John B. LEEDOM, Relator, v. William THOMAS, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Arguеd April 18, 1977. Decided April 22, 1977. Opinion June 3, 1977.
373 A.2d 1329 | 473 Pa. 193
Stuckert, Yates & Krewson, John J. Kerrigan, Jr., Newtown, for respondent.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This action in quo warranto was commenced on February 24, 1977, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court.1 Relator John B. Leedom contends that he was duly elected to the office of district justice of the peace for magisterial district 7-2-01 and that he has been wrongfully denied his public office.
The writ of quo warranto is granted: respondent is removed from office and relator is declared entitled to the office to which he was elected. See Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976).
NIX, J., dissents.
Opinions to follow.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROBERTS, Justice.
This action in quo warranto was commenced in February 24, 1977, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court.1 Relator John B. Leedom contended that he was duly elected to the office of district justice of the peace for magisterial district 7-2-01 and that he had been wrongfully denied his public office. On April 22, 1977,
I
The facts are not disputed. In January 1975, the office of district justice of the peace for district 7-3-01 was held by Edward E. Dougherty. His term of office was to expire on January 5, 1976. By order of this Court, dated January 13, 1975, district 7-3-01 was reclassified and redesignated as district 7-2-01, effective January 5, 1976. On February 18, 1975, thе election process for the position of district justice for the newly designated district 7-2-01 was initiated by a letter from the Secretary of the Commonwealth to the Bucks County Board of Elections, notifying the Board that the office was to be filled at the November 5, 1975 municipal election and that each eligible political party was to select its nominee at the May 20, 1975 primary election.
On February 26, 1975, respondent William Thomas filed nominating petitions for the office of district justice on both the Democratic and Republican primary ballots. On March 6, 1975, relatоr Leedom and the incumbent district justice, Edward E. Dougherty, also filed cross-nominating petitions.
On April 23, 1975, Dougherty died. In the primary election of May 20, 1975, Leedom was nominated as the Republican Party candidate and Thomas was nominated as the Democratic Party candidate.
On June 9, 1975, the Governor nominated Thomas to fill the vacancy created by Dougherty‘s death. The appointment was for a term ending the first Monday of
By decision of the Bucks County Board of Elections, the office of district justice remained on the ballot in the municipal election. On November 5, 1975, Leedom was elected for a six year term commencing January 5, 1976. The Board of Elections issued a certificate of election to Leedom on November 24, 1975. Nevertheless, on December 16, 1975, the Governor issued a commission to Thomas for the office of district justice expiring on the first Monday of January 1978. Thomas tоok office on January 5, 1976 pursuant to the commission issued by the Governor.
On January 15, 1977, this Court‘s decision in Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976), was published in the Atlantic Reporter advance sheets. After learning of the decision, Leedom requested his commission for the office of district justice for district 7-2-01 from the Secretary of the Commonwealth. He also notified the Bucks County Board of Elections that since the office was filled in the 1975 municipal election, it should not appear on the 1977 ballot.
Under
In Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 459, 366 A.2d 574, 577 (1976), this Court stated that the appointive process of
This case is controlled by our decision in Berardocco. Here, as in Berardocco, although the vacancy arose less than ten months before the 1975 municipal election, the normal election process had already been “triggered by the anticipated expiration of the incumbent‘s term.” 469 Pa. at 457, 366 A.2d at 576. Thus, the “ten month” provision of
Thomas seeks to distinguish Berardocco. He asserts that he ceased campaigning after he was nominated by the Governor to fill the vacancy created by Dougherty‘s death and, therefore, a “normal election process” did not take place. We reject the contention that our decision in Berardocco rested on a finding that the parties had actively campaigned for the disputed office. We stated in Berardocco that the “ten month” provision of
Thomas also raises the defense of laches. This defense bars relief when “the cоmplaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another‘s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Enterprises, Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133, 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, Thompson v. Curwensville Water Co., 400 Pa. 380, 162 A.2d 198 (1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Storb v. Schroll, 398 Pa. 354, 157 A.2d 179 (1960). A party asserting laches must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the lapse of time. Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 334 A.2d 585 (1975); Beaver v. Penntech Paper Co., 452 Pa. 542, 307 A.2d 281 (1973); Young v. Hall, 421 Pa. 214, 218 A.2d 781 (1966); Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180, 205 A.2d 429 (1964); Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 172 A.2d 152 (1961). The question of laches is factual
Thomas argues that Leedom is guilty of laches because Leedom did not institute this action until February 1977. Thomas contends that he has been prejudiced by Leedom‘s delay in the following ways: (1) he retired from the Pennsylvania State Police prior to the May 1975 primary election in order to run for the office of district justice; (2) hе ceased campaigning after the Senate approved his nomination to fill the vacancy; and (3) he has devoted his full time to the responsibilities of his office and has attended courses and done outside reading to improve his skills.5 We conclude that Thomas has failed to establish that he was prejudiced during a period of inordinate delay.
