expectations “reasonablе of professional service,” 574 F. 2d, at they have not shown the requisite under- mutual standing they permitted would be represent clients in any particular case in the Ohio specu- courts. The lative claim that Fahringer’s and Cambria’s reputation might suffer as the result of the denial of their asserted right cannot by itself make out an injury to a constitutionally protected interest. There simply was no deprivation here of some right previously held under state law. Id., at 708-709.

Nor is there a basis for the argument the interest appearing pro hac vice has its source in federal law. See Paul Davis, supra, at 699-701. There is no origin federal permits lawyers appear in state courts without meeting that bar State’s admission requirements. This Court, on several occasions, has sustained state bar rules that excluded out-of-state practice counsel from alto gether or on a case-by-case basis. See & Western Norfolk R. Co. v. Beatty, 423 U. S. 1009 (1975), summarily aff’g 400 F. Supp. (SD Ill.); Brown v. Supreme Court Virginia, 414 U. S. 1034 (1973), summarily aff’g 359 F. Supp. (ED Va.). Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 343- 345 (1975). These decisions recognize that the Constitu tion does not require that because a lawyer has been admitted to the bar of one State, he or she must be allowed in another. See Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A. 2d 889, appeal dismissed want of substantial federal question, 358 U. S. 52 (1958). Accordingly, because Fahringer and Cambria did possess a cognizable property within the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution does not obligate the Ohio courts to accord them procedural process due in passing on their application permission *6 appear pro Common Pleas Court of vice before the hac County.5 Hamilton judgment granted, petition is certiorari

The writ lawyer’s argues that a dissenting opinion MR. The SteveNS Justice . . . calling protected the Due Process Clause right “pursu[e] his post, him, at 445. the State that licensed he the border” of when crosses “reinforce” “protected” interests that identifies two Mr. Justice SteveNS pro in hac These are said to be “the 'nature’ of the each other. inhering 'implicit promise’ in Ohio custom.” vice admissions [and] Post, at 456. “discharg- lawyer’s first is described as that of these “interests” justice

ing responsibility in our for the fair administration of [his] adversary system.” is, the Post, important as this interest at 453. As lawyer practice right suggestion that the Constitution assures the of a by any authority every one, supported in court of is a State novel right brought attention. flies in the face of to our Such asserted authority traditional be admitted to of state courts to control who supra; Beatty, B. Co. v. before them. See & Western Norfolk Enforcement, Special Disciplinary Prob- ABA Committee on Evaluation of (Final Disciplinary and Enforcement 13-14 lems Recommendations 1970). accepted, Draft If the constitutional rule advanced the dissent- ing opinion prevent hac would those States that have chosen to bar all see, g., appearances continuing so, vice e. Cal. Bus. & Prof. to do (West 1978); Supp. Code Ann. 1974 and under- would §§ policy reciprocity mine the of those States which do not extend to out-of- lawyers, see, g., Sup. (c) I; state e. Ariz. Ct. Rule 28 Fla. Rules of Sup. Relating Bar, I, Ct. to Admissions to the Art. 1.§ ground process protection

The second dissent- for due identified in the ing opinion “implicit promise” past practice is the inherent in Ohio’s “assur[ing] they practitioners out-of-state are welcome Ohio’s Post, courts. . . .” recall that a We no other claim constitu- by estoppel merely wholly tional can be created —as if because a — exрressly discretionary privilege ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‍granted generously state has been past. courts, setting in the That some the standards for admission jurisdiction, required within their showing denying have of cause before appear pro provides leave to support proposition no for the imposes requirement the Constitution this “cause” on state courts that reject have chosen to it.

of the Sixth reversed, Circuit is and the case is remanded proceedings further opinion. consistent with this

It is so ordered. grant Me. Justice White would certiorari and case set the argument. for oral

Me. Justice Stevens, with whom Me. Justice Beennan *7 and Me. Justice Maeshall dissenting. join, lawyer’s

A by interest in his pursuing protected is calling the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth The Amendment.1 question presented by lawyer this case is whether a abandons protection that when he crosses the border of the State which issued practice. his license to

The Court holds lawyer constitutionally pro- that a has no tected in practice. interest his In the view, out-of-state its lawyer interest of the is so trivial no obli- judge a has gation give any to of a consideration whatsoever to the merits pro vice request, lawyer any hac or to give opportunity advance reasons in support application. of his The Court’s square is holding Due Four- Process Clause simply teenth Amendment apply does not to this kind of by ruling a state judge.2 trial 1 Konigsberg Bar, 252; v. State 353 U. Schware Board Bar S.

