Lehman v. Powe

49 So. 622 | Miss. | 1909

Lead Opinion

Smith, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

In dne course of the administration of the estate of T. J. George, deceased, in the chancery court of Forrest county, the same was declared insolvent. The administrator was ordered to cause a notice to be published directing the creditors who had probated their claims to file same with the clerk of that court on or before Monday, the 13th day of January, 1908, and notifying them that said claims would be examined and objections thereto heard by N. T. Ourry, master in chancery, at the courthouse in the city of Hattiesburg, on Monday, the 20th day of January, A. D. 1908. On the day appointed the master proceeded to examine and approve the claims filed with the clerk, including the claims of all parties hereto, and in due course reported his action to the chancery court. No objection was made to the claims of appellees before the master; but on the coming in of his report exceptions were filed in the chancery court by appellees, whereupon, by order of said court, the same were referred to two auditors, with directions to hear and determine said exceptions and report their findings, together with the evidence heard by them, to the court. After hearing the evidence, they reported to the court, recommending that these claims be allowed, and there was a decree in accordance with such recommendation, and from it this appeal is taken.

It is insisted by appellees that appellants cannot now be heard to object to the allowance of their claim, for the reason that they (appellants) failed to appear before the master and object thereto. "Where a matter has been referred by a chancery court to a master, the rule is that, in order to lay the foundation for the presentation of exceptions as to all matters depending on proof and confided to the judgment of the master, the party must make an objection before the master, so that he may have an opportunity to correct his ruling; but as to all matters of law apparent on the record such objection is not necessary. 16 Cyc. 448; Davis v. Foley, Walk. 43; Fowler v. Payne, 52 Miss. 210. All objections, therefore, to the claims *454of appellants, except those of law appearing on the record, were waived by reason of not having been made before the master.

The claim of A. T. Powe was excepted to on two grounds: First, because it is barred by the statute of limitations; second, because it is feigned and fictitious. Both of the exceptions relate to matters depending on proof, which were confided to the judgment of the master, and under the rule above announced cannot now be considered. But, even if this were not true, the claim was allowed by auditors on proof, and their report approved by the court. We think this action of the court was correct. Certainly we cannot say that it was manifest error. The decree of the court, however, allowed $240 of the amount found to be due Powe as a preferred claim, and directed this amount be paid him in full, same being his wages as bookkeeper for the deceased, at $60 per month, for the four months immediately preceding the death of deceased. This exception presents a matter of law appearing on the record, and is, therefore, open for review. The master’s report with reference to this preference is as follows: “Tour master reports further on this claim that the same is asked to be allowed as a preference claim to the amount of $240, wages for four months at $60 per month; and, being unable to find authority of law for allowing such part of said claim as a preference, your master respectfully refers the question of preferring said claim, to such amount, to your honor.” Like him, we have not found or been referred to any law which would warrant this preference. Its allowance, therefore, was error. Powe was simply a general creditor of the estate, with no greater rights than the other general creditors.

Coming, now, to the claim of E. B. George, we find that it is objected to on two grounds — that it is feigned and fictitious, and that same was not probated in the manner required by law. The last objection presents an error of law appearing on the record, and is open for review. This claim is for $600, and the probate consisted in presenting to the clerk two canceled, *455checks, with the affidavit required by section 2106 of the Code of 190.6, attached thereto.' These checks, with the indorsements thereon, are as follows:

“Hattiesburg, Miss., Sept. 22nd, 1906. No. ■ — ■-1. Hattiesburg Trust & Banking Company: .Pay to the order of T. J. George $100.00, One Hundred Dollars and no/100 Dollars. E. B. George.”

“No. 5,250. The First National Bank. Hnited States Depository. Hattiesburg, Miss., March 21, 1905. Pay to the order of E. B. George $500.00, Five Hundred and no/100 Dollars. To Germania National Bank, New Orleans, La. James W. Harper, Asst. Cashier.”

Both of the foregoing instruments are marked “Paid.” The following indorsements appear on the back of these two instruments: On the first: “T. J. George.” “A. T. Powe.” On the second, or $500' draft: “E. B. George.” “T. J. George.” “For deposit. B. Besenberg & Sons. Through N. O. Clearing House. Indorsements guaranteed. March 22, 1905. ‘2’ Hibernia Bank & Trust Co.”

Code 1906, § 2106 provides: “Any person desiring to probate his claim shall present to the clerk the written evidence thereof, if any, or, if the claim be a judgment or a decree, a duly certified copy thereof, or if there be no written evidence thereof, an itemized account, or a statement of the claim in writing, signed by the creditor,” etc.

