207 P. 623 | Mont. | 1922
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action to recover damages for alleged false and fraudulent representations made to plaintiff by the defendant relied upon by the plaintiff, as a result of which he was induced to purchase from the defendant at face value two overdue promissory notes executed by one Thomas C. Smith, secured by chattel mortgages on certain automobiles, aggregating in amount $3,366.35. Seven thousand dollars are claimed as actual and $2,000 as exemplary damages. Upon issues joined, the cause was tried before a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, defendants moved the court for a nonsuit, which was granted, and judgment thereupon entered for defendants, with their costs. The appeal is from the judgment, and from the order denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
But one question is presented decisive of the case, viz.: Did the court err in granting a nonsuit?
It appears that one Thomas O. Smith was, on January 1, 1918, indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,606 and interest, represented by two promissory notes past maturity; that the plaintiff had on that date commenced action to recover thereon, in which an attachment issued and levy was attempted to be made upon certain automobiles covered by two chattel mortgages of record, executed by Smith as mortgagor, in favor of the defendant bank, mortgagee. In an effort to pro
In several instances the sheriff took from the possession of persons claiming ownership by purchase from Smith, automobiles covered by said chattel mortgages, resulting in actions in claim and delivery, all of which terminated adversely to the plaintiff. See the case of Luther v. Lee, 62 Mont. 174, 204 Pac. 365. In this action plaintiff seeks actual damages for loss of the amount paid to the bank by him in exchange for the Smith notes and chattel mortgages, the amount of Smith’s independent indebtedness to the plaintiff, and for the expenses and costs incurred by him in litigation in an endeavor to recover the property covered by such mortgages. By way of proof of the alleged fraud and misrepresentation,' it appears that the defendant Garvey, acting as the agent of the defendant bank, represented to the plaintiff, at and before the purchase by him of Smith’s notes and the chattel mortgages securing the same, that such mortgages were in full force and effect; that none of the property described therein had been released or discharged from the liens of the same, and that they were unpaid and undischarged. Plaintiff was one of the organizers of the defendant bank, its vice-president, and a member of its board of directors and loan committee.
The plaintiff Lee testified on direct examination, in part, as follows: ‘ ‘ G. T. Garvey was engaged in business in Hardin,
And as regards his connection with the bank and familiarity with its business and affairs, he testified on cross-examination: “I can’t say that I did anything at all on my own volition about the matters of the bank. I talked the matter over with Mr. Bowman and Mr. Garvey; Mr. Garvey more than Mr. Bowman. From month to month, as I attended the directors’ meetings, I went over the various notes and discounts handled by the bank. Some of them I approved; some we would agree on; some we would not agree on. At any rate, I exercised my judgment on them. Then after September, 1917, along that year, the Smith notes came before the bank for consideration several times during the year. As to whether I inquired at any time as to the status of his financial condition, I would like to answer that so the jury and judge and all will understand. When we first was going to organize this bank, Mr. Smith goes to Mr. Garvey and wanted a loan, and I told Mr. Garvey not to let Mr. Smith go too far, and I says, ‘ Get security. ’
“By the Court: Did.you so testify—that is the question. A. Well not in this ease here now. I did so testify in the Luther ease. Continuing quotation of the testimony on page 60 of the witness in the case of Luther v. Lee: ‘Q. And at a meeting held before you bought that note, weren’t Mr. Smith’s financial conditions talked over and the fact disclosed he had sold a lot of this mortgaged property? A. Well, there was some, yes, sir. I think Mr. Garvey was authorized by some of the directors to make Mr. Smith pay this note. Q. And you knew then before you bought this note in question that Smith had disposed of a lot of the mortgaged property and the notes hadn’t been paid, didn’t you? A. I would not say “a lot.’’ ’
“Mr. Enterline: This is on page 60: ‘Q. Didn’t you know at all times yourself that Smith in the automobile business was disposing of mortgaged property? A. Well, not all the time; no, I didn’t. Q. Didn’t you know, Mr. Lee—in the first place you started, you and he, to build a building, and that fell through, didn’t it? A. It never got much of a start. He fibbed to me a little bit, I guess. Q. So you knew his financial condition was such .that he was doing business by borrowed mouey, secured by mortgages, did you? A. Yes, sir; he was
