Opinion
Little-known section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution allows states, without offending equal protection, to disenfranchise citizens “for participation in rebellion or other crime.” Petitioners here seek a writ of mandate, claiming that the disenfranchisement allowed by the section is limited to felonies at common law. We conclude that there is no historical evidence supporting the claim. And the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution has never read the word “crime” as petitioners contend. We thus deny the writ.
*451 BACKGROUND
There are seven petitioners in all (collectively, Petitioners), the first two of which are entities; Legal Services for Prisoners with Children and The Center for Children of Incarcerated Parents. 1 The former is a nonprofit organization that promotes “the interests of parents who are incarcerated, on parole, or at risk of incarceration, and their children”; the latter is a private nonprofit corporation that “provides services, conducts research, and produces publications about and for children of criminal offenders and their families.”
The other five Petitioners are individuals, three of whom are on parole for what they assert are crimes that were not felonies at common law, though without specifying the exact crimes of which they were convicted: Ann Marie Taylor and Veronica Briscoe assert that they were convicted of, and are on parole for, violations of the Health and Safety Code; Audra Kettlewell asserts she was on parole at the time the petition was filed, but that her parole was scheduled to expire in February 2008. The other two petitioners, Arlene Robinson and Pat Caetano, assert that they are currently on parole for convictions of felonies at common law.
There are five respondents, all of whom oversee voting in their official capacity (collectively, Respondents). The first is Debra Bowen, the California Secretary of State. The others are the registrars of voters of four counties: Steven Weir (Contra Costa County), Conny McCormack (Los Angeles County), Stephen Jones (Merced County), and Jill Lavine (Sacramento County).
Petitioners originally filed their petition for writ of mandate 2 in our Supreme Court, which transferred the matter to this court. We requested informal responses from Respondents and a reply from Petitioners; we also *452 received briefing from the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and Impact Fund as amici curiae. We issued an order to show cause and heard oral argument. We now deny the petition.
DISCUSSION
A. The General Principles
“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.”
(Wesberry v. Sanders
(1964)
States nonetheless “have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, . . . absent of course the discrimination which the Constitution condemns.”
(Lassiter
v.
Northampton Election Bd.
(1959)
Challenges to state laws restricting the right to vote have typically been brought under the equal protection clause found in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A law disenfranchising voters violates equal protection if there is “purposeful discrimination” and “a discriminatory effect” on
*453
the defendant specifically as a result of that “purposeful discrimination.”
(McCleskey v. Kemp
(1987)
B. The Background: Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Richardson v. Ramirez, Hunter v. Underwood, and the Reconstruction Act
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment exempts from equal protection disenfranchisement for “participation in . . . crime.” As noted, Petitioners raise a single claim: that the exemption in the section is limited to felonies at common law. Analysis of Petitioners’ argument requires that we take an unusual journey — to determine the intent of the post-Civil War Congress in drafting section 2.
Section 2 provides in its entirety as follows: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in *454 Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”
As our colleagues in Division One have distilled it, section 2 “imposes a penalty on states that deny the vote to male citizens 21 years or older, except for those who participated in rebellion or [other] crime, by reducing that state’s congressional delegation.”
(McPherson, supra,
Richardson v. Ramirez
(1974)
The petitioner in
Richardson,
the Mendocino County Clerk, argued that the disenfranchisement of “ex-felons” was exempted from equal protection under section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Richardson, supra,
The
Richardson
holding was recently discussed in
McPherson,
where the Court of Appeal concluded that felony
probationers
could not be disenfranchised under Elections Code section 2106, which “provides that persons
‘in prison
or on parole for the conviction of a felony’ are not entitled to register to vote.”