It is not contended by counsel for appellee that these checks constitute an itemized account or statement of the claim in writing signed by the creditors; but the contention is that they constitute the written evidence of the claim. It becomes necessary, therefore, Jo determine what 'is meant by “written evidence” of the claim. Does it mean any or every writing relating to the claim, or does it mean such a writing on it as shows by its terms that a liability exists on the part of the estate? One of the objects of the statute in requiring claims to be probated, allowed, and registered is that the administrator and all *456other parties concerned may ascertain what debts are claimed to be due by the estate, and act intelligently in determining whether the same are just and should be paid, or whether the same should be contested. The statute also clearly contemplates that, in presenting claims against the estate of a decedent, the evidence or statement of same probated must on its face show a prima facie right in the claimant to recover from the estate the amount claimed, and that it must disclose the nature and amount of the claim with sufficient precision to bar, when paid, an action therefor.

These canceled checks disclose no liability at all on the part of the estate to any one. In fact, they showed no liability from any person to’ another, and could not have been used as a foundation for a suit in any court. They could have been used, it is true, as evidence 'in a suit for money loaned, if in fact they related to such a transaction, but only as'one link in the evidence necessary to maintain such a suit. Their mere introduction in evidence in such a suit, unaided by other evidence, would not have proven anything. The words “written evidence,” as used in the statute, clearly mean such a writing as by its terms or on its face evidences the fact that a liability exists on the part of the estate in favor of the claimant. Code 1906, § 2106, is mandatory, and, unless it has been complied with, the administrator, under Code 1906, § 2105, has no authority to pay the claim; nor has the court power to order him so to do, unless Code 1906, § 2106, has been complied with. The allowance of this claim was error.

In some of the states, probably in most of them, the statute does not require that claims shall be presented for probate in any particular form; but where the statute does so require, as is the case with us, it must be complied with. 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) p. 1074.

It follows, therefore, that the decree of the lower court is affirmed, except as to the allowance of $240 to A. T. Powe as a preference, and as to the allowance of the claim of E. B. George *457for $600. As to these two items, the decree is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Reversed.






Dissenting Opinion

Mayes, J.,

delivered the following dissenting opinion.

On the 15th of October, 1906, a petition was filed in the chancery court of Forrest county, alleging the death of T. J. George on the 11th day of the month, and praying for the appointment of an administrator. After hearing the petition one A. T. Powe was appointed administrator; the appointment being made on the same day that the petition was filed. On the 9th day of October, 1907, E. B. George probated his claim for $600¡. The opinion in chief literally reproduces the claim • filed by E. B. George, and I shall not incumber this dissent with a reproduction of it. By an examination of this claim, it will be seen that it consists of two paid checks, one for $100, and another for $500, and to these two paid checks is attached the affidavit of E. B. George, in literal compliance with the requirement of Cbde 1906, § 2106. It is manifest from the record that this is the only evidence in writing that E. B. George has of the indebtedness to him by the estate. He made no account of it in any other way. No notice seems to have been published for the’ probation of claims until the order made by the chancellor on the 11th day of December, 1907, after which the claim in question was reprobated and allowed on the 26th of December, 1907.

On the 6th day of December, 1907, a petition was filed by the administrator, praying that the estate of T. J. George be declared insolvent, which was accordingly done on the 11th day of December, 1907, the same day that the court ordered the administrator to publish notice to creditors, to probate their claims. In this same decree the chancellor appointed as master N. T. Curry “to examine and hear objections to all claims probated against the estate, which claims shall be filed with the chancery clerk, and the examination and hearing of same shall take place *458at the courthouse iu the city of Hattiesburg on Monday, the 20th day of January, 1908, and the master shall report his findings to the chancellor in vacation.” On the '9th day of June, 1908, N. T. Curry, the master appointed on December 11, 1907, made his report to the court, allowing the above claim of 35. B. George, and showing that at the hearing fixed by the court to take place on the 20th of January, 1908, no objections were filed by any one to the allowance of the above claim for any reason. On the 10th day of June, 1908, certain creditors for the first time filed their objections to the allowance of this claim, specifying, first, “that the proof of the claim is insufficient in law, because E. B. George failed to present to the clerk written evidence thereof, or an itemized account or statement of the claim in writing, signed by E* B. George,” etc; and, secondly, “that the said claim is feigned and fictitious.” George answered, denying that the claim was feigned or fictitious, and alleging that, since the objectors had failed to present any objection to the claim, for either of the reasons specified, when the question was being heard by the master by the order of the court on the 20th day of January, 1908, they could not now be heard to object, after the master had fully examined and allowed the claim, without any objection being entered. The chancellor proceeded to hear the objections, and on the application of the objecting creditors referred the matter to two auditors appointed by the court to hear and determine the controversy, and the decree making the reference designated the 2d Monday of July, 1908, as the date for the hearing before the auditor. On the 17th day of December, 1908, the auditors made a report to the court, sustaining the sufficiency both in law and fact of the probated claim of E. B. George, and allowed same. The undisputed proof shows that the above amounts were loaned to T. J. George by E. B;. George, and that the above is all the written evidence of the claim that E. B. George has, or ever had. In short, the debt is placed by the proof beyond question, and the solitary question presented by this record is *459•whether or not E. B. George complied with the requirements of Oode 1906, § 2106, as to the probation of the claim. The chancellor sustained the action of the auditors in overruling the exceptions and allowed the claim, and from this judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