Examiners, 232, 238-239, 353 U. S. and 5.n. 2 Although it, the Court does presents not address this case also question by representation whether a defendant’s interest nonresident any counsel is entitled protection. clients, constitutional The as well as lawyers, parties litigation. are Moreover, judge to this trial perfectly ruling defendants, made it clear that his was directed at the and mеrely striking appearances Fahringer their counsel. After Cambria, judge the trial stated: you then, Flynt. “I will tell Mr. 2d case is set for the [T]he May, only thing you having 1977. . . . The is that will be restricted to attorney that’s admitted to in the State Ohio.” Tr. of premises holding briefly for this can be stated. A lawyer no of either or right, nonresident has as a matter state appear federal in an law, Ohio court. Absent mutual explicit enforceable based on an rule or entitlement, understanding, lawyer’s interest making may grant is appearance “privilege” a mere that Ohio judges. withhold the unrestrained discretion of individual lawyer protection The conclusion that a has no constitutional against capricious major- exclusion so seems obvious Proceedings County, Ohio, Court, in Common Pleas Hamilton in No. Apr. 8, 1977, p. (emphasis added). B77-0341 on adequate representation “perhaps A defendant’s interest in is his most important Alabama, privilege” protected the Constitution. Poweü v. scope lawyer’s practicing U. S. 70. Whatever the of a Friendly surely be, Judge stating in other States correct in representation by the client’s interest in out-of-state counsel is entitled protection: some measure of constitutional persuaded, however, are “We that where a has been conferred law, guarantee against federal abridgment citizens the constitutional its necessary appropriate must be read to include what is for its asser- *8 age specialization mobility In an high bar, tion. of increased of the comprehend bring attorney this must to to the of an assistance lawyer any admitted in 'public the resident state a licensed act’ of thought task, other state who is fitted for best and to allow him to effective, only in subject serve whatevеr manner is most rules to valid City courts as Hattiesburg, to before them. Cf. Lefton v. 333 280, (5 1964). Indeed, F. 2d 285 Cir. in instances where the federal claim unpopular, is lawyer advice and assistance defense an out-of-state only Spanos be the means available for vindication.” v. Skouras Corp., (en banc) (CA2 1966). Theatres 2d dispute capricious In this case is no there about the character of the Notwithstanding Ohio court’s action. professional unblemished ca Fahringer reers of and Cambria —in Ohio and elsewhere—their adherence application procedures they to the successfully same had followed past, familiarity and their demonstrated with the issues involved in the litigation, Judge Morrissey pro appear refused to allow them to hac vice. full, Judge Morrissey

In Fahringer ruled: “Mr. and Mr. Cambria attorneys try are not of record in this permitted case and will not be Aрr. 8, 1977, supra, this case.” Tr. of at 3. shows, So far as the record ity argument question of the is unnecessary. Summary reversal is the order day.

