*1 light applicable judgment upon development of all the facts further able circumstances, disposition then the facts that the defense raised case of law and 401(b)(15) of the becomes matter under issuer Section must be may grant summary judg- the trial court tested the crucible of a trial. mere- We ment. require ly pleadings, affidavits, that depositions, evidentiary admissions or other at Mayfield, 735-36. materials genuine establish that there is no Lambrecht, In we found issue of material fact and that reasonable by refusing court erred to direct verdict differing minds could reach not inferences for the investors at the close evidence or conclusions that the issuer has or has is a after trial. directed verdict mecha proof not satisfied his burden of concern- jury nism which the controls the ing exemption all of the elements claimed. hands, by taking jurors’ out of the case See, Buckner v. Corp., General Motors delayed summary like and acts somewhat (Okl.1988). motion in it determines that genuine no there are issues fact that The summary judgment is REVERSED Friedenthal, the jury. need to be sent to and the case is remanded further supra at 540. ceedings not inconsistent opinion. with this sufficiently the record Lambrecht HARGRAVE, V.C.J., HODGES, developed testing after adversarial such LAVENDER, OPALA, WILSON, that, ALMA together taken the stipula- when SUMMERS, JJ., parties KAUGER and applicable tions of and the concur. stat- utes, no issue of fact existed submit to SIMMS, J., dissents. jury disposition the case question became a of law for the court. Id. Here, contrast, signifi- the most
cant feature of the record us is its granted
paucity. summary judg- briefs, upon pleadings, par- based tial admissions and affidavits. INC., FREIGHT, LEE WAY MOTOR May- The instant case is similar to PepsiCo, Inc., Petitioners, field, we in support where found the record summary judgment might reasonably WELCH, Loyd conclusions; therefore, Claimant-Respondent. support differing E. summary judgment inappropriate. No. Mayfield, at 736. The here record reflects Supreme Court of Oklahoma. questions of material fact exist whether the carried interests this “third for a Nov. quarter deal” supervisory and the fee ex ceeded a reasonable fee for the services
actually question performed; a material working
fact exists whether the interest had diluting
retained the effect of in funds; and,
vestors’ material knowledge
fact exists whether the
business skills of the made investors them requiring protection
members a class We,
the Oklahoma Securities Act. there
fore, misapplied conclude the trial court granting summary
Lambrecht and erred
Our not decision should be taken to mean summary grant the trial court *2 Morrison,
Albert M. Kenneth N. McKin- Roark, ney, L. McKinney, Stringer Robert Webster, Green, Turner, & and Charles C. Turner, Braun, Green City, & Oklahoma Case, and White City, & New York Schiff, Waite, Chicago, Ill., Hardin & petitioner, PepsiCo, Inc. Gravitt, Gossett, Stipe, Stipe,
Lew Har- per, Estes, Parks, McCune & Oklahoma City, claimant-respondent. OPALA, Justice. questions
Three
are tendered for our re-
view:
[1]
Does the out-of-state
parent
com-
pany’s guaranty
subsidiary—a
for its local
necessary
device
to assure the latter enti-
ty’s continued status as an Oklahoma own-
employer—make
risk
liable
payment
of benefits awarded
guaranty,
effective date of the
where the
default in
occurred af-
ter the
guaranty’s
revocation?
[2]
Did the
Workers’
Court err
in-
cluding
co-obligor
the guarantor—qua
bankrupt
subsidiary
the now
own-risk
who
employer—as
party
was the
an additional
certifying
codebtor in the order
the obli-
gation for
the district
district court in accordance with the terms
partial disability payments continued until
disability that
firmed
motion, the trial tribunal
remittances of benefits.
ruary
tion
demnity fund tax of
fees of
ary
the affirmative.
Inc.,1
or
of Lee
October
disability totaling
he
on May
sion. Lee
Co,
Oklahoma own-risk
To
ings
required
award for
affirmative and the second
court?
Claimant received
Loyd
employer],
was a
the third
temporary
Inc.
Court allowed claimant
we answer
1984 award Workers’
Way
E. Welch
Lum v.
$3,381.
[PepsiCo
passenger
Way,
1985 the
specify
Motor
default?
three-judge
suffered an
total
Court
Is
then
when
This order was
when
on the
an order of the
[claimant],
$16,905,
or
Freight,
employer. By
was involved in a
all
due
certifying an
first
$338.10
guarantor],
Following
we also
subsidiary
Lee Way
the truck in which
permanent
review
certified on
him;
Upon
on-the-job injury
temporary
Motor
*3
in
less
balance to the
Inc. [Lee
an
respond
permanent
Compensa-
special in-
claimant’s
panel.
ceased all
employee
Workers’
negative.
later
Freight,
counsel
partial
teach-
Pepsi-
Janu-
total
colli-
Way
Feb-
af-
an
in
Way
facial
to a
amount of the
ed as a district court
enforced. We hold that in this
certify
definite and
order under review is
has not reduced the award’s
sion in
siCo’s
law which
support
er the Workers’
equal
cated
tion
claimant had secured
basis
test. That
anty
Way
The
specific
came
Motor
inwas
obligation.