Thomas resigned from the state police on April 2, 1975, before incumbent Dougherty‘s death, the 1975 primary election and Thomas’ appointment to office by the Governor. Thus, his resignation preceded the material events which gave rise to this dispute and bears no relation to Leedom‘s delay in bringing suit.
We also conclude that Thomas’ decision not to campaign in the municipal election cannot make out a defense of laches. Laches is founded on some change in the condition or relations of the parties which occurs during the period the complainant unreasonably failed to act. 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 419d, at 177 (5th ed.
Finally, the time and effort expended by Thomas in connection with the exercise of his duties of office do not establish that he was prejudiced by the delay.8 While these efforts are commendable, we cannot say that
For the reasons discussed above, Leedom was entitled to the writ of quo warranto issued by this Court on April 22, 1977.
NIX, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
I cannot accept the conclusion reached by the majority of the Court that the instant matter is controlled by our prior decision in Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976). In my view, relator John B. Leedom has failed to act expeditiously in instituting this action in quo warranto for his commission as district justice and should be barred from recovery in this belated action by the doctrine of laches.
The pertinent facts of the instant litigation are as follows: Relator and respondent, William Thomas, filed nominating petitions for the primary election of May 20, 1975, for the office of district justice. Edward Dougherty, the incumbent also filed nominating petitions but died on April 23, 1975. In the subsequent primary election both Leedom and Thomas were nominated as the candidates for the municipal election by their respective parties.
On June 9, 1975, respondent was nominated by the Governor to fill the vacancy for the office of district justice for District 7-3-01 which became vacant upon the death of Dougherty. The Senate confirmed the nomination on June 17, 1975.1 Subsequently, Thomas was sworn into office to serve in the post of district justice until the entry of the order in this case on April 22, 1977. The Bucks County Board of Elections declined to remove the position from the ballot in the November 5, 1975 municipal election and Leedom was elected to that
At first blush, it would appear that Berardocco v. Colden, supra, governs the instant matter. There, both relator and respondent were also candidates for the office of district judge. On April 14, 1975, during the course of the primary campaign, the incumbent resigned his commission and the Governor nominated respondent Colden to fill the vacant office for a term ending the first Monday of January, 1978. Following confirmation by the Senate, Colden assumed the office of district justice on June 24, 1975. That same date, Berardocco filed an action in quo warranto seeking to have the appointment declared invalid. We dismissed that complaint without prejudice on the ground that it was premature.
As in the instant matter, relator was elected in the November municipal election to a six-year-term commencing January 5, 1976. When Berardocco failed to receive his commission by that date he immediately instituted a second action in quo warranto. Subsequently, this Court held that relator was entitled to his elective office.
Although in some respects similar, I believe the instant action presents separate and distinct considerations
As defined by this Court:
Laches is an equitable doctrine, and its purpose is for the repose of title, claims and demands for peace and order in society. See, St. Peter‘s Evan. Luth. Ch. v. Kleinfelter, 96 Pa.Super. 146 (1929). The question of its application does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but rather whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party or parties are chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to institute or prosecute the claim: Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947). Gabster v. Mesaros, 422 Pa. 116, 119-120, 220 A.2d 639, 641 (1966).
See also Mulholland v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 405 Pa. 268, 174 A.2d 861 (1961); Heinly v. Keck, 192 Pa.Super. 537, 161 A.2d 655 (1960). The uncontradicted facts of this case establish that more than thirteen months elapsed from the date on which Leedom‘s elected term was to commence until this aсtion was instituted on his behalf. This is so despite Leedom‘s admission that since the latter part of 1975 he was aware of a similar claim being raised in the Berardocco case. Relator asserts that he was awaiting our ruling in that matter before commencing his own suit.4 I believe it was incum-
The majority correctly points out that a рarty asserting laches must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the lapse of time. My quarrel with the majority‘s reasoning is that it confines the inquiry to the possible prejudice of respondent and ignores the prejudice to the citizens who reside within this magisterial district. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Storb v. Schroll, 398 Pa. 354, 157 A.2d 179 (1960). In matters affecting the operations of government the right of the public must transcend the rights of those seeking office. It is a fundamental goal of this Court to obtain an ordered and effective judicial system at every level in this Commonwealth. Today‘s result needlessly frustrates that end. To now remove the present district justiсe and permit Leedom to assume the position, totally disrupts the judicial process in the district in question. During the past 13 months respondent has faithfully and effectively discharged the duties of that office. The people of the district have come to know and rely upon him to serve their needs. Undoubtedly, many matters are presently pending before that court, thus the continuity of the work flow will be needlessly disturbed. There will be in all probability, instances where pending matters will be unduly delayed, possibly to the irreparable prejudice of the litigants. While I agree with the rule announced in our decision in Berardocco, its application here is unwarranted in view of the gross intrusion upon the orderly administration of
entitled to the benefit of a favorable result particularly where his tardiness in instituting an action on his own behalf has substantially and adversely affected the rights of others. Further, even though it is conceded that relator learned of our decision in Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976) on January 24, 1977, he did not commence this action in quo warranto until an additional 31 days had passed.
