15 Mo. App. 205 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1884
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiffs were trustees in a deed of trust made to secure the payment of certain promissory notes. The net proceeds of the sale of the property on foreclosure, in the hands of the trustees, were claimed by three different persons: Thomas T. Turner, the original payee of the notes ; Brainard M. Million, to whom the principal note was delivered, after maturity, by Turner; and William Roemheld, to whom this note was delivered by Million as collateral security for a loan. These persons were made defendants, and were required to interplead for the fund. Each defendant, in a separate answer, sets up the grounds upon which he claims the proceeds of the sale. On hearing, the court decreed that the interplea'of Million be dismissed, and that out of the money paid into court by plaintiffs, $3,000, with interest from August 22, 1881, at ten per cent, be paid to Roemheld, who is required to surrender into
It appears from the evidence that on February 22, 1876, August Rohn and wife executed to plaintiffs a deed for a lot of ground in St. Louis to secure seven promissory notes of same date, all made by Rohn to the order of Turner, as trustee of Rebecca Briggs, all bearing interest after maturity at ten per cent; the principal note was for $9,000, payable in three years; the other notes were interest notes for $450 each, payable at intervals of six months. The three first maturing interest notes were paid. The other notes were not paid, and the taxes for 1878 were also not paid. The deed contained a covenant that Rohn should pay all taxes, and for default in this respect, or in payment of any of the notes, the trustees were empowered to sell on thirty days’ notice by advertisement. Rohn died in 1878. In March, 1879, the trustees, at the request of the holder of the notes, advertised the property for sale. This advertisement was not inserted for thirty days, but for twenty days only, owing to a mistake of the trustees. A sale was, however, made under this defective notice, and the property was knocked down to Turner, the holder of the notes, at $6,000. The trustees applied the net proceeds of this sale first to the interest notes, which were thereby extinguished and cancelled, and then to the principal note, on which a credit of $4,633.08 was indorsed. The trustees then made a deed to Turner for the property with the usual recitals. Turner took possession without objection ; the tenants attorned to him ; he paid delinquent taxes and remained in peaceful possession, believing that the foreclosure was valid, until July 1, 1881, when an offer was made to him to purchase the property for $9,000. Turner ac
We need not inquire whether, upon this state of facts, Million is entitled to recover from Turner aiiy expenses to which he may have been put, or compensation for his trouble and loss of time in endeavoring to enforce the recovery from the estate'of Rohn of any supposed balance due upon the note after the credit had been made upon it by mistake. No such claim against Turner is, or could be, set up in the present proceeding.
The first inquiry will be as to what Million took by the assignment of Turner. If the assignment had been made before maturity for value, in the absence of any express agreement between the parties to the contrary, the assignment of the note would have carried with it the collateral. Goodfellow v. Stillwell, 73 Mo. 17; Logan v. Smith, 62 Mo. 455, But in the present case the note was assigned after it was dishonored ; and the minds of the assignor and assignee met upon this — not that the collateral should go with the note, but that the collateral was exhausted, that it had ceased to exist; that having been applied to, and swallowed up, so to speak, by the note, and the note being still unsatisfied, recourse should be had to the general assets of the maker. Million was to discover such assets if he could, and to make them available if he could, toward the payment of what yet remained due upon the note after the sale of the collateral and the application which had been already made
Million, certainly, took no assignment of the deed of trust. He took none at law, because no legal assignment of that instrument was made. He took none in equity by the assignment of the debt secured, by reason of the equitable considerations just mentioned above.
Is Eoemheld, as to this, in any better condition than his assignor? The general rule is, that the transferee of negotiable paper to whom it is transferred after maturity, acr quires only the actual right and title of the transferrer. Not only was the Eohn paper overdue when Eoemheld bought it, but it was stamped with almost every note which could define dishonor. It was long past due; it was assigned
Quia me vestigia terrent
Omnia te adversum spectantia, nidia retrorsum.
The least inquiry, either of Turner or of Million, must have elicited the fact that Million had no right to pledge the Rohn note in such a way as to carry with it the deed of trust securing it. Even Million must have disclosed this ; for it was obvious to inquire, why, if he owned the Rohn note, any one else was directing the trustees to foreclose, or why, if he was directing the foreclosure advertised for September 2d, he desired to borrow $3,000 for one year, on the 18th of August, on the security of a note which must, if well secui’ed, be paid in two weeks. It may be said that proceedings were already on foot to enjoin this foreclosure; but an inquiry into these proceedings would have given Uhlman or Roemheld the actual knowledge for the absence of which Roemheld assumes the attitude of an innocent purchaser without notice. It is well settled that every one is conclusively presumed to know those things which he might have known if he chose to ask a question that it was his duty, in ordinary prudence, to ask. Notice means the means of knowledge of which a person wilfully neglects or refuses to take advantage. We are of opinion, that taking this note after maturity and without inquiry, Roemheld stands in no better position than the transferrer; and that, as the deed of trust did not pass with the note to Million, neither can it be looked to by Roemheld for satisfaction of the note which he took from Million.'
But we are cited to the doctrine that, where, of two innocent persons, one must sustain a loss occasioned by the fraud of a third, it must fall upon the one who put it in the power of the third one to commit the fraud. Of this doctrine, there can be no doubt. It is said that this doctrine is applied by the supreme court in the case of the Interna
We are of opinion that the decree herein should be reversed and the cause remanded. It is so ordered.