JANIE J. LEHMAN v. DAVID M. LEHMAN
Case No. 13-CA-2
COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
August 20, 2013
2013-Ohio-3622
Hоn. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.; Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.; Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. 1998 DS 98. JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded.
For Plaintiff-Appellee
DAVID K. GREER
1150 Morse Road, Suite 230
Columbus, OH 43229
For Defendant-Appellant
LEE S. ROSENTHAL
Goldman & Rosenthal
2 Easton Oval, Suite 180
Columbus, OH 43219
{¶1} Appellant David M. Lehman apрeals a judgment of the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, rendering an amount due on his obligation to pay one-half of the college expenses for the parties’ two children and ordering him to pay one-half of the amounts paid by appellee Janie J. Lehman toward ongoing student loan payments.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant and appellee were married in August of 1991. Two sons were born to the parties, R.L. (born in 1982) and K.L. (born in 1984). In May of 1998, the parties filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage in the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. Thе court issued a decree of dissolution on June 10, 1998.
{¶3} The dissolution decree incorporated the parties’ separation agreement, Article II(g), which provided for splitting the cost of thе sons’ post-high school education. Said article reads in pertinent part:
{¶4} “Husband shall pay and be responsible for and Husband shall hold the Wife and children safe and harmless with regard to one-hаlf of the college education or continuing education expenses of the children after high school, including colleges, trade schools, and other such educational facilities, and said obligation of the Husband shall include one-half of tuition, book expenses, room and board expenses, and other such expenses. * * * Husband‘s obligations under this paragraph shall terminаted (sic) at the time each child reaches the age of twenty-four.”
{¶6} In 2004 and 2005, appellee filed two contempt motions against appellant, alleging non-compliance with the aforesaid provisions. On August 1, 2005, the trial court rendered a contempt finding against appellаnt and imposed a 30-day jail term, subject to being purged by appellant paying $100 per month toward an established liquidated amount of $3,200 to cover all past expenses, plus $1,000 in attorney feеs.
{¶7} Appellee was further ordered in the August 1, 2005 judgment entry to establish a checking account at Lanfair Federal Credit Union as a designated college expense account for the monthly payments, and to provide appellant with deposit slips. The entry also provided that appellant would be responsible for one-half of the deferred loans.
{¶8} Appellee thereafter filed motions to impose the jail sentence. Appellant responded by filing a motion to vacate the August 1, 2005 judgment entry which had found him in contempt and ordered the establishment оf the Lanfair escrow account. These motions were resolved by an agreed judgment entry on April 16, 2007, which, among other things, (1) acknowledged a $4,000 payment to appellee by appеllant and declared him “current on all ongoing monthly expenses” concerning R.L. and K.L. through March 31, 2007; (2) vacated the 2005 contempt entry; and (3) provided for appellant to thereafter pay $344.31 per month, via deposits into the Lanfair college expense account.
{¶10} The contempt motion proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on January 20 and 21, 2011. Both appellant and appellee took the stand. The trial court issued a preliminary judgment entry on April 19, 2011, in which it stated: “From the evidence offered, the court finds it most difficult to determine what 50% of the total college expense really is.” Id. at 2. The court thus ordered the parties to submit post-trial worksheets and supporting documents by May 12, 2011. Accordingly, both parties submitted worksheets and supporting documentation to the court.
{¶11} The trial court issued its final judgment entry on July 1, 2011. The court dismissed all contempt matters against appellant, but ordered him to pay appellant the amount of $4,502.99 (one-half of $9005.97) at the rate of $300.00 per month. Appellee filed an appeаl from this judgment.
{¶12} On appeal, we reversed and remanded, finding that the court failed to properly calculate the arrearage. Lehman v. Lehman, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 11-CA-43, 2012-Ohio-2082. In footnote two, this Court stated in pertinent part:
{¶14} On remand, the trial court found the amount of the arrearage to be $9,049.24, which hе ordered appellant to reimburse to appellee at the rate of $200.00 per month. The court‘s judgment of December 5, 2012, also states in pertinent part, “The question before the Cоurt concerns footnote number two at the bottom of the last page of the Court of Appeals Opinion. The footnote suggests that it is premature to require the Appellee/Petitiоner-Husband to pay one-half of the total claims because the Appellant/Petitioner-Wife had not paid those sums yet. * * * With respect to Petitioner-wife‘s ongoing loan payments to these loan providers in the future, Petitioner-Husband is hereby ordered to reimburse Petitioner-Wife, in addition to the $200.00 per month previously stated, one-half of the amounts paid toward these loans within seven (7) days, upon Petitioner-Wife‘s presentation of proof of payment to these loan providers. * * * Failure to comply, or untimely compliance, with any of these orders constitutes prima facie grounds for a motion for contempt of this Court.”
{¶15} Appellant assigns a single error to this Court on appeal:
{¶16} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT ORDERED APPELLANT-HUSBAND TO PAY ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE AMOUNTS PAID BY APPELLEE-WIFE TOWARD THE ONGOING LOAN PAYMENTS.”
{¶17} Appellant does not contest the trial court‘s calculаtion of the arrearage on remand. However, appellant argues that the court exceeded the scope of this court‘s
{¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court explained the law-of-the-case doctrine in Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984):
{¶19} “[T]he doctrine provides that the dеcision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels. * * * [T]he doctrine functions to compel trial courts to follow the mandates of reviewing courts. * * * Thus, where at a rehearing following remand a trial court is confronted with substantially the same facts and issues as were involved in the prior appeal, the court is bound to adhere to the appellate court‘s determination of the applicable law. (Citations omitted).”
{¶20} The Nolan court concluded that the trial court had exceeded the scope of a remand when it reworked the financial aspects of the marital home disposition, as it was clear from the appellate court‘s opinion that the sole basis for the remand was occupancy of the marital home. Id. at 4, 462 N.E.2d 410. Ohio courts have followed Nolan and found prejudicial error when the trial court exceeded the scope of a remand from the appellate court. Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 160, 519 N.E.2d 390 (1983); Graham v. Graham, 98 Ohio App.3d 396, 400-402, 648 N.E.2d 850 (1994); State ex rel. TRW, Inc. v. Jaffe, 78 Ohio App.3d 411, 415, 604 N.E.2d 1376 (1992).
{¶21} In the instant case, we remanded solely on the issue of calculation of the arrearage. The language in footnotе two was not tantamount to a remand for the court to enter an order that appellant pay for ongoing loan payment. The footnote was simply
{¶22} The assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Fairfiеld County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed as to the calculation of the arrearage, and reversed as to the order that appellant pay one-half of ongoing loan payments to appellee. This cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings according to law and consistent with this opinion. Costs assessed to appellee.
By: Baldwin, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Farmer, J. concur.
HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
CRB/rad
JANIE J. LEHMAN v. DAVID M. LEHMAN
CASE NO. 13-CA-2
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
2013-Ohio-3622
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio is affirmed as to the calculation of the arrearage, and reversed as to the order that appellant pay one-half of ongoing loan payments to appellee. This cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings according to law and consistent with this opinion. Costs assessed to appellee.
HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER