MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this long-running case, Shlomo Leibo-vitch and several of his family members (“Plaintiffs”) seek to recover for injuries they suffered as a result of an act of terrorism committed in Israel with the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information (“Defendants”). Presently before the Court are motions to quash filed by non-parties Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. (“Bank of Tokyo”) and BNP Paribas (“Paribas”) (collectively, “the banks”), as well as Plaintiffs’ post-judgment motions to compel discovery from these non-party banks. (R. 133; Bank of Tokyo’s Mot. to Quash; R. 139, Bank of Tokyo’s Mot. to Quash: R. 149, Paribas’ Mot. to Quash; R. 154, Pls.’ Mot. to Compel: R. 158, Pls.’ Mot. to Compel.) For the reasons stated below, the banks’ motions are granted and Plaintiffs’ motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
Several opinions have been issued in this case as it wound its way up to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and back down again. See Leibovitch, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al.,
On June 17, 2003, Leibovitch, an Israeli citizen, was driving with several of his family members along a highway in Jeru
In an effort to collect on their judgment, Plaintiffs recently served discovery requests and citations to discover assets on Bank of Tokyo and Paribas. (See R. 154, Pls.’ Mot. to Compel: R. 158, Pis.’ Mot. to Compel.) Bank of Tokyo is a Japanese bank headquartered in Tokyo. (R. 168, Cunningham Deal. ¶¶ 2-4.) It has approximately 700 branches in Japan and 75 branches located in 40 other countries: it has a total of 11 branches and offices in the United States, including a branch in Chicago. Illinois. (Id.) Its Chicago branch services only a limited number of corporate customers with offices in the Midwestern United States. (R. 142, Cunningham Supply. Deal. 5.) The branch has approximately 70 employees, which represents a small percentage of its 35.000 total employees; the Chicago branch generated approximately .06. percent of the bank’s total ‘ profits for the fiscal year ending March 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Paribas is a French bank with its headquarters in Paris. (R. 152, Christie Deal. ¶ 3.) It has 6.800 branches worldwide, with three branches and three other offices in the United States, including a branch in Chicago. (R. 153, Zambrana Deal., Ex. R at 23, 34.) The Chicago branch employs 47 individuals, which is less than one-tenth of a percent of the 185,000 employees of Paribas worldwide. (Id. ¶4.) The branch offers a variety of services, but its primary business is providing bank line lending services to U.S. clients. (Id.)
The discovery directed at these banks seeks information about Defendants’ assets, if any, that the banks hold either here or abroad. Plaintiffs have served identical citations on the banks that purport to compel them to freeze any assets of Defendants that they have, wherever these assets may be located. (R. 138, Viapiano Deck, Ex. A at 6; R. 153, Zambrano Deck, Ex. B.) The citations also require a designated corporate officer of the banks to appear and be examined under oath as to any assets the banks may hold belonging to Defendants. (See R. 138, Viapiano Deck, Ex. A at 5-6.) The citations warn that the “failure to comply ... may result in a judgment being entered against you for the unsatisfied amount of this judgment.” or arrest and the imposition of contempt sanctions, including “imprisonment in the county jail.” (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiffs have also served the banks with document subpoenas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, and deposition subpoenas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). The document subpoenas seek “[d]ocuments sufficient to identify all Iranian Accounts” maintained by the banks from February
Similarly, the Rule 30(b)(6) subpoena requires the banks to designate an officer or director who can testify regarding the following matters:
The details of all financial accounts maintained by [the banks] located anywhere in the world held in the name of, or for the benefit of, Iran .... the names and locations of the branches at which such accounts are held, the account numbers on such accounts, the current account balances on such accounts, transaction histories for such accounts and any communications with the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Treasury (OFAC), or any other department or agency of the government of the United States concerning such accounts.
(R. 143, Viapiano Suppl. Decl., Ex. A at 7.)
The banks respond that they have duly searched the records at their Chicago branches and have not located any responsive assets, documents, or information. (R. 152, Christie Deck "¶ 7; R. 168, Cunningham Suppl. Deck ¶ 6.) They further assert that they have no employee with knowledge of such accounts at their Chicago branches, and that these local branches do not have access to a centralized database of customer and account information-that would allow them to obtain documents and information located at the banks’ headquarters, at other branches, or with the banks’ affiliates and subsidiaries worldwide.