A years few ago repudiated syllogism a similar which had long supported the conclusion parolee that a has no constitutionally protected status.4 Accepting his this was the second official action respect taken with to the applications of Fahringer and first, Rupert Cambria. In the Judge A. Doan, presided Flynt’s who arraignment, designating two issued orders lawyers both counsel “of record” in case B77-0341, eventually No. the case assigned Judge Morrissey for (E) trial. According to Rule 10 of the- Rules of Local Practice of the Court of Pleas, Common County, Hamilton Ohio, under Judges which Morrissey Doan and operating, were once a designation order filed, attorney “such attorney shall become of rec- ord . . . and pеrmitted shall not be except upon withdraw written motion good and for cause Despite shown.” (E), Rule 10 objection no appearance Fahringer Cambria, any argument nor either for or against request, was heard in advance of ruling. point the final In of fact, nothing in the record legitimate identifies a judge’s for the reason action. The record suggest, does and in holding case the Court’s broad certainly would encompass, explanation one Judge Morrissey’s unusual ruling, hardly but it can legitimate. characterized as This is an obscenity case. Conceivably Judge Morrissey strong has about the views distribution of pornographic lawyers materials minors and about who specialize defending activity. Perhaps these are not the kind of lawyers that he wants practicing in Judge his courtroom. Morrissey That reportedly referred to Fahringer as a “fellow of pomographers traveler” is at least consistent speculations. with these Post, Cincinnati Feb. 1977, p. Indeed, denying after respondents’ request Judge to have Morrissey removed from the case bias, Supreme Court of Ohio explanation without ordered that judge another County of the Hamilton Court of try Common Pleas the case. syllogism That had its adherents well into century. Curtis See Bennett, 351 F. 2d 931, (CA8 quoted 1965), Morrissey Brewer, *9 (CA8 F. 2d 1971): parole “A is a grace, matter of not a right. vested . . . is left to the [Discretion States as to the manner and upon terms paroles which granted be and proc revoked. due Federal ess require does not parole that a predicated revocation be upon notice and opportunity to be Hyser heard.” See also Reed, App. U. S. D. 254, 266, C. 318 F. 2d 225, 237 (1963), cert. denied sub nom. Jamison his preserve “right” no parolee has the premise the concluded that the nevеrtheless liberty, the Court contingent prom- “implicit the with State’s status, coupled of his nature was sufficient arbitrarily, be revoked it would ise” Brewer, 408 Morrissey v. protection. constitutional require hardly it “is observed, As the Court 481-482.5 U. S. in terms of problem try to deal with this any longer to useful ” Id., a 'privilege.’ a or liberty 'right’ parolee’s the whether deal try to futile to equally it is my In judgment, at of whether in terms by this case problem presented with the on an calling is based lawyer’s a pursuit of the out-of-state “entitlement” rather than an “explicit,” or “enforceable” nature the examine we should “privilege.” Instead, so-called made has promise Ohio activity implicit and the the petitioners. these

I arbitrary and judge has that a state trial The notion lawyer permission to nonresident power unlimited to refuse a bygone of a a remnant nothing but in his courtroom is appear Board in re- (“In the Parole Chappell, a real sense 375 U. S. 957 withdrawing privilege from an parent voking parole occupies role of the privilege”). the punishment but for misuse of errant child not as interest, ‘weight’ the question merely individual’s is not “The contemplation of one the nature the interest is within whether but . . Amendment. . 'liberty property’ language of the Fourteenth parole promise will implicit parolee has relied at least “The on many parole In only up conditions. if to live he fails revoked parole is revoked. cases, parolee lengthy incarceration ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‍if his faces indeterminate, liberty although see, therefore, parolee, of a that the “We liberty unqualified its many termination of the core values includes hardly It is parolee and on others. ‘grievous loss’ often inflicts a try problem in terms whether longer to deal with this useful By name, liberty ‘right’ ‘privilege.’ whatever parolee’s is a or a protection liberty be seen as within is valuable must orderly process, calls some Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination S., 481-482. informal.” U. however *10 era. Like body of rules governed that once parole, the nature of practice law has undergone a metamorphosis during the past century. Work that was once the province exclusive of the lawyer is performed now by title real companies, estate brokers, corporate trust departments, and accountants. Rules of ethics that once insulated the local lawyer from competition are now by forbidden the Sherman Act6 and First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.7 Inter- state law practice and multistate law firms are common- now place.8 questions Federal regularly arise in state criminal trials permeate the typical lawyer’s practice. Because the assertion of federal claims or defenses is often unpopular, 6Because the “transactions which create the need particular for the legal question services in frequently are transactions,” interstate practice of law is regarded now as a activity commercial subject to the strictures the Sherman Virginia Act. Bar, State 421 U. S. Ooldfarb 773, 783-784. 7Lawyers now have a constitutional to advertise “sig because nificant societal interests are served speech.” Bates v. Bar State Arizona, 433 350, U. S. 8 “Multistate or practice interstate by attorneys country in this is an expanding phenomenon. published While no quantitative specifically data support assertion, variety a of established or verifiable facts exist that make virtually inference indisputable. First is the increased mobility ... legal problem-solvers, problem-bringers and hence the legal problems themselves. Second, outgrowth of the first set of facts is the increasing degree of uniformity of our laws, point to a where we are commonly now confronted with model codes, uniform acts, state federal practice (often rules copied by states) and similar pro substantive and cedural developments. Third, partly response to the first two sets of partly facts and a reflection of growing general complexity of our society, gradual is the change in the character of law generalist skill to an increasingly specialized one; hence emergence lawyers regarded and operating as specialists . . . . . . equipped cope problems with jurisdictional transcend boundaries legal and the competence generalists.” of local Brаkel Loh, & Regulating the Multi state Law, Practice Wash. L. Rev. (1975) (footnote 699-700 omitted). See also 19 Stan. L. (1967). Rev. lawyer may be the by an out-of-state assistance “advice and *11 spe- “increased for vindication.” only means available consequence today’s Bar is a mobility” of high cialization and services legal demand for in the change of the dramatic century. past during occurred has appear- of importance History attests Appeals, for Court of writing Judge Merritt, ances. As explained: our many in of lawyers appeared have