(Richardson, supra,
The United States Supreme Court has addressed section 2’s disenfranchisement of felons in one other
case
— Hunter
v. Underwood, supra,
Congressional motivation in drafting section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is also instructive. While there is, in the words of Richardson, only “scant” legislative history of section 2, what there is shows that the post-Civil War Congress faced a perplexing dilemma: readmittance of the former rebel states into the Union and adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, would seem to result in a Democratic majority in Congress. Facing the Republican-controlled “Congress when it convened in 1865 after the Civil War, was the urgent problem of insuring that the new representational power resulting from the thirteenth amendment’s abolition of slavery did not redound to the old southern leadership.” (Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment (1960) 46 Cornell L.Q. 108, 109, fn. omitted.)
Given this conundrum, the Republican majority fashioned section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that victory in the Civil War did not result in a Democratic majority in Congress. Earlier drafts of section 2 sought to achieve this by enfranchising African-Americans, but that proved to be politically prohibitive. The solution was to put states themselves in a conundrum, by forcing them either to allow all male citizens over 21 years of age to vote or have the Congressional delegation from that state reduced proportionally. This result proved politically viable, resulting in the current version of section 2. 5 As the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress has observed: “With the abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth *457 Amendment, the African-Americans formerly counted as three-fifths of persons would be fully counted in the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives, increasing as well the electoral vote, there appeared the prospect that politically the readmitted Southern States would gain the advantage in Congress when combined with Democrats from the North. Inasmuch as the South was adamantly opposed to African-American suffrage, all the congressmen would be elected by whites. Many wished to provide for the enfranchisement of the African-American and proposals to this effect were voted on in both the House and the Senate, but only a few Northern States permitted African-Americans to vote and a series of referenda on the question in Northern States revealed substantial white hostility to the proposal. Therefore, a compromise was worked out, to effect a reduction in the representation of any State which discriminated against males in the franchise.” (Cong. Research Service, Library of Cong., The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation (2004) pp. 2033-2034.)
In short, the motivation behind section 2 was to create an enduring framework for apportionment of representatives that also inured to the advantage of the victors of the Civil War.
The Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867 (Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428; Reconstruction Act), on the other hand, was not enduring. It was temporal legislation designed to foster the rebuilding of the Union after the Civil War by “establish[ing] conditions on which the former Confederate States would be readmitted to representation in Congress.”
(Richardson, supra,
C. Disenfranchisement allowed under section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to common law felonies
Petitioners contend that the disenfranchisement for “crime” allowed by section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to felonies at common law. *458 This interpretation, Petitioners assert, advances the framers’ intent and is consistent with the definition of “crime” at the time the amendment was adopted and with contemporaneous legislation, primarily the Reconstruction Act. Petitioners further argue that if section 2 is not interpreted to restrict permitted disenfranchisement to felonies at common law, it would lead to an absurd result. Respondents counter that this issue was already decided in Richardson. They also argue that, even if it were not, Petitioners’ reading of section 2 is contrary to its plain language and does not advance its intent.
At first blush,
Richardson
does appear to foreclose Petitioners’ argument, as the holding is that California may disenfranchise “convicted felons.”
(Richardson, supra,
But however forceful and logical this argument,
Richardson, Murphy,
or
Davis
cannot be read to foreclose this issue. None of these cases expressly considers whether the section 2 exemption is limited to felonies at common law, and “[c]onstitutional rights are not defined by inferences from opinions which did not address the question at issue.”
(Texas v. Cobb
(2001)
That said, the Supreme Court language is compelling. In describing the section 2 exemption, the majority opinion in Richardson used the words “felony,” “felon,” or “ex-felon” at least two dozen times. By contrast, not once did the opinion describe the exemption to apply to “felonies at common law.” 6 Tellingly, Richardson was applied to a respondent who was convicted of drug possession, a crime that was not a felony at common law. Perhaps even more *459 significantly, the Supreme Court cited two cases that upheld the disenfranchisement of felons convicted of non-common-law felonies. It is difficult to believe the Supreme Court would have so held if section 2 were as restricted as Petitioners assert.
