Legout v. PriceLegout v. Price
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Dunn
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal by William M. Price from a decree of the circuit court of Lawrence county declaring Adolphus M. Legout, the appellee, to be the owner in fee simple of the northeast fractional quarter and the fractional southeast quarter of section 29, township 2, north, range 11, west, containing 154 acres, except 40 acres off the south end of the west half of the latter tract, and setting aside as a cloud on the title a warranty deed from Joseph Legout to the appellant, dated June 28, 1916.
The appellee is the father of Julian, Lewis and Joseph Legout and Georgia For shier, and they are his only living children. Julian Legout, Sr., the father of the appellee, was the owner of the 154 acres of land described above, and on November 10, 1875, executed an instrument concerning it in the following language, omitting the description, the waiver of homestead and the covenants:
“This Indenture, made this tenth day of November, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, between Julian Legout, of the first part, and the heirs of Adolphus Legout, of the second part,
“Witnesseth: That the said party of the first part for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand dollars, in hand paid bythe party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained and sold and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell unto said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, all the following described lot, piece or parcel of land situated in Denison Township, in the County of Lawrence and State of Illinois, to-wit: * * *
“Provided always that Adolphus Legout may retain the possession of, and have the use of the lands above conveyed during his lifetime. It is also understood and agreed that the said Julian Legout do hereby reserve during his lifetime the rent off all the land herein conveyed that is now cleared and in cultivation except the sand hills.
“Together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof; and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever, of the said party of the first part, either in law or equity, of, in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments and appurtenances.
“To have and to hold the said premises above bargained and described with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns forever.”
Adolphus M. Legout was about thirty years old at the date of this instrument, and he had one child, Julian. Afterward three other children were born to him, — Joseph, Lewis and Georgia, who married Bert L. Forshier. On April 14, 1914, the appellee, his daughter and her husband, conveyed by warranty deed to the appellant an undivided one-fourth interest in the 154 acres for a consideration of $2000. By arrangement between the appellant and his grantors and the other children of the appellee the appellant entered into possession of the 40 acres mentioned above, which by an oral partition it was agreed should be his interest in the 154 acres by virtue of the deed to him. There is no question in this suit as to the ownership of this 40-acre tract. On June 28, 1916, the appellant obtained a deed from Joseph Legout for an undivided one-fourth of the 154-acre tract for the consideration of $4000. Adolphus took possession of the land under his father’s deed and continued in possession of the 154 acres until the oral contract for partition was made, and
The appellee contends that by the application of the rule in Shelley’s case a fee simple was conveyed to him by the instrument executed by his father on November 10, 1875-The appellant contends that the rule has no application but that the heirs of Adolphus M. Legout take as purchasers. The contention of neither party can be sustained. The instrument is void for want of a grantee and is inoperative to affect the title in any way. It purports to convey a present estate, but
At common law a deed must contain words of grant, release or transfer in order to pass the title. While it is not essential that formal technical words be used, the entire want of words of conveyance cannot be supplied. There can be no valid and operative conveyance of lands without some words of grant or alienation. (Johnson v. Bantock, 38 Ill. 111.) In that case the only question presented was whether an instrument executed by the sheriff to the plaintiff was sufficient as a deed to pass the title. The instrument stated: “Know all men by these presents, that I have this day sold to Olof Johnson and Samuel Remington the following described tract of land,” (describing it,) and concluded: “and the said Olof Johnson and Samuel Remington are entitled to a deed for the premises so sold, to have and to hold the
The words “give, grant, bargain and sell” are frequently employed and are sufficient in any class of conveyances. Other words frequently used are enfeoff, release, alien, assure and convey. Though none of these formal technical words may be necessary, it is necessary that the conveyance contain words purporting to transfer the grantor’s interest. The words “shall have and be entitled to at and after the death of the party of the first part” are not sufficient; (Brewton v. Watson, supra;) nor the words “sign over;” (McKinney v. Settles, 31 Mo. 541;) nor the words “warrant and defend.” (Hummelman v. Mounts, supra.) The declaration
The object of a proviso is to except something out of the general terms of the grant, statute or other instrument to which it may be attached, and this was the effect of the proviso in Julian Legout’s deed, — to except the use of the lands during the lifetime of Adolphus Legout from the conveyance to his heirs, but it did not purport to convey that use to him. If the proviso is regarded as a reservation it is of no effect to pass the title to Adolphus. A purported reservation in favor of a third person can only take effect as a grant to him by way of exception to the other grant, and in such case there must be words of conveyance to the third person. (DuBois v. Judy, supra; 2 Devlin on Real Estate, sec. 982; West Point Iron Co. v. Reynolds, 45 N. Y. 703; Littlefield v. Mott, 14 R. I. 288; Haverhill Savings Bank v. Griffin, 184 Mass. 419; Stone v. Stone, 141 Iowa, 438; Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73; Herbert v. Poe, 72 Md. 307; Strasson v. Montgomery, 32 Wis. 52; Beardslee v. New Berlin Light and Power Co. 207 N. Y. 34; Redding v. Vogt, 140 N. C. 562.) The words “retain and have the use of” do not purport to convey anything, and the instrument cannot be regarded as conveying a life estate to Adolphus. Since there was no conveyance to him of a life estate, the attempted conveyance to his heirs in his lifetime was void and the instrument was wholly ineffectual.
The appellee had no such title as would sustain his bill, and the decree must be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill.
Reversed and remanded, with directions,