OPINION
The sole issue in this case is whether cooperative agricultural associations are exempt from paying unemployment compensation taxes. During the four-year period from the third quarter of 1973 to the second quarter of 1977, Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farms [hereinafter “Lehigh Valley”], a cooperative agricultural association, paid unemployment
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compensation taxes totaling $357,733.42. At that time, Le-high Valley believed that it was legally obligated to pay those taxes. In 1977, Lehigh Valley applied for a refund but the Bureau of Employment Security [hereinafter “Bureau”] denied the request. Lehigh Valley appealed and the Commonwealth Court determined that Lehigh Valley was entitled to a refund.
1
The Court, however, limited the refund to taxes paid within ninety days of the refund application.
See Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bureau of Employment Security,
55 Pa. Commw.Ct. 13,
The Cooperative Agricultural Association Net Income Tax Act, Act of May 23, 1945, P.L. 893, § 3, 72 P.S. § 3420-23 (Supp.1982-83) [hereinafter “Cooperative Tax Act”], provides:
Every [cooperative agricultural] association shall be subject to, and shall pay for, the privilege of doing business in this Commonwealth, or having capital or property employed or used in the Commonwealth ... a state excise tax at the rate of four per centum (4%) per annum upon each dollar of net income, which tax shall be collected in lieu of any other excise tax including corporate net income tax or property tax.... (Emphasis added)
Lehigh Valley argues that since both this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have stated that an employer’s contributions to an unemployment compensation *524 fund are excise taxes on the right to employ, 3 and because it pays the income tax provided by the Cooperative Tax Act, it is exempt from paying unemployment compensation tax (“any other excise tax”). The Commonwealth Court was pursuaded by Lehigh Valley’s argument and concluded that the Cooperative Tax Act was “clear and free from all ambiguity” and that it was unnecessary to apply rules of statutory construction in this case. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (words of a statute free from ambiguity are not to be disregarded).
This argument is flawed in two respects. First, the proposition that unemployment compensation taxes are
excise
taxes is not controlling in this case because that finding was not required to decide the issue in any of the United States or Pennsylvania cases cited by Lehigh Valley.
See In Re Pew's Trust Estate,
Second, it is necessary to apply rules of statutory construction simply because unemployment compensation taxes are not explicitly mentioned in the Cooperative Tax Act. It is interesting to note that the Act is sufficiently ambiguous in this regard to have prompted Lehigh Valley to pay unemployment compensation taxes for four years or longer, believing that it was legally obligated to do so. Moreover, the argument that unemployment compensation taxes are excise taxes is derived from case law, not from a straightforward application of any statute.
A required rule of statutory construction provides that a statute exempting persons or property from taxation must be strictly construed.
See Commonwealth v. Rohm and Haas Company,
28 Pa.Commw. 430,
The legislature clearly had taxes other than unemployment compensation taxes in mind when it enacted the Cooperative Tax Act. In the original Act and subsequent amendment, the legislature specifically mentioned certain “excise” taxes, i.e. “income,” “property,” and “use” taxes.
5
Generally, such taxes are imposed without regard to a taxpayer’s unique circumstances. By contrast, unemployment compensation contributions are based in part on an employer’s individual experience rating, i.e. unemployment compensa
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tion benefits actually paid to employees laid off
by that particular employer.
(The fewer the layoffs, the lower the tax.)
6
Then Judge Wilkinson recognized this difference in his dissenting opinion below, and found it strange that the legislature would contemplate “an excise tax in its traditional sense based on what is called a contribution rate”.
See Lehigh Valley v. Bureau, supra
Another required rule of statutory construction provides that in ascertaining legislative intent, the practical results of a particular interpretation may be considered.
See Commonwealth, Department of Transportation Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Von Altimus,
49 Commw.Ct. 245,
Finally, Lehigh Valley claims that its argument is supported by a legislative policy which grants an economically
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“advantageous position” to agricultural cooperatives.
See Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farms v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
8 Commw.Ct. 18, 25,
We conclude that unemployment compensation taxes are not “excise” taxes within the meaning of the Cooperative Tax Act. Consequently, the order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the order of the Bureau of Employment Security, which denied Lehigh Valley’s refund claim, is reinstated.
Notes
. Justice Wilkinson, then sitting on the Commonwealth Court, dissented.
. For this reason, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the appropriate refund period is ninety days or four years. Accordingly, Lehigh Valley’s cross appeal at No. 81-2-263 is dismissed as moot.
.
See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
. For instance, in
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra
. The Cooperative Tax Act explicitly exempted agricultural cooperatives from “corporate net income tax” and “property tax”. In 1978, the Act was amended to exclude “liquid fuel tax”, “fuel use tax”, and “sales and use taxes on registered motor vehicles” from the exemption provision. See Act of July 1, 1978, P.L. 591, No. 112, § I, 72 P.S. § 3420-23, as amended. (Supp. 1982-83).
. See Sections 301 and 301.1 of the Unemployment Compensation Act, 43 P.S. §§ 781, 781.1, as amended (Supp. 1982-83).
. In fact, during the four-year period at issue in this case, unemployment compensation benefits paid to former employees of Lehigh Valley totaled $471,665.