The banks resist being ordered to produce discovery beyond their Chicago branches, as they believe that this. Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them and that principles of international comity militate against permitting the expansive, global discovery that Plaintiffs have requested. They argue, that determining whether any accounts or documents are held in other bank offices throughout the world would require a burdensome search and, further, that" disclosing these records would potentially .subject them to civil or criminal liability in their home countries. Therefore, they seek to quash the citations and subpoenas issued by Plaintiffs. (R. 133, Bank of Tokyo’s Mot. to Quash; R. 139, Bank of Tokyo’s Mot. to Quash; R. 149, Paribas’ Mot. to Quash; R. 151, Pari-bas’ Mem.; R. 152, Christie Deck; R. 153, Zambrano Deck; R. 168, Cunningham Deck; R. 169, Wolfe Decl.; R. 172, Banks’ Reply; R. 173, Inoshita Deck; R. 197, Banks’ Suppl. to Mot.)
ANALYSIS
Before turning to the parties’ discovery dispute, some legal background on the FSIA and applicable post-judgment discovery procedures is needed. “The default rule of United States law is that foreign states are immune from suit and attachment of assets in United States courts, but [the FSIA] provides a number of exceptions and special procedures for such cases.” Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic,
Several legal, principles limit the ability of a prevailing plaintiff from attaching assets of a foreign state. “Subject to stated exceptions, the FSIA shields foreign-state property from execution.” Bank Markazi,
I. Personal Jurisdiction
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the parties’ discovery dispute. The threshold issue presented by the parties’ motions—and a point on which they strenuously disagree—is whether the Court has personal jurisdiction to take any action against the banks, either in connection with the citation or the discovery requests.
In determining whether personal jurisdiction exists, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the com
Personal jurisdiction refers to the Court’s “power to bring a person into its adjudicative process.” N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving,
Likewise, a court must have personal jurisdiction to order compliance with a discovery request. Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat,
“[T]he mechanics for asserting personal jurisdiction in federal court are found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k).” KM Enters., Inc. v. Glob. Traffic Techs., Inc.,
A. General Jurisdiction
“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them” only when the corporation is “essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler,
Thus, following Daimler, in all but the most “exceptional” cases general jurisdiction over a corporation is limited to its place of incorporation and/or principal place of business. Id. at 761 n. 19. The Supreme Court provided the following example of an “exceptional” circumstance that would meet the standard: where a world war forced a foreign company to temporarily relocate its principal place of business to Ohio due to enemy activity abroad. Id. at 761 n. 19 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
Indeed, Daimler explicitly criticized the practice asserting personal jurisdiction based on the presence of a branch in the forum state and noted that the cases applying this rule “should not attract heavy reliance today.” Daimler,
Plaintiffs try to resist this outcome by arguing that Daimler only applies to defendants, and not to third parties. (R. 170, Pis.’ Reply at 2-5.) However, the Court cannot discern any valid reason why Daimler would not apply any time the Court is called to decide personal jurisdiction. The policies behind the requirement of personal jurisdiction, were outlined by the Supreme Court as follows:
[T]he requirement represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty. ,.. The defendant must generally hire counsel and travel to the forum to defend itself from the plain-1 tiffs claim, or suffer a default judgment. The defendant may be forced to participate in extended and often costly discov: er, and will be forced to respond in damages or to comply with some other form of remedy imposed by the court should it lose the suit. The defendant may also face liability for court costs and attorney’s fees. These burdens are substantial, and the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause prevents the forum State from unfairly imposing them upon the defendant.