for the
force
infirmities—(1)
remaining
guaranty
Lee
Claimant relies on
the certification
Way’s
its liability
govern
revoked
Way
It
Freight,
sum,
propriety
default is
be certified
guaranty, accepted by
was hence filed below after
compensation liability.5
this award and
employer-subsidiary
because
ceased to meet that
are stated
district court a
issue for review is wheth-
the order cannot be treat-
The
Inc.4
I
the award whose
on the award in
enforceability
general principles
PepsiCo
award there to be
order
ambiguous
fraught
finding
PepsiCo’s
They apply
PepsiCo’s
unpaid portion
certified
was
Lum v. Lee
conclusively
Court must
on
respect
with two
that Lee
July
revoked
August
specific
and in-
of Pep-
adjudi
as the
inclu
order
guar
por
con
of O.S.Supp.
1983 422
28 of
and Rule
§
THE TRIAL
FINDING
TRIBUNAL’S
the Workers’
Court.3
OF DEFAULT IS TOO VAGUE
that order the trial
neither reduced
AND INDEFINITE
to a lump sum nor made a finding with
certifying
The trial court’s order
respect to
specific
un-
partial
permanent
disabili
January 3,
balance then due on the
ty for execution and enforcement
PepsiCo,
guar-
award in default.
finding
district court rests on its
that:
antor, who
was included
the certification
Order,
entering
“2.
since
said
Re-
...
party obligor,
as an additional
comply
brought
spondent has failed to
herewith
proceeding
the instant
for correc-
tive relief.
in accordance with said Order.”
mail,
delivered,
given by
1.
The
provisions.
interpretation.
insurers violate the Act’s
judicial
One
indefinite for
ex-
terms of
ation.16
fication order for district court enforce-
give
certified award the
To
Way—the employer—was
ment. Since Lee
judg
efficacy of a district court
force and
bankruptcy
obligation
pay
then in
ment,
duty-bound
suspended by
the award stood
force of
due and
find the amount that was
law,
only
federal
Although
in default.
under the award
obligor against
is-
whom
could
hearing re
transcript of the certification
sue. The certification of the
undisputed testimony as to the un
flects
facially
execution and enforcement is
amount,
nothing upon the face
there is
(a)
infirm because
the trial tribunal’s find-
gives
order that
it the
of the certification
ing
in “compliance”
that Lee
was not
for a sum certain.
quality
vague
ambiguous
was too
to establish
legal
of an
suffi
No
assessment
order’s
(b)
its default and
the certification order’s
ciency may
made on the basis
failure
to reduce the
to an
alone
is the
transcript, because it
prevents
becoming
amount certain
it from
placed
county
of record in the
which is
enforceable district court
clerk’s office and on the district court’s
short,
judgment docket.17 In
the award’s
THE ORDER IS ACCORDINGLY SUS-
amount must
always
ascertain
TAINED IN PART AND THE MOTION
examination of
able from a four-comers’
TO CERTIFY IS REMANDED
DI-
WITH
the certified award.
RECTIONS TO SPECIFY HOW AND
OCCURRED,
WHEN DEFAULT
IN-
SUMMARY
THE
CLUDE IN
CERTIFICATION OR-
DER THE UNDISPUTED AMOUNT OF
The certification order under review does
ARREARAGE,
TOTAL
DETERMINE
qua
sine
non standard
meet the
THE
RATE
APPLICABLE
OF ACCRUA-
correctly
definiteness. The trial tribunal
INTEREST,
BLE
AND
THE
INSERT
that the claimant in this
ruled
case could
DATE FROM WHICH
guarantor’s
INTEREST ON
secondary liability
invoke the
THE
Way’s compensation obligation
for Lee
CERTIFIED AMOUNT IS TO BE
guaranty
accepted.
existence when the
*6
CALCULATED.18
16.The
ernaw,
LAVENDER Appellant, v. Marvin E. concur.
SIMMS, J., Oklahoma, Appellee. concurs result. STATE of No. F-86-917. WILSON, J., part. ALMA dissents Appeals Criminal of Oklahoma. KAUGER, J., recused. Oct. WILSON, Justice, dissenting ALMA part: part majority I dissent
opinion which concludes the order is incapable
review of enforcement in the conformity
district court. I would hold jurisdictions those which consider that enforcement copy filing
is initiated
of the award in the district court where judg- renders a automatically
that tribunal [emphasis accordance with mine] See, No.
the award. footnote opinion, majority citing Durham Iron Durham, 62 Ga.App.
Co. v. 7 S.E.2d Camp Fidelity v. U.S. Co., Guaranty
& Ga.App. 157 S.E. (1931). sought The amount obviously fig-
enforced a definite award is immediately
ure and ascertainable in a hearing by district court reference sim-
ple arithmetic. The district court’s judg- (not
ment thereon Compensa- judgment)
tion Court is subsequently ten-
dered integri- execution. Otherwise the
ty of the district court’s appa- impinged by foreign
ratus is tribunal.
Moreover, I see no adopt proce- reason to *7 may encourage
dure which delay in the Compen-
sation awards.
