102 Minn. 74 | Minn. | 1907
Appellant company was operating a planing mill, consisting of a one-story wooden structure eighty feet long and twenty two feet wide. The machines were located on the main floor, and about eight
September 14, 1905, Knute G. Lee was engaged in running a surface planing machine on the main floor. He was directed by the foreman to go with another employee and push the tightener into an upright position for the purpose of loosening the belt, that it might ~be relaced. The men went up the stairway, and by means of the joists, plank, rafters, and studding climbed up the.wall and shoved -.the tightener forward, holding it until the belt was repaired, when
The personal representatives of the deceased base their claim for damages upon the ground that appellant was negligent in directing-Tee to assist in the work of shoving forward the tightener without providing a reasonably safe place for him to do his work. The complaint charged that on September 14, 1905, the belt needed relacing, and Tee was directed by appellant to leave the machine which he was. operating and ascend to the girders above and help shove forward the belt tightener, in order that the belt might be repaired; that he was ignorant of the manner and method of doing the work, but that' he was directed by appellant to climb up on the timbers and studding-of the north wall, and acted in the manner so pointed out to him;that after adjusting the tightener, and when about to descend, he stepped upon the 2x4 scantling brace, not knowing it was insecurely fastened at the end which rested against the blower pipe, and the brace, not being securely fastened, slid out of position under his weight, and on account thereof he was thrown to the floor below. Appellant contended in the court below, and also on this appeal, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the allegations of negligence,, because there was an entire absence of proof that it was feasible to-•maintain a ladder, or other special means, for descent at the point in-question, and that the evidence completely failed to show that the absence of guards or platforms was the cause of decedent’s fall; that the evidence does not show that the brace was provided by appellant as a foothold for the use of its servants; and that the evidence is. not sufficient to show that Tee stepped on the brace, or used it as a means of getting down.
The following facts were shown with reasonable certainty: The mill had been in operation for a number of months, that it was necessary to repair the belt which ran from the main shaft to the blower about every two months; that in order to make such repairs the mill
While the evidence does not precisely indicate how Tee came to fall, ,and it is possible that he may have slipped or lost his balance while
The question of contributory negligence was also for the jury. Appellant requested the court to charge the jury:
The plaintiff cannot recover in this case, unless you find from-a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has been negligent in the way claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint.
The court charged as follows:
Now, the defendant owed the duty to the decedent to exercise ordinary care by furnishing safe tools and-implements for his use, and having a proper place in which to prosecute his work, and a reasonably safe means of access to and from his work. If the defendant failed in any of these particulars, and by reason of such failure decedent was injured, then plaintiff would be entitled to recover, unless you should find that decedent’s negligence or carelessness contributed in some way to-his own injury.
This excerpt must be read in connection with the entire charge. The material element of negligence charged in the complaint was that appellant failed to furnish a safe place in which to do the work; but,
Appellant also requested the court to charge:
If you find that the evidence does not show what caused Knute G. Lee to fall, but that the cause of his falling is a matter of guesswork, conjecture, or speculation, then your verdict must be for the defendant.
This was refused; but the court did charge that, if the jury should find from the evidence that Lee’s fall might reasonably be attributed to any other cause than the negligence alleged in the complaint, then the verdict must be for defendant. Appellant insists that by this instruction the jury were left to guess as to the cause of Lee’s fall, even though they should find there was no evidence reasonably tending to show that he fell by some other manner than as charged in the complaint. This criticism might be warranted, if it included all the court had to say on the question; but, when the entire charge is considered,, it is plain that the court fairly explained to the jury that they could not return a verdict for respondent, unless by a fair preponderance of the evidence they found that appellant was negligent in the manner charged in the complaint, and that such act of negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
Appellant also took exception to the charge of the court on the assumption of risk. By selecting certain portions of the charge the point may be made that certain statements of the court are incomplete; but, when considered in its entirety, it cannot be reasonably claimed that the court did not fairly present to the jury the true rule of law in that respect. The court at some length went over the different phases of the evidence and used the following language, which is criticised:
But the decedent did not, when he entered the service of • the defendant, assume the risks and dangers occasioned by the carelessness or negligence'of the defendant; or, to restate the proposition, he did not assume the dangers or risks incident to-the failure upon the part of the defendant to perform duties it owed to its employees. And if the decedent’s injury in this.*80 case was the result of the ordinary risks and dangers of his occupation, then he could recover no damages for such injury; * * * but if the decedent’s injury was occasioned by the negligence or carelessness of the defendant, then plaintiff may recover, unless decedent’s own carelessness or negligence in some way contributed to his injury.
This part of the charge is not, of itself, complete. In another connection the court said:
If you find from the evidence that said Knute G. Lee did actually know the dangers and appreciate the risks to which he was exposed at the time of the accident, or that in the exercise of ordinary care or prudence and the use of his senses he should have known such dangers and appreciated the risk thereof, then your verdict must be 'for the defendant.
And again:
Said Knute G. Lee was himself required by the law to exercise such care for his personal safety at the time and place of the accident as a reasonably prudent and careful man would have exercised under the same circumstances. If he failed to do so, the plaintiff cannot recover.
The complaint charged appellant with negligence in failing to provide a platform across the girders between the lower end of the tightener and the north wall, as well as negligence in failing to provide handholds and ladder in order to get up and down; and the court charged the jury that, “if the platform in question and the wall back of the belt tightener were the means used by the defendant to enable its employees to stand while making the repairs in question, then the defendant was bound to exercise reasonable care to have the said platform so floored or properly covered and guarded as not to be dangerous to persons required to pass upon or stand thereon.” According to the evidence, there was no platform, but merely a plank laid across the cross-beams upon which the men stepped or stood. It is evident that the court meant that, if the space between the tightener and the north wall had been completely covered, then decedent would
We find no errors in the other assignments.
Order affirmed.