{¶ 3} Three years later, appellee requested an administrative adjustment of appellant's child support obligation through the Child Support Enforcement Agency [hereinafter CSEA]. Appellant filed an objection to CSEA's initial recommendation that appellant's child support obligation be increased. A hearing was held on appellant's objections on July 17, 2003, before a Magistrate.
{¶ 4} The Magistrate issued a Decision on October 15, 2003. Appellee filed objections to the Magistrate's Decision. After a hearing on appellee's objections, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry on January 29, 2004, which increased appellant's child support obligations, thereby ordering that appellant pay child support in the amount as calculated through the use of a child support computation work sheet and the child support guidelines.
{¶ 5} It is from this Judgment Entry that appellant appeals, raising the following assignments of error:
{¶ 6} "I. The trial court abused its discretion by modifying child support without making a finding that the modification was in the best interests of the children.
{¶ 7} "II. The trial court abused its discretion by modifying child support without making a finding that the substantial change in circumstances was not contemplated at the time of the original child support order."
{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has addressed what constitutes sufficient grounds for a modification of a prior child support order. In DePalmo v.DePalmo,
{¶ 10} "[I]f a support order already exists, the only test to determine whether child support shall be modified is set forth by R.C.
{¶ 11} "If an obligor or obligee under a child support order requests the court to modify the amount of support required to be paid pursuant to the child support order, the court shall recalculate the amount of support that would be required to be paid under the support order in accordance with the schedule . . ., and if that amount as recalculated is more than ten per cent greater than or more than ten per cent less than the amount of child support that is required to be paid pursuant to the existing child support order, the deviation from the recalculated amount that would be required to be paid under the schedule . . . shall be considered by the court as a change of circumstance that is substantial enough to require a modification of the amount of the child support order."
{¶ 12} "In determining the ten percent figure, the court takes into account all other factors required by R.C.
{¶ 13} "The law favors settlements. However, the difficult issue of child support may result in agreements that are suspect. In custody battles, choices are made, and compromises as to child support may be reached for the sake of peace or as a result of unequal bargaining power or economic pressures. The compromises may be in the best interests of the parents but not of the child. Thus, the legislature has assigned the court to act as the child's watchdog in the matter of support. Id.
at 115,
{¶ 14} In this case, a new child support worksheet was completed. The resulting figure was more than ten percent larger than the amount of child support originally ordered to be paid. Thus, pursuant to DePalmo
and R.C.
{¶ 15} We now turn to the Marker standard. In Marker v. Grimm (1992),
{¶ 16} Thus, in order to deviate from the amount of child support calculated by using a child support worksheet, a trial court must find that the calculated figure is unjust or inappropriate to order as child support and would not be in the child's best interest. However, there is no need to make the reverse findings, ie. that the amount of child support as calculated by using the child support worksheet is just and appropriate and in the child's best interest, if the trial court intends to order the calculated amount of child support. The amount arrived at by using the child support worksheet and guidelines is rebuttably presumed to be in the child's best interest.
{¶ 17} Appellant also argues that the trial court could only modify child support if it found that the substantial change in circumstances was not contemplated at the time the original support order was issued. Appellant relies upon R.C.
{¶ 18} In Monti, this court held that a "court need not modify support in accordance with the computation if the change in circumstances was contemplated at the time of the existing child support order." However,Monti was decided prior to the DePalmo decision, and, therefore, is not dispositive.
{¶ 19} As stated above, in DePalmo, the Ohio Supreme Court held that once a substantial change is found pursuant to the ten per cent test, the trial court is to set child support at the amount set by the guidelines unless that amount would be unjust or inappropriate and not in the best interest of the child. DePalmo,
{¶ 20} Thus, in order for the trial court to continue a deviation, appellant had to produce evidence demonstrating that a deviation should be granted. Accordingly, there was no requirement that the trial court find that the substantial change in circumstances was not contemplated at the time the original support order was issued.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 22} The judgment of the Tuscarawas Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Edwards, J., Wise, P.J. and Boggins, J. concur.