For this reason, other courts have applied Daimler and earlier Supreme Court decisions addressing personal jurisdiction generally to cases involving third parties. See Gucci,
Plaintiffs also argue that the banks should be deemed “at home” in Illinois because they are registered to do business under the state’s Foreign Banking Office Act. (R. 170. Pls.’ Reply at 5 (citing 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. 645/3).) The Foreign Banking Office Act says nothing about consent to jurisdiction, but Plaintiffs point out that under Illinois law foreign banks, like Illinois banks, have the capacity to “sue or be sued.” (Id. (citing 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5(1)).) This is an accurate statement of the law, but it does not show that personal jurisdiction exists over the banks. The ability to sue or be sued pertains to a party’s capacity, as outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b). This is not the same as personal jurisdiction. “Capacity to sue or be sued does not mean a defendant’s amenability to suit in a particular judicial district, which is a matter of the existence or nonexistence of personal jurisdiction over a defendant there.” LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Kearon, No. 98 C 5099,
Plaintiffs also argue that general jurisdiction exists because the Illinois registration statute requires foreign banks operating within the state to appoint a registered agent for service of process. (R. 159, Pls.’ Mem. at 8 (citing 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. 645/9, 645/10).) They point to Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Banco De Seguros Del Estado,
Additionally, Wausau was decided long before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Daimler. After Daimler, numerous district courts in this Circuit have concluded that registering to do business in a state and/or designating a registered agent for service of process is not enough to make a corporation “at home” in that state. See. e.g., Dimitrov v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 15 C 06332,
Indeed, even under Illinois law, the appointment of a registered agent is not determinative in the personal jurisdiction analysis. Alderson v. Southern Co.,
Plaintiffs rely on Vera v. Republic of Cuba,
Plaintiffs also rely on the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital for the proposition that broad post-judgment discovery should be permitted in FSIA execution proceedings. (See R. 165, Pls.’ Opp’n at 2; R. 170, Pls.’ Reply at 1-5.) In that case, the Supreme Court held that the FSIA does not contain any provisions forbidding or limiting the scope of discovery in aid of execution of a foreign state’s assets.
B. Specific Jurisdiction
That is not the end of the matter, however, because Plaintiffs also argue that the Court can exercise specific jurisdiction over the banks. (R. 159. Pls.’ Mem. at 10-13.) Specific jurisdiction requires a plaintiff to show that the controversy between the parties “arises .out of the forum-related activity.” Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc.,
1. Minimum Contacts
To establish the requisite minimum contacts to support specific jurisdiction, “not just any contacts will do: For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process; the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Advanced Tactical,
Applying these principles here, it is apparent that there is virtually no link between the in-state banking activities of these French and Japanese banks and Plaintiffs’ claims arising from a terrorist attack that occurred in Israel with the support of the Iranian government. It certainly cannot be said that Plaintiffs’ claims “directly arise” out of the banking activities of these local branches. See GCIU,
Although the Seventh Circuit • has not addressed this issue, two Circuits have reformulated the minimum-contacts inquiry in cases involving third-party discovery, focusing more narrowly “on the connection between the nonparty’s contacts with the forum and the discovery order at issue.” Gucci,
Plaintiffs point out that these two banks have been found guilty of wrongdoing by regulators, in that they processed financial transactions involving Sudan, Iran, Burma, and other countries with which the United States does not conduct business. Specifically. Paribas pled guilty to processing transactions on behalf of these' countries that should have been blocked under U.S. Treasury regulations. (R. 160, Tolchin Decl., Ex. H-J.) Bank of Tokyo, in turn, was sanctioned by the New York State Department of Financial Services for misleading the department and violating New York banking laws in connection with U.S. dollar-elearing transactions conducted on behalf of Sudanese, Iranian, and Burmese parties. (R. 156, Tolchin Decl., Ex. G.) This conduct is certainly far from commendable, but Plaintiffs have not demonstrated an adequate connection between these
Plaintiffs argue that the proper minimum contacts test should look to the banks’ activities within the United States as a whole, not just the state of Illinois, because this action arises under the ATA. (R. 155, Pls.’ Mem. at 10-11; R. 170, Pls.’ Reply, at 7.) When a federal statute that creates a cause of action prescribes its own rules for service of process, “the Federal Rules provide that service made according to the statute is effective to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant, regardless of whether a court of the state encompassing the federal district could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Waeltz v. Delta Pilots Ret. Plan,
The ATA does in fact contain its own service provision that authorizes nationwide service of process.
Plaintiffs do not argue—nor is it clear from the record—that the special venue provisions contained in the ATA are satisfied in this case. To satisfy the ATA’s venue requirements, an action must be filed in a district “where any plaintiff resides,” or in any district where “any defendant resides or is served, or has an agent.”
Because of these complicating factors, the Court finds it difficult to rely on the cases cited by Plaintiffs where courts found that the appropriate inquiry in a suit involving the ATA is the defendant’s minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001,
But even if the Court were to consider the banks’ activities within the United States as a whole, while it presents closer question, the Couit would still find an insufficient link between the discovery sought and the banks’ activities to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. It bears repeating that these banks conduct a very small portion of their business in the United Slates when considering their operations as a whole. Bank of Tokyo has 11 branches in the United States out of 700 worldwide. (R. 168, Cunningham Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) Its operations in the United States made up approximately 3.9 percent of its total profits for the fiscal year ending March 2015.
