3 Minn. 448 | Minn. | 1859
By the Qov/rt
This was an action brought by the Appellant in tbe District Court for tbe Sixth Judicial District, to recover lot number ten, in block twenty-seven, in tbe town of Mankato. Tbe Complaint alleges that on tbe 14th of February, 1853, tbe Plaintiff, in conjunction with other parties therein named, selected lands in which lot ten, block twenty-seven, are embraced, being 318 88-100th acres, on tbe town site of Mankato; that at tbe time stated the Company took possession of, and made settlement on tbe lands under tbe municipal pre-emption law of 1844, and by themselves and those bolding under them, built upon and
The answer denies the selection and settlement of the lands as stated in the complaint, and also the continuous occupation —and denies that the persons named in the complaint ever maintained improvements upon or occupied for town purposes any of the lands, except that two of the persons named settled upon claims embracing parts of the lands sej>arately and occupied them until 1856, then abandoned them; that Plaintiff as an individual built certain houses on the lands but never personally occupied the same nor resided thereon, and occupied none of the lots except those built upon. It further denies notoriety of occupation, and denies that entry was made under or pursuant to application of Judge Ghatlield, but avers that it was pursuant to application of his successor, Judge Elandrau, and denies that the settlement upon which the Government parted with its titles, was that of the parties named in the complaint,
The evidence taken upon the trial of the case is voluminous, and numerous exceptions wore taken to the rulings of the Court upon the reception of evidence, and the charge to the jury. Much of this evidence is irrelevant to the real issues in the case. These issues are presented in a very inartistic form by the pleadings, which are also encumbered by matter having no legitimate connection with the real issues in the case. It will be unnecessary to notice more than two or three of these exceptions, as a correct ruling upon the points involved in those will be decisive of the case.
The Plaintiff claims the lot in question as one of the occupants of the town site of Mankato, entered under the act of Congress of May 23d, 18M. That part of the act applicable to this case reads as follows : “ That whenever any portion of the surveyed public lands has been or shall be settled upon and occupied as a town site, and therefore not subject to entry under the existing pre-emption laws, it shall be lawful in case such town or place shall be incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof, and if not incorporated, for the Judge of the County Court for the county in which such town may be situated, to enter at the proper land office and at the minimum price, the land so settled and occupied, in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof according to their respective interests. The execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such town, and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be conducted under such rules and regulations as
Under this act the United States Government permits the entry of a certain quantity of land which has 'been “ settled upon and occupied as a town site,” and designates the party who is to hold the title “ in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, according to tlieir respective interests.” For a party claiming, under this act, one of the first requisites is to show that the land he claims has been entered in accordance with the provisions of the law, and that the government lias parted with its title to the same. Upon this branch of the case, nothing is pertinent save an inquiry into the simple fact, as to whether the proper Land Office or Department has authorized the entry of the land in question as a town site. The State Courts have nothing to do with the question as to whether such entry was properly or improperly made, as to whether sufficient or legal proof was made to entitle the applicant to enter: nor, indeed as to whether there was any proof at all. Those are questions entirely and only within the province of the Register and Receiver of the Land Office, and their decision thereon, (or that of the proper department when appeal is taken,) must be final and conclusive in the matter. The duplicate of the proper Land Office on such entry is evidence that the tract therein described "has been “ settled upon and occupied as a town site,” in accordance with the law, and that fact cannot be litigated in the State Courts. Consequently, any evidence having for its object to prove that the settlement and occupation, under which the entry was made, was insufficient for such purpose, is irrelevant and improper, save as proving who the occupants were in behalf of whom the application was made.
In order to show a right of recovery in this action, the Plaintiff must prove that he was an “ occupant ” of the premises, in the sense intended in the act of Congress above referred to. The pleadings allege that the Plaintiff was one of the Company wlio selected the town site of Mankato, that the Company settled upon the said site, and built upon and occupied the same. -(Proof was introduced tending to estab
“ The occupancy contemplated by the municipal pre-emption law of Congress, the act under which the parties to this action respectively claim that they are entitled to the relief prayed for by them in' the complaint and answer in the action, is of the same character as the occupancy required in the agricultural pre-emption act. That the proof of occupancy in both cases must be the same; that before a person can avail himself of the benefit of the municipal pre-emption law, he must show himself to be a resident upon the town site and in personal occupancy of the premises to which he asks title,” — to which charge exception was taken.