“Nonresident Hamilton, Andrew example, For celebrated cases. most Peter John bar, defended Philadelphia a leader most America’s in in colonial York New Zenger ap- Clarence Darrow freedom-of-speech case. famous unpopular of an many plead the cause peared in states trial Tennessee including Scopes the famous client, out-of-state law- well-known, opposed he another where lawyers Bryan. Jennings Great William yer, Evans Daniel to Charles Alexander Hamilton and Webster for admitted specially were Hughes and John Davis W. A in other states. small important the trial of cases inspired and hac vice lawyers appearing pro group In a stages. early rights movement its initiated the civil South, throughout brought in courts series of cases Mot- Constance lawyers Thurgood Marshall, out-of-state appointments ley before Spottswood Robinson, developed legal principles which to the federal bench, gave rights to the civil movement. rise for this tradition. a number of reasons

“There are society’ our mobility and the ‘The demands business American Bar Association given are the reasons Resрonsibility. the Code of Professional Canon 3 of limitations’ discourages Canon ‘territorial That 9Spanos Corp., 2d, at 170. Skouras Theatres 10Ibid. law, including trial practice. There are other

reasons in addition to business reasons. A client may want particular a lawyer particular a kind of case, and a lawyer may want to take the case because of the skill required. Often, as in the case Andrew Hamilton, Darrow, Bryan Thurgood .and lawyer par- Marshall, a ticipates in a case out of justice. sense He feel of duty sense to defend an unpopular defendant and in this way give expression to his own moral sense. These important are values, lawyers both and clients, and should not be arbitrarily.” denied 2dF. (CA6 878-879 1978) (footnotes omitted).11 *12 The modern examples by identified Judge Merritt, though more illustrious typical than the pro hac vice appearancе, are not rare exceptions to general a custom of excluding nonresi- dent lawyers from practice. local On the contrary, appear- by ances out-of-state counsel have been routine throughout the country for at quarter least a of century.12 a The custom is so well recognized that, Judge Friendly as in 1966, observed there “is slightest not the reason suppose” to qualified a that lawyer’s pro hac vice request will be denied.13

This case involves a application by qualified legal specialists;14 legitimate no reason denying 11 Judge See also Soper’s Ades, discussion in re Supp. 467, In 6 F. (Md. 1934). 475-476 supra Loh, 12 Brakel & 8, 702, 9; n. Note, Attorneys: and n. Inter state and Practice, Federal 1711, 80 Harv. L. (1967). Rev. 1716 13Spanos v. Skouras Corp., supra, Theatres at 168. 14Both Fahringer and Cambria are York, members of the Bar of New specialize who obscenity defense and lаw. In criminal the former received the Outstanding Practitioner of the Year award from the New York State Bar Association. The latter received legal his education in Ohio University at the of graduated Toledo Law School where he first in his class. school, While law he was admitted of Ohio State as legal practiced intern and Municipal as such in the Prosecutor’s office in Toledo. 452 retained had been They by the record.15 suggested