Although there is evidence that the banks availed themselves of the U.S. banking system to process certain transactions that should have been blocked under federal law, the discovery sought by Plaintiffs is not limited to those specific transactions. It is -far more expansive, as Plaintiffs are seeking, detailed information related to any accounts held by Defendants anywhere in the world. Evidence that these non-party banks conducted general banking activities within the United States that in some way benefitted Defendants is not sufficient to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001,
2. Principles of Fairness
Assuming Plaintiffs could satisfy the minimum-contacts test, the Court must also consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction' comports with “fair' play and substantial justice”’ under the circumstances of this ease. Burger King Corp.,
In determining whether the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable, the Court should consider such factors as' the burden on the foreign defendant, the interests of the forum, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief in the forum, and the interests of other sovereigns. Id. at 113,
The record shows that the far-reaching discovery sought by Plaintiffs would impose a heavy burden on these foreign non-party banks, both of which are headquartered thousands of miles from this Court. The Chicago branches of these foreign banks have no responsive documents or information in their possession, nor do they have access to a centralized database to conduct a global search for responsive documents in their home countries or the many other countries in which they operate. It seems unlikely that these foreign banks would have envisioned that operating a handful of branches in the United States—out of hundreds or thousands worldwide—would subject them to vast discovery in an Illinois lawsuit to which they are not a party.
The banks have also submitted convincing evidence that disclosing responsive information located abroad would violate the laws of their home countries.
Similarly, French law prohibits the production of bank records located in France for use in civil discovery elsewhere, except when the documents are requested in compliance with an international convention, such as the Hague Convention, or through procedures available under French law. (See R. 153, Zambrano Decl., Ex. K at 65-67; Id. Ex. L at 93-95.) Violation of bank secrecy provisions can result in the imposition of civil or even criminal sanctions. (Id. Ex. K at 65-67.) These provisions have been enforced “at least a dozen” times since 2006. In re Activision Blizzard. Inc.,
On the other hand, there is no doubt that this is an important case, or that the United States (and the state of Illinois) has a strong interest in combatting terrorism and providing a remedy for its victims. Yet the Court must consider that only one of the eight plaintiffs is a U.S. citizen and that the events giving rise to this suit occurred in another country. None of the Plaintiffs appear to have any link to this District (indeed, it is not clear that they are even living in the United States), and their lead attorneys are located in New York and Israel. Under these circumstances, their interest in litigating in this District is somewhat “diminished.” See McGill v. Gigantex Techs. Co., No. 05C5892,
Based on a careful consideration of the competing interests at stake, the Court concludes that principles of fairness militate against exercising jurisdiction over the banks in this District to require them to comply with Plaintiffs’ broad discovery requests. See Asahi,
II. International Comity Concerns
Assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiffs could satisfy the requirements of personal jurisdiction, the Court still must consider international comity concerns before ordering discovery in this case. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
As discussed above, the banks have submitted evidence that the laws of their home countries prohibit the disclosures sought by Plaintiffs in this case, and that their failure to comply with these laws could subject them to civil or criminal liability. “The fact that foreign law may subject a person to criminal sanctions in the foreign country if he produces certain information does not automatically bar a domestic court from compelling production.” United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi.,
In balancing the interests at stake, courts ordinarily employ the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (“the Restatement”). See Reinsurance Co. of Am.,
[T]he importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested: the degree of specificity of the request; whether the information originated in the United States: the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.
Restatement § 442(l)(c).