But beyond this, all indications are that “other crime” as used in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to felonies at common law. Such indications are found in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the word “crime” elsewhere in the Constitution. And also in the definitions of that word at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
“The normal rule of statutory construction assumes that ‘ “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” ’ ”
(Sorenson
v.
Secretary of Treasury
(1986)
Interpretation of “crime” by the United States Supreme Court in other constitutional provisions has found the word to mean, if not limited by context, a “serious” offense, not a “petty” one. Thus, the Sixth Amendment guarantees that in “all criminal prosecutions” the defendant has the right to a jury trial held in the state or district in which the “crime” was committed. This right has been repeatedly held to apply to “serious crimes,” offenses that carry a minimum sentence of six months or more.
(Baldwin
v.
New York
(1970)
In other situations, the context of the provision limits or expands the meaning of “crime.” For instance, the extradition provision in article IV, section 2 allows a state to extradite any person charged with “treason, felony, or other crime.” Read in context with the words treason and felony, the court concluded that other crime “includes every offence, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offences, and includes what are called ‘misdemeanors,’ as well as treason and felony.”
(Commonwealth of Ky. v. Dennison, Governor, &c.
(1861)
In short, nowhere in the Constitution has the word “crime” been limited to felonies at common law. Rather, “crime” has been read to mean a “serious” offense or, where context requires, all criminal offenses. Nonetheless, Petitioners argue that “rebellion” modifies “crime,” resulting in an idiomatic meaning, i.e., only felonies at common law. This reading, as demonstrated above, is not supported by the plain language of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor by the contemporaneous definitions of crime.
The 1854 edition of a leading dictionary defined “crime” as “[a]n act which violates a law, divine or human.” (Webster’s, American Diet, of English Language (1854) p. 283.) Thirteen years later, the 1867 edition of that dictionary defined “crime” as a “[g]ross offense, or violation of law, in distinction from a misdemeanor or trespass, or other slight offense.” (Webster’s American Diet, of English Language (1867) p. 313.) This edition further explains that the word “crime” means “a violation of law either human or divine; but in present usage the term is commonly applied to actions contrary to the laws of the state.” (Ibid.) “[A]ctions contrary to the laws of the state” by definition include statutory crimes. These definitions are devastating to Petitioners’ argument. So, too, the legal dictionaries.
The 1866 edition of a leading legal dictionary — an edition, not incidentally, published contemporaneous with the adoption of Fourteenth Amendment— defines “crime” as “an offense against public law.” It continues: “[t]his word, in its most general signification, comprehends all offenses; but, in its limited sense, it is confined to felony.” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1866) p. 352.) Nowhere in this primary definition is “crime” limited to felonies at common law. And the fourth definition could not be more on point: “Crimes are defined and punished by statutes and by the common law.” (Ibid.-, accord, 1897 version [“Crimes are defined and punished by statutes and by the common law.”].) In sum, all authorities demonstrate that at the time the *461 Fourteenth Amendment was drafted the definition of “crime” was not limited to felonies at common law. Rather, “crime” meant a serious offense, including statutory felonies.
What case authority there is confirms our conclusion, shown by the holdings of the federal cases directly addressing whether the section 2 exemption is restricted to felonies at common law. Two recent United States District Court cases granting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.) rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss have rejected the claim Petitioners assert here:
Coronado v. Napolitano
(D.Ariz., Nov. 6, 2008, No. CV 07-1089-PHX-SMM)
Perry v. Beamer
(1996)
Notwithstanding all this, Petitioners assert that failing to give “crime” as used in this context a different, idiomatic meaning would lead to an absurd
*462
result, and it would allow the rebel states to artificially decrease the African-American electorate through manipulation of the criminal justice system.