There is another question in the case involving a preference, but, since I am in accord with the majority opinion in this, I make no further mention of it.

So precise and literal is the construction placed on C'ode 1906,. § 2106, in the opinion in chief that it holds that, because E. B. George did not actually make out an open account against the estate of T. J. George for $600 and attach the affidavit to that, the probation is void. What E. B. George did do was substantially this, and he gave the administrator all notice that was necessary in order to enable him to be informed of the nature of the claim and to enable him to contest it, if he so desired; and this is all that the statute, in my judgment, ever intended to accomplish. Statutes are not designed as snares to trap persons unskilled in the law, defeating them of just and honest rights. A construction of a statute which leads to this result is very much to be deplored. The construction given this statute by the majority is, in my judgment, not only unwarranted by its language, but is a sacrifice of justice to useless literalness. The section provides that: “Any person desiring to probate his claim shall present to the clerk the written evidence thereof, if any, or if the claim be a judgment or decree, a duly certified .copy thereof, or if there be no written evidence thereof, an itemized account, or statement of the claim in writing, signed by the creditor,” etc. In so far as it was possible, E. B. George literally complied with this statute. He propounded to the clerk all the “written evidence” of the claim that he had, and made the only “statement of the claim in writing” that it was possible to make, unless, instead of filing the cancelled checks, he had made an account to read “T. J. George, Dr., to E. B. George, $600.00 in open account.”

*460In 18 Oyclopsedla Law, 480, a clear and conservative rule is laid down. It is there held that: “In stating a claim no fixed form is ordinarily required, nor is the technical accuracy and certainty of description which is essential in pleading necessary. All that is necessary, as a general rule, is that the statement shall give to the personal representative notice of a claim against the estate, for payment of which the creditor looks to the estate; that the statement shall be so clear' and unambiguous as to distinguish the claim with reasonable certainty from all other similar claims; and that it shall give to the personal representative such information concerning the nature and amount of the demand as to enable him to act intelligently in providing for its payment or in rejecting it.” In the case of Borum v. Bell, 132 Ala. 85, 31 South. 454, the court said: “The claim, it must be admitted, is very indefinite in description; but technical accuracy or the certainty of description essential in pleading, is not required. Claims against estates are often made out and presented by unskilled persons, and generally no more is required than to inform the personal representative, on an inspection of it, of the nature, character, and amount of the claim, and must distinguish it with reasonable certainty from all other similar claims. Floyd v. Clayton, 67 Ala. 265; Parker v. Bank, 121 Ala. 517, 25 South. 1001. The presentation “ueed not be in any particular form, provided that it be sufficiently definite to notify the administrator of its character and amount, and enable him to make provision for its payment.’ 5 Am. & Eng. Law. 217.” The same thing is held in the case of Henderson v. Ilsley, 11 Smed. & M. 9, 49 Am. Dec. 41.

The opinion in chief assigns as the reason for rejecting the claim of E. B. George, as insufficient in law, because “the canceled checks disclose no liability at all on the part of the estate to any one. In fact, they showed no liability from any person to another.” The effect of what E. B. George did was as if he had filed an open account. It carried out the intent of the statute, and fully Informed the administrator of the claim of E, B. *461George and its character. The method selected was more complete in its information than would have been the filing of an open account; for the administrator was not only informed of the amount, but he was also informed as to the exact way in which it arose. A mere open account, without affidavit attached, furnishes no more evidence of indebtedness in itself than would the paid check. No case that I have been able to find or that is cited in the opinion in chief sustains the conclusions reached therein. The construction of the statute in the main opinion carries with it a literalness that is sacrificial to the rights of men of ordinary intelligence.and precaution.