As to the first factor, there is no doubt that these documents are important to Plaintiffs, or that providing a remedy for victims of terrorism is of general importance to the United States. But the present proceedings do not relate to the merits of a terrorism claim. They relate instead to the peripheral issue of post-judgment discovery. See Reinsurance Co. of Am.,
As to the second and third factors, the requests are specific as to the types of information sought, but very broad as to where the information might be located. The banks have submitted evidence that they have hundreds or thousands of offices in various countries around the world, and that it would be highly burdensome for them to search for responsive documents that might be located at any' one of them. (R. 136, Cunningham Decl. ¶¶ 8-11; R. 152, Christie Decl. ¶5.) The banks have also submitted evidence that no responsive information is located in this forum, and Plaintiffs acknowledge that at this point the discovery dispute is over “Iranian bank accounts maintained by the Bank[s] in [their] overseas branches.” (R'. 165, Pis.’ Opp’n at 1). It is unlikely that records pertaining to bank accounts held or opened outside of the United States would have “originated” in the United States, and Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Plaintiffs suggest that the Chicago branches should be able to obtain these foreign documents if they tried hard enough, but this does not answer the question of where the documents originated. As-another Judge in this District observed: “The jurisdiction of American courts is unquestioned when they order their own nationals to produce documents located within .this country.” but a court is on far shakier ground when it “order[s] a party -or non-party to produce documents located abroad, especially when the country in which the documents are situated prohibits their disclosure.” Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan,
As to the fourth factor, the record shows that Plaintiffs do have alternative means available for obtaining discovery in aid of their judgment. As to Paribas, Plaintiffs can use Hague Convention discovery procedures, which are outlined in the note following 28 U.S.C. § 1781, to gain information from the bank’s headquarters. (See R. 151, Paribas’ Mem. at 17-21 (outlining procedures).) Japan is not a signatory to the Hague Convention, but Plaintiffs can use the - Japanese Civil Execution Act and the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure to obtain discovery at Bank of Tokyo’s headquarters to aid in the execution of their judgment. (R. 137, Inoshita Decl. ¶¶ 12-17.) Plaintiffs would clearly prefer to proceed with their execution efforts- in Illinois (although given the location of their attorneys and other practical considerations it is not entirely clear to the Court why this is the case), but they have not demonstrated that these other means would be ineffectual. As Justice Ginsburg has noted, there is little legal basis for a court in the United States to “become a ‘clearinghouse for information’ about any and all property held by [a foreign state] abroad.” NML Capital,
As to the fifth factor, the banks have provided evidence that turning over the records requested by Plaintiffs could subject them to-civil liability or even criminal sanctions in the jurisdictions where they-are headquartered. The heavy penalties that apply reflect that these countries attach great significance to the non-disclosure of this information.
While the United States does have a general interest in providing post-judgment remedies to enforce a judgment obtained here, declining to permit discovery in this District would not leave Plaintiffs without options for executing their judgment. In addition to the foreign discovery procedures outlined above. Plaintiffs can also seek to attach Defendants’ assets located in the United States that have been blocked pursuant to TRIA.
Carefully considering all of the relevant factors, the Court finds that interests of international comity weigh against ordering these foreign non-party banks to comply with Plaintiffs’ broad discovery requests.
In closing, the Court is cognizant of the horrific injuries suffered by Plaintiffs at the hands of terrorists supported by the Iranian government. The Court also understands Plaintiffs’ desire to obtain their multi-million dollar judgment, as well as the practical difficulties faced by terrorist victims seeking to enforce their judgments against Iran. But the Court cannot jettison the requirements of due process or important principles of international comity to permit the expansive third-party discovery sought by Plaintiffs in this case. For these reasons, the Court declines to compel compliance with the citations or subpoenas issued to these non-party banks.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the banks’ motions to quash (R. 138, 139. 149) are GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motions to compel (R. 154.158) are DENIED.
Notes
. The Court notes that the New York branch of Paribas voluntarily coordinated a search for any information available among its six U.S, offices regarding blocked assets of Defendants located in the United States, and at the time of briefing the parties were working out an agreement for the turnover of this information. (See R. 159, Pls,’ Mem; at 4: R. 160, Tolchin Decl., Ex. D at 2.)
. The Court commends the attorneys for the excellent manner in which these difficult legal issues were briefed by all sides.