John H. Kifer, a witness for the plaintiff, who occupied the position of sheriff in Big Horn county in 1918, testified, in part: “I recall a transaction that Mr. Lee had with reference to some chattel mortgages against a man named Thomas C. Smith. With regard to that transaction, I think I was present when any inquires were made as to the status of the property covered by the mortgages. As I recall it, it was the day that we took the mortgage up at the Stockmen’s Bank. I don’t think I talked with anybody at the Stockmen’s National Bank, but I heard the conversation, I think, that was directed there with Waddell and Lee; I think was there. I think the conversation was had with Mr. Garvey. I heard something in that conversation that was said by Mr. Garvey, for instance. It was with reference to whether or not he gave Smith permission to dispose of any of the property, automobiles. I heard Mr. Garvey say, in response to that inquiry, that he had not. That is practically all, I believe, that I just
John L. Waddell, a witness for the plaintiff, testified, in part, as follows: “I was in the law business in the month of January, 1918. I had something to do as the attorney of Mr. Lee with reference to some chattel mortgages owned by the Stockmen’s National Bank in the month of January, 1918. I was present when some conversation was had between Mr. Lee and Mr. Garvey with reference to some chattel mortgages. If I remember correctly, the time when this conversation was had was the morning of January 21, 1918, in the Stockmen’s National Bank in the town of Hardin. I recall who was present when that conversation was had. Mr. Garvey and Mr. Lee and myself were present. There was nobody else present right at that time. I know a man named Kifer who was sheriff at that time. As to whether he was present at that time, he was present at a second conversation that we had, and Mr. Kifer and Mr. Garvey and Mr. Lee and myself. As to what was said and what was done at that conversation, Mr. Lee had me prepare papers for an attachment against the property of Mr. Smith, and we checked up the items on the mortgages held by the Stockmen’s National Bank and the Ballantine State Bank against property of Mr. Smith. That was in the first conversation. Mr. Lee was present. Mr. Garvey and I cheeked that over. As to how long after the first conversation the second conversation was had, it occurs to me that
The plaintiff then offered in evidence the testimony of 0. T. Garvey, taken by deposition in the case of John Luther v. Walter O. Lee et al., and four other cases then pending in the district court of Big Horn county. On direct examination he testified: “After the taking of these three mortgages which have been testified to, and which are attached to the complaints which I have identified, I did not at any time give
The foregoing synopsis constitutes the gist of all of the plaintiff’s testimony offered in support of his complaint.
As defined in our statute, section 7480, Revised Codes of
As to whether actual fraud has been practiced is a question of fact (sec. 7482, Rev. Codes 1921), and the burden of proof is upon the one who alleges it. (Lindsay v. Kroeger, 37 Mont. 231, 95 Pac. 839.)
In order to go to the jury the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case embracing the elements of actual fraud, viz.: (1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity, or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance upon its truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) and his consequent and proximate injury. (26 C. J. 1062.)
“When it appears that a party, who claims to have been
“One cannot secure redress for fraud where he acted in reliance upon his own knowledge or judgment based upon independent investigation.” (26 C. J. 1162.)
In our opinion the district court properly granted a non-
Since it is essential that the party to whom a misrepresentation is made should be deceived thereby, and believe it to be true, one can secure no redress for a misrepresentation, which he knew to be false, nor for failure to disclose facts which he knew to exist. If the representee knew the truth, it is obvious that he was neither deceived nor defrauded, and that any loss he may sustain is not traceable to the representations, but is in effect self-inflicted. The facts disclosed in this action present a case falling clearly within the rule of caveat emptor under the great weight of authority. The evidence was not sufficient to take the case to the jury. The weakness of plaintiff’s position prompts the remark that just because one brings a lawsuit or appeals a case to this court is not indicative that either is meritorious. Under all of the evidence submitted, the plaintiff failed to prove his case, and in our opinion the nonsuit was properly granted.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
'Affirmed.