9
According to Petitioners, the rebel states would easily disenfranchise large numbers of African-Americans through conviction of trumped-up charges: “Blacks would inevitably receive harsher treatment from white police, prosecutors, judges, and juries. The only way to limit abuse of the exception for crime was to limit criminal disenfranchisement to a fixed category of offenses.” To support this theory, Petitioners point to the language in the Reconstruction Act that the electorate for the state constitutional conventions is “ ‘the male citizens of said State, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such election,
except such as may be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion or for felony at common
law.’ ”
(Richardson,
supra,
We disagree, and do so with two observations. The first is that the fear of the trumping-up of charges by the rebel states could well have been the reason that the Reconstruction Act read as it did, so that the disenfranchisement in that setting was limited to “felonies at common law.” The second observation is that confirmed by the district court judges in Coronado and Harvey: the different language in section 2 and in the Reconstruction Act shows that Congress knew how to say what it meant.
As demonstrated above, the plain meaning of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is clear and unambiguous. Petitioners show nothing to the contrary, no legislative history showing that crime should be read in the restrictive manner they assert, nothing showing that the 39th Congress ever considered “crime” to be limited to felonies at common law. Our review of the legislative history reveals the same — nothing.
Petitioners argue, citing nothing, that the only logical conclusion is that when the 39th Congress said “crime,” it must have meant felonies at common law. Attempting to explain the lack of Congressional debate or discussion regarding the meaning of “other crime,” Petitioners assert that “[t]he only plausible explanation for the lack of interest in the exception is that the members of Congress were in agreement that the exception was limited to *463 common law felonies and that large scale penalty free disenfranchisement would be greatly impeded by this requirement.” This argument is without any historical or legal support, and we decline to rewrite section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment based on rank speculation.
We cannot conclude this discussion without comment on the difficulties present were we to accept Petitioners’ argument, not to mention the perverse effect such acceptance would have. Specifically:
Petitioners’ fundamental position is that there were 10 felonies at common law: treason, murder, manslaughter, mayhem, rape, arson, burglary, robbery, larceny, and sodomy. (See
Jerome
v.
United States
(1943)
To begin with, while Petitioners’ initial brief listed the 10 crimes as felonies at common law, their reply notes that 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (13th ed. 1989) section 26, “unhesitantly” acknowledges seven common law felonies: murder, manslaughter, arson, rape, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny. A footnote then acknowledges that “prison break” is omitted from some lists of common law felonies.
Further complicating the matter is Blackstone, relied on heavily by Petitioners at oral argument. Blackstone does not present a specific list of common law felonies, but offers the definition of crimes “which occasioned at common law the forfeiture of lands or goods.” (2 Blackstone, Commentaries (1871) p. 353.) Included in this discussion are treason, suicide, homicide, and “petit larceny or pilfering.” (Ibid.) An 1816 legal dictionary lists felonies at common law by their class: crimes “against the life of a man, as murder, manslaughter .... Against a man’s goods, such as larceny and robbery: Against his habitation, as burglary, arson, or house-burning, and against public justice, as breach of prison.” (Williams, Law Diet. (1816).) And one dictionary from the late 19th century lists eight specific crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, arson, burglary, theft, and robbery. (Anderson, Dict. of Law (1893) p. 454.) So, what is Petitioners’ number of felonies at common law? Ten? Seven? Eight? Or is it “10 or so,” the number used at oral argument.
The Attorney General asserts that felonies at common law included numerous other crimes, some statutory in nature. And what California law there is on the subject supports that position. For example,
People v.
*464
Rehman
(1967)
These observations are consistent with the views of a leading hornbook: “In early England, usage and custom were the generally accepted methods of determining the kinds of conduct which warranted punishment. In the course of implementing such standards, the courts refined and molded them to accommodate varying fact situations. Moreover, statutes were passed from time to time supplementing or modifying this decisional law. After centuries of this kind of case-law development and supportive statutes ... a vast body of generally accepted law came to emerge. This body of law came to be called the English common law. When the English colonists came to America, they brought with them so much of the common law as was appropriate to their new surroundings and conditions. This included any English statutes, enacted prior to the Revolution, which had been generally accepted by the Colonies.” (1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed. 1993) Definition and Classification, § 9, pp. 29-32, italics added.)