. Even though the underlying events in this case occurred in Israel, the FSIA applied because Shira Leibovitch is a U.S. citizen. See Leibovitch,
. Plaintiffs argue in passing that the banks waived their objection to personal jurisdiction by filing a motion for limited intervention in this case. (R. 165, Pls.’ Opp. at 4-5.) The Court does not agree. “[T]o waive or forfeit a personal jurisdiction defense, a defendant must give a plaintiff a reasonable expectation that it will defend the suit on the merits or must cause the court to go to some effort that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction is later found lacking.” H-D Mich., LLC v. Hellenic Duly Free Shops S.A.,
. The Illinois long-arm statute permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction for any reason permitted by the Illinois and United States Constitutions. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-209 (a)(2), (b)(4), (c). Thus, jurisdiction under the Illinois long-arm statute is essentially coextensive with federal due process requirements. RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd.,
. Plaintiffs rely heavily on Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd.,
. Vera is also factually distinguishable because there the court specifically noted that the documents requested by the subpoena could be "found via electronic searches performed in [the bank’s] New York office, and are. within this jurisdiction.” Vera, 91 F,Supp.3d at 571. The banks here have submitted evidence that they have no responsive documents at their Chicago branches and do not have access to a centralized database that would permit them to search for documents located at their headquarters or at other branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates throughout the world. (R. 136, Cunningham Decl. ¶¶ 8-11; R. 152, Christie Decl. ¶ 5.) The Court also notes that the Second Circuit never reviewed the merits of the district court’s order in Vera, as it determined that the order was not reviewable as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or as an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Vera v. Republic of Cuba,
. As to Paribas, the record shows that its "subsidiary in Geneva ('BNPP Suisse’) and branch in Paris (‘BNPP Paris’) facilitated or conducted the overwhelming majority of the apparent violations of U.S. sanctions laws.” (R. 160-8. Tolchin Decl., Ex. H at 2.) As to Bank of Tokyo, some of the dollar-clearing transactions—a process by which U.S. dollar-denominated transactions are satisfied between counterparties through a U.S. bank— were settled through its New York branch and other New York-based financial institutions. (R. 156-7, Tolchin Decl., Ex. G at 2 & n.1.) However, the bulk of the wrongdoing was attributed to high-ranking corporate officers, including its Compliance Manager and Executive Officer of the Global Planning Division, who were located abroad. (See id. at 10-11.)
. The FSIA also contains special provisions relating to service of process over foreign states. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b). Plaintiffs do not argue, nor can the Court discern, how provisions pertaining to service on a foreign sovereign might be applicable to a third-party discovery dispute involving a private bank. Indeed, the FSIA is quite unique, in that there is generally no need to conduct a minimum-contacts analysis in a case against a foreign state under the FSIA because the statute expressly provides that personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant as long as subject matter jurisdiction exists and service was proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) ("Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.”).
. In one of their filings, Plaintiffs state that Bank of Tokyo’s operations in the United States represented "approximately 15%-19% of [the bank’s] gross profits in 2014,” citing generally to "Exs. 1-Kto Tolchin Decl,” without reference to any particular document or page number. (R. 155, Pis.’ Mem. at 2.) The exhibits they reference consist of general corporate materials and press releases. The Court has examined these exhibits in detail and cannot discern how Plaintiffs are deriving this figure. Bank of Tokyo has asserted in a sworn declaration that its operations in the United States make up less than four percent of its total profits. (R. 168, Cunningham Decl. ¶ 5.) It is Plaintiffs’ burden to establish that jurisdiction exists, and their vague assertion is not enough to rebut the bank's sworn declaration. See GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund,
. Plaintiffs point to the district court's decision on remand in Gucci, in which the court found the exercise of specific jurisdiction proper, but in that case there was a far greater link between the non-party bank’s activities in the forum and the discovery requested by the plaintiffs. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li,
. "In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether' or nbt submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P, 44.1.
. By contrast, a domestic bank in Illinois is protected from the risk of double liability by statute. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-712.
. These cases applied an earlier version of the Restatement, but the guiding principles are similar. See Reinsurance Co. of Am.,
. Under the Restatement, the Court has discretion to require the party contesting discov
. TRIA provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism ... the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.” TRIA § 201(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note). The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control provides an annual report of the blocked and non-blocked assets of Iran located within the United States. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Terrorist Assets Report (available at https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/ .sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar20I4.pdf).
. Because of the Court’s ruling on the threshold issues of personal-jurisdiction and international comity, the Court does not reach the banks' alterative arguments regarding the proper scope of Rule 45 and Rule 30(b)(6), the "separate entity rule.” or the extraterritorial reach of the statutes at issue in this case. ' (See R. 167, Banks’ Mem. at 18-21.)
. Plaintiffs make a general request for jurisdictional discovery without outlining why it is needed or what limited discovery requests they would make. (See R. 159, Pls.' Mem. at 13; R. 170, Pls.1 Reply at 9.) Instead. Plaintiffs appear to request that full compliance with their discovery requests be ordered and that the documents be turned over “in camera or subject to a confidentiality agreement,” and a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition conducted, so that the Court can determine from the information revealed whether jurisdiction exists. (R. 159, Pls.' Mem. at 13.) This argument is rather circular, as the threshold question is whether the Court has authority to require compliance with the discovery requests at all; the case law is clear that Plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction before such discovery should be permitted. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp.,