request is be might that trial litigant unpopular to defend classic It is and attitudes.16 prejudices by local affected be served justice would the interests in which situation his by counsel represented to be the defendant allowing choice. merely is to vindicate lawyers seek these interest attempt every individual’s that motivates goal pecuniary profession’s It calling.17 his pursue Cam- [Fahringer and against disciplinary actiоn any “No evidence Court, there nor is presented has been by any bar association

bria] are contemplated. Both presently action is to believe reason persons qualified representation in the and experienced competent, 1977). (SD Ohio Supp. charged crimes.” with “War, The entitled Flynt’s publication respondent charged that Ann. contrary youth Ohio Rev. Code Obscenity,” is harmful Real Federal based on the are Among his defenses several (1975). §2907.31 vagueness over- and is “void 2907.31 He claims § Constitution. and publication on the impermissible prior restraint breadth, imposfes] an Amend by the First and Fourteenth protected of materials circulation relation or reasonable Constitution,” “bears no rational and ments Preliminary Per Complaint for legitimate interest.” ship to a state Act. C-T-77- Declaratory Judgment, in Civ. No. Injunction manent (SD pp. 19-21. Ohio, 14,1977), June people, there can be no doubt for a 'free In a Constitution Regents Roth, ‘liberty’ indeed.” Board must broad meaning *13 “liberty” protected 564, Although the boundaries of 572. 408 U. S. surveyed, conclusively it been have never by Amendment the Fourteenth bodily merely they freedom from encompass “not [the] is clear that specific provisions Constitu of the rights conferred restraint” and “ long ‘privileges Nebraska, 390, 399, but also the Meyer 262 U. S. tion, v. orderly pursuit happi of to the as essential recognized at common law ” quoting Meyer ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‍651, 673, v. Ingraham Wright, U. v. 430 S. ness.’ Organization Families, Foster Smith supra, v. Nebraska, at 399. See specific privileges right Among is “the to hold 816, those 431 U. S. McElroy, v. profession," Greene follow a chosen and to private employment v. Board of law.” Schware including practice “the 492, 360 U. S. S., at 238. Examiners, 353 U. Bar denial of rely fact that way on the in no Fahringer and Cambria

453 discharging its responsibility for thе fair administration of justice in our system. adversary The nature of that surely worthy of the protection afforded the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II In the past, Ohio implicitly has prac- assured out-of-state titioners they that are welcome in Ohio’s courts unless there is a valid, articulable reason for them. excluding Although the Ohio Supreme Court respondents’ dismissed petition for an extraordinary writ of mandamus it not case, this has dispelled that because assurance it did purport pass merits their my claim.18 In opinion the assur- State’s ance is adequate to create interest that qualifies “prop- as erty” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.

The District Court found as a fact judges that Ohio trial routinely permit out-of-state counsel appear pro vice.19 regular This pursuant is conducted Rules the Supreme Ohio,20 Ohio’s Code Professional applications their “might make them somewhat less attractive” to clients and might compromise otherwise Bishop professional reputations. Cf. Wood, 426 U. S. 348-350. only The record of Supreme the Ohio Court’s actions in this is a case journal notation it was “dismissed.” The record indicates petitioners argued to the Supreme Court in their written submissions that the court could not extraordinary entertain an writ in this matter but respondents’ remedy lay post-trial in a appeal assuming Flynt was — newly convicted. assigned judge Flynt’s case, only trial Ohio court of which we are interpreted aware that has Supreme the Ohio Court’s matter, actions concluded that the dismissal not on the was respondents’ merits of claim of a explanation to an being before denied admission. It instead concluded that “apparently claim is an you issue that will have to resolvе appellate normal procedures if and when opportunity presents May 10, itself.” Tr. of 1977, p. 16. Supp., at 483. Ross, See State App. 185, 188, 2d 304 N. E. 2d 396, (1973), denied, cert. 415 U. S. 904. I, Rule (C), Supreme § Court of Ohio Rules for the Govern ment of the Bar of Ohio “participation by allows a nonresident of Ohio *14 leading and a court,22 local rules of each Responsibility,21 that criteria identifying Appeals of Ohio opinion the hac pro on acting in discretion judge’s a trial inform should an true that unquestionably While it applications.23 determining whether in discretion has broad judge trial Ohio it court, in appear his lawyers to nonresident not to allow give practice rules, precedents, true that is also exer expectation unequivocal lawyers an out-of-state reasons.24 permissible based be discretion will of that cise is with participation litigated in this state when being in a cause hearing such сause.” judge leave recognizes the Responsibility Professional Code of of Ohio’s Canon 3 ability pursue attorneys to many modern indispensability to state lines: interests across clients’ unreasonably discourage regulation legal profession should