The issue is further complicated because of the numerous and specific crimes populating California’s Penal Code. For instance, most (but not all) lists of felonies at common law include rape. Would sex crimes similar to, but not identical to, rape be included? Child molestation? Forcible oral copulation? Penetration by a foreign object? Theft crimes offer similar problems. Blackstone’s definition includes “petit larceny or pilfering.” Would this mean a misdemeanor petty theft was a felony at common law?
These questions are only the half of it.
If Petitioners’ argument were accepted, it would mean that someone convicted of larceny, a felony at common law, would not be allowed to vote, however modest the take. But the defendants in
People v. Schoenfeld
(1980)
*465 DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is denied.
Kline, P. J., and Lambden, J., concurred.
Petitioners’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 15, 2009, S170852.
Notes
Petitioners seek class status for two classes of Petitioners: first, all otherwise eligible voters who are disenfranchised because of conviction for a crime other than a felony at common law and, second, otherwise eligible voters who are disenfranchised because they are on parole. They also seek certification as a class of respondents all registrars of voters who are not named parties in this action. As we deny the petition, the class certification requests are denied as moot. We also deny as moot Petitioners’ request for judicial notice of various statistics regarding the population of African-Americans in prison and on parole in California and in the general population in California.
These claims are appropriately raised by mandate, as Petitioners seek to compel voting registrars to perform their “ministerial duty of permitting qualified voters to register. Mandamus is clearly the proper remedy for compelling an officer to conduct an election according to law.”
(Jolicoeur
v.
Mihaly
(1971)
The history of the changes to voting rights in California has been discussed at length in other cases, and we need not repeat it here. (See
Ramirez
v.
Brown
(1973)
The constitutional provision in effect at the time allowed the disenfranchisement of anyone convicted of a felony, regardless of whether they were in prison or had completed parole. After the California Supreme Court opinion, the voters amended the California Constitution in this regard to conform with the dictates of that opinion. (See McPherson, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1478-1479.) The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions have not been changed since. {Ibid.)
We are not the first to confirm this motivation. Justice Marshall in his dissent in Richardson noted that “[t]he Republicans who controlled the 39th Congress were concerned that the additional congressional representation of the Southern States which would result from the abolition of slavery might weaken their own political dominance. There were two alternatives available — either to limit southern representation, which was unacceptable on a long-term basis, or to insure that southern Negroes, sympathetic to the Republican cause, would be enfranchised; but an explicit grant of suffrage to Negroes was thought politically unpalatable at the time. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the resultant compromise. It put the Southern States to a choice — enfranchise Negro voters or lose congressional representation.” (Richardson, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 73-74 (dis. opn. of Marshall, J.), fns. omitted.)
The dissent in
Hayden v. Pataki
(2d Cir. 2006)
In fact, the only time the phrase “felonies at common law” appears in the opinion is when the court is quoting the Reconstruction Act.
Our Supreme Court interprets the California Constitution in a similar manner. For example, in determining the meaning of “fee” and “charge” in certain constitutional provisions, the court looked to how those words were used elsewhere in the Constitution. Doing so, the court noted that “when a word has been used in different parts of a single enactment, courts normally infer that the word was intended to have the same meaning throughout.”
(Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil
(2006)
Language in one California case is also supportive, though not in the context at issue here. That language is in
Flood v. Riggs
(1978)
Petitioners also argue that if section 2 and the Reconstruction Act are not harmonized, the Reconstrdction Act would be contrary to the Constitution, as the latter would impose stricter standards for disenfranchisement than section 2. We easily reject this argument, as section 2 does not apply to the Reconstruction Act. Section 2 applies to certain state elections— executive, legislative, and judicial. The voting provided for in the Reconstruction Act does not fall within any of those three categories. Rather, it set forth the manner of electing delegates to the state constitutional conventions.