I also am not willing to dismiss as cavalierly аs the majority has seen fit, the claim that the events which preceded the November, 1976 election in effect deprived a segment of the community of a viable candidate for this office. The majority attempts to discount this claim because respondent was not sworn into office until after the November election of 1976. What the majority ignores is that between the primary election and the general election the Governor had initiated the appointing process which, if legally valid, would have in fact nullified the pending election process. While there was some problem in the confirmation of respondent, see note 1, supra, no challenge was raised to the power of the Governor to appoint for a two-year term during the period between the primary election and the general election. In such a posture it would not have been unreasonable for a segment of the community who supported respondent‘s candidacy to have relied on the Governor‘s power of appointment and to have concluded that the only contingency attached to Thomas’ gaining the office for the stated term was an effective Senate confirmation.
In this context it is significant that in Berardocco the relator initially instituted his action in the month of June preceding the November election. While it is true that this Court declined to reach the merits of the question until after the election, it was nevertheless important to the decision in that case that all parties were put on notice of a cloud over the validity of such an appointment and, therefore, should have been fully cognizant of the possible significance of the forthcoming election. In contrast, in the instant case, there was no reason for the citizens of this district to have questioned the validity of the appointive process.5 Under these circumstances it cannot be said that it would have been unreasonable for
that the appointment had caused either of the parties to withdraw from active campaigning.I fail to perceive how a court, which has on prior occasions, exhibitеd serious concern over the possibility that a major political party might be deprived of a candidate for an office in a general election, can here display such an insensitivity to that problem by rendering a decision which creates that result. Cf. Chalfin v. Specter, 426 Pa. 464, 233 A.2d 562 (1967). In Chalfin, Mr. Specter who was then serving as the elected District Attorney for the City of Philadelphia ran for the Republican nomination for the office of Mayor of that City without first resigning from the office of District Attorney as required by the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. The decision in that cause was handed down betwеen the primary and the general elections. The members of the Court could not agree upon an opinion but at least four members decided that Mr. Specter as District Attorney was a city officer and thus covered by the provisions of the Charter.
“Under these very unusual facts and circumstances, are the people of Philadelphia to be denied the right to
vote for a candidate for Mayor on one of the two major tickets, i. e. the Republican ticket, . . . .” Id. at 472, 233 A.2d at 566.
At a later point in his opinion he answered this rhetorical question as follows:
“Under these exceptionally unusual circumstances, I believe . . . . Specter should be permitted to be a candidate for Mayor of Philadelphia without resigning his office as District Attorney. To hold otherwise, under all the very unusual facts and circumstances and exigencies hereinabove set forth, would be a gross miscarriage of Justice!“” Id. at 477, 233 A.2d at 568. (Emphasis added).
In my judgment the circumstances are more compelling in the case at bar for refusing relief to relator then they were in the Chalfin case for declining to take action against Mr. Specter for the breach of the Charter provision.
Moreover, it necessarily follows that if Leedom were entitled to hold the office from January 5, 1976, he is equally entitled to receive the salary from that date. Since the question of back pay is not properly before this Court in an action in quo warranto, Meyer v. Strouse, 422 Pa. 136, 221 A.2d 191 (1966), there is nothing to preclude a subsequent demand on the part of relator, and thus the people of this Commonwealth are left exposed to
Finally, the appropriateness of the application of the doctrine of laches under these facts is emphasized by the fact that the appointive term would have expired on the first Monday of January, 1978. The election process for the municipal election to be held in November, 1977 has already begun and both relator and respondent have filed their respective nominating petitions. If the situation had been left undisturbed, the people of the district in question would have had an opportunity to select, in a viable election, their choice tо fill the new six-year-term. In my judgment such an approach would have better served the ends of justice.
For the stated reasons, I would deny the Writ.
Notes
On May 20, 1975, certain amendments to the“A vacancy in the office of justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be filled by appointment by the Governor. If the vacancy occurs during the session of the Senate, the appointmеnt shall be with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the members elected to the Senate, except in the case of justices of the peace which shall be by a majority. If the vacancy occurs during sine die adjournment of the Senate such appointment shall not require advice and consent of the Senate. The person so appointed shall serve for an initial term ending on the first Monday of January following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs.” (emphasis added).
I do not share the belief that a party who sits idly by to await the outcome of a lawsuit to which he is a stranger, is necessarily“Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be elected at the municipal election next preceding the commencement of their respective terms of office by the electors of the Commonwealth or the respective districts in which they are to serve.”