This charge was incorrect, and calculated to mislead the j ury. The language of the pre-emption act of 1841 is essentially different from that of the municipal pre-emption act of 1844. The former is limited as to the age of the person entitled to its benefits, as to his nativity, requires the party to make settlement “in person,” aud to “inhabit and improve the same,” and “ erect a dwelling thereon,” prohibits him from leaving his own land to make settlement on the government land^ and also from owning three hundred and twenty acres at the time of making his pre-emption. On all of these points the act of 1844 is silent, and where the pre-emption right has been so carefully guarded in the one case, and in another and subsequent act all these restrictions are omitted, it would certainly be a strange construction to hold that they must be supplied by implication. It is true, both acts speak of a settlement, but the act of 1844 defines what settlement is intended, viz: “ settled upon and occupied as a townsite,” while the previous act, both in terms, and in the construction which the Department has placed upon it, limits the settlement to agricultural purposes. Nor, going outside the letter of the statute, do we find any authority in the reason of the case, for placing such construction upon the act, as was given by the Court below. The object and idea of settling and building a town is not for
The question of occupancy, as before remarked, becomes material in this case, only so far as may be necessary to show who the occupants are or were for whose benefit the trust was created. And in_ this connection it will be proper to inquire, «whether there is any limit as to time, within which a person must show himself an occupant, in order to claim the benefit of the act of 1844. While the act does not in terms fix any limit, a careful examination of its provisions, will aid in determining tlie question. It will be observed that before it is lawful to enter land under this law, it must have been settled upon and occupied as a town site. If such be the case it may be entered for tlie “ several use and benefit of the occupants
If this view be correct, then the refusal of the Court below to charge the jury in the following language, was error, to wit:
“If the jury find from the evidence in the cause that the proof of occupation and settlement upon which the land embraced within the town site of Mankato, was afterwards entered, was made at the proper land office on the --day of March, 1856, and if they further find from the evidence that the settlement and occupation of the Defendant, did not take place until some time in the month of May, 1856. In that case they must find against the Defendant, he not being an occupant within the meaning of the act of Congress; that
It is true that the request to charge as above stated, stand, ing alone as an abstract proposition might not be strictly correct, as parties might have derived equitable interests subsequent to proof made from those who were occupants at the time of such proof. But taken in connection with the pleadings before the Court, we think the request was proper. Bor the Defendant does not pretend to derive his title from any occupant of the town site of Mankato, but claims as an original settler thereon. Whether his answer as it is stated in the case before this Court, sets up sufficient facts to entitle him to affirmative relief, might well admit of doubt were the question raised. But as no objection has been raised to it on that ground, it is not necessary to consider the point.
The counsel for the defendant urges that a construction of the act of 1844, by which it should be held that only those who were occupants at the date of the application to enter, were entitled to the benefits of the law, would lead to great wrong and injustice. And he supposes the case of a shrewd speculator, who might select a favorable location for a town site, and without making settlement, and in order to prevent others from securing any rights which might arise from settlement and occupany, should induce the Judge to make application to enter the land as a town site, but should defer making proof until it suited his convenience to make settle- ■ ment and occupy. In the mean time, other persons, finding the land vacant, settle upon and occupy it. The Counsel affirms it would be monstrous to. hold that these last parties had no rights, because an application had been previously filed by the Judge to enter the land as a town site.
It is a sufficient answer to the Objection to state that the case supposed is by no means analogous to the one at bar. The Counsel for the Plaintiff did not request the Court to charge, that the rights of the occupants must be determined as they existed at the date of the application to enter the town site, nor does this Court so hold. We propose to go no far
We think the Court below also erred in some of its rulings on questions concerning the introduction of evidence. But it is deemed unnecessary to discuss those points, as a correct ruling upon the fundamental issues of the case, which have been dwelt upon at some length in this opinion, will probably relieve the case of its principal embarrassment. A new trial is granted.