“[T]he lawyer handle the upon right of a to limitations territorial imposes to opportunity a client obtain upon the client or legal of his affairs presentation including the in all matters lawyer choice a of his services lawyer is not which a tribunal before matter contested of a practice.” to admitted permanently of Common Practice of the Court 10(E) Local the Rules of Rule attorney accepts “[a]ny who Ohio, requires County, Pleas, Hamilton Once specified form. file a case” to employment in criminal private here, attorney becomes judge, a as ocсurred form' is endorsed except upon to withdraw permitted be “attorney who “shall not of record” supra. 3,n. good shown.” and for cause See motion written supra. Boss, State v. attorney recognized that an 24 “lt however, been has, generally may state, good standing in another practice Ohio, but to admitted person representing a purpose of specially admitted specially or not criminal. so case, be it civil or Whether particular Ohio, practice in but admitted attorney not admitted permit party in a state, represent standing in another good and in trial the sound discretion of the action, lying within is a matter particular (cid:127) has been an abuse whether there must determine Thus, we court. 2d, Ross, supra, 188, 304 N. E. at State instance.” in this discretion in dicta that have held or stated admission courts appellate Other jurisdiction not be without denied courts within their vice to trial

455 In Ross, State v. 36 App. Ohio 185, 2d 304 N. E. 2d 396 (1973), the leading Ohio area, case the Ohio Appeals appeal an entertained from a judge’s trial order denying an out-of-state attorney’s pro application. hac vice appellate The exhaustively inquired court into the basis the trial court’s action and specific identified the misdeeds of the attorney justified that concluding his exclusion, before that the trial judge had acted only The inference properly.'25 that can be drawn from opinion arbitrary that is that an ruling by the judge trial would constituted have reversible error; in this area of authority Ohio law, least, at to exercise discretion does not power include to act arbi- trarily.26 Having made this implicit promise respondent to attorneys,27 Ohio not may nullify promise the substance Evans, In re 1004, (CA5 cause. 524 F. 1975) (denial 2d inappro 1007 priate except upon showing conduct); Burris, of unethical McKenzie v. 36,6 330, 344, 255 Ark. 357, (1973) (trial 500 S. 2d W. court “arbitrary impose numerical [pro limitation on number of vice] by attorney” appearances 'expertise area). with the relevant See United, also Munoz v. Court, (CA9 1971); States District 2d 446 F. 434 Atchison, T. & S. Jackson, F. R. Co. v. (CA10 1956); 390, 235 2dF. 393 Wood, Brown v. 252, 258, 257 98, (1974). Ark. 516 2d 102 S. W. requirement of' greater cause even support where, 3, has here, as see n. sufra, attorney an out-of-state previously a criminal case has made been counsel record Cooper order of a trial Hutchinson, court. v. 184 119, (CA3 1950); 2d 123 State Kavanaugh, 7, 18, v. 52 N. J. 2d 243 A. 225, (1968); Brock, 231 Smith v. (Okla. 1975). 532 P. 2d 850 App. 2d, 190-201, at 2d, N. E. at 401-406. 26This “holding as a matter lawyers of state law” that out-of-state are to judge have a trial entitled exercise say, his discretion —that to permissible have a ruling reason for his he application denies an —before appear, “necessarily [Fahringer establishes that and Cambria had a] property protected by interest” Bishop the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wood, S., 426 U. n. 27“Property interests ... are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that independent stem from an source such as state or understandings law—rules that secure certain benefits support and that claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Board of A state meaning. its safeguard procedures no providing matter contested in a action judge’s requirement rise to inevitably gives reason permissible a predicated some have litigants affected requirement procedural Kennedy, Arnett judge. See with reason opportunity in part).28 concurring J., (Powell, 416 U. S. *16 III admis- interest the of “nature” the

Either with custom in Ohio inhering promise” “implicit the sions an create to sufficient is admissions to those respect of each Moreover, Clause. Process Due the by protected the other. reinforces conclusions these years in recent by the employed analysis of mode “liberty” of concepts Amendment Fourteenth the has treated exclusive, mutually they defined though as “property” and shedding neither interests, with of categories closed the in some Indeed, other. the meaning the light only property that not implied it has opinions recent Court’s state specific apart not exist does liberty itself but Rights.29 the Bill guarantee express or an authorization lies action case, the state In S., 577. at Roth, 408 Regents U. is multi- promise implied '‘'understanding” or the relevant the source judges, Ohio trial practice past the consistent In addition faceted. sufficient found conduct of administrative course analogous is which case rules and local by state supported promise is Morrissey, that law. conferred, not procеss ... is procedural due 28 “[T]he legislature guarantee. While by constitutional grace, but legislative may employment, it in federal property interest confer may not to elect interest, once deprivation of constitutionally authorize have our cases safeguards. As procedural appropriate conferred, without depriva statutory procedures adequacy of recognized, consistently analyzed in consti interest must property statutorily created of a tion concurring in J., S., at 167 (Powell, Arnett, 416 U. terms.” tutional omitted). (footnote part) Fano, U. S. 693; Meachum Davis, 424 S.U. Paul v. See Rights nor Bill of that “neither the view to adhere continue I In my judgment this is not way majestic language

the Fourteenth Amendment should be read.

As is demonstrated cases Meyer like v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471; Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 539, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s classic opinion concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com- mittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 162, judiciаl construction of the words “life, liberty, or property” is not simply a matter of applying the precepts of logic to accepted premises. Rather, it experience and judgment that have breathed life into the Court’s process of adjudication. constitutional It is not only Ohio’s experience with out-of-state practitioners, but that of the entire Nation as well, that compels judgment that no State arbitrarily reject a lawyer’s legitimate attempt pursue this aspect of his calling.

IY It is ironic that this litigation ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‍should end as it began —with *17 judicial ruling on the merits before parties have been heard on the merits. Pursuant to Rules 19, 23, and 24 of this Court, the only issue discussed the petition for certiorari and in respondents’ brief memorandum in reply is whether “a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Sixth Circuit in this matter.” Pet. for Cert. 19. This surely is case that should be decided before respondents have been given an opportunity to address the merits. Summary reversal “should be reserved for palpably clear cases . . . error.” Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 S. 697, U. 707 laws of sovereign States liberty create the which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant provisions constitutional are limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on liberty of the citizen. The relevant state laws either property create rights, they curtail freedom of the citizen who must live in ordered society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise enjoyment liberty individual in a complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, surely not the exclusive source.” Id., at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting). egregiously reversals are dissenting). Such J., (Rehnquist, a “novel constitutional facing when the Court improvident Mimms, U. S. Pennsylvania (Ste- question.” I dissent respectfully Accordingly, dissenting).30 J., vens, great a question summary disposition from the Court’s administration justice. importance to the summary dispositions Although previous three the Court cites nothing to do with decision, whatsoever two have Court in favor of its preventing out- with rules hac vice Both are concerned admissions. they up permanent practices in where lawyers setting States of-state Supreme Virginia, 414 U. S. Brown v. were not licensed. Oinsburg, (ED 1973); summarily Kovrak aff’g Supp. Va. question, appeal federal 52, dismissing, for want of substantial 358 U. S. chal *18 (1958). The third case involved a Pa. 139 A. 2d 889 from 392 Supreme process grounds to a rule of the Court lenge on substantive due placed applications hac vice the trial decisions on Illinois Beatty, R. Co. v. 423 U. S. court’s discretion. & Western Norfolk 1975). (SD opinion summarily aff’g Supp. 400 F. Ill. So far as indicates, however, no claim in the in that case there was District applied arbitrarily discriminatorily. been the rule had

Case Details

Case Name: Leis v. Flynt
Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Published: May 14, 1979
Citation: 439 U.S. 438
Docket Number: 77-1618
Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS
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