175 P. 873 | Mont. | 1918
delivered the opinion of the court.
In March, 1910, W. A. Longley agreed to convey to Thomas E. Laughery nineteen lots in Laurel, and, in consideration thereof, Laughery agreed to convey to Longley the Miller ranch " in Carbon county. Longley made his conveyance, but Laughery, being unable at the time to comply with his part of the contract, conveyed to Longley another ranch known as the “Laughery”
The complaint contains two so-called causes of action — one to quiet title, the other in ejectment. The answer contains certain admissions and denials not now material, and an affirmative defense in which is recited the transactions between Longley and Laughery, followed by allegations to the effect that the deed and contract constituted a mortgage, that no proceedings for its foreclosure had been instituted, and that the Laughery ranch was at all times of much greater value than the Miller ranch. There was reply to the new matter, and upon a trial to the court without a jury the issues were determined in. favor of plaintiff. From an order denying him a new trial, defendant appealed.
The findings made by the lower court refer to the deed and contract, to the conveyance to the Yellowstone Land & Grain Company, and to the deed to plaintiff. There is a finding that plaintiff obtained title without notice of any claim by defendant except such as might have been conveyed by defendant’s possession; that defendant had secured a lease of the Laughery ranch from Longley; and that he had not performed or offered
(1) That the contract between Longley and Laughery was an agreement on the part of Longley to reconvey on condition to be performed by Laughery within a specified time, and that, by reason of Laughery’s failure to perform or offer to perform, he could not assert any claim to or interest in the Laughery ranch.
(2) That defendant had held possession by virtue of a lease.
(3) That the leasehold interest had terminated; and
(4) That plaintiff is owner of the Laughery ranch, and his title thereto should be quieted.
The judgment establishes title and right of possession in plaintiff and awards him possession and his costs. It then proceeds to declare that the claim of defendant is invalid, and he is enjoined from further asserting it.
1. The complaint does not state a cause of action to quiet title.
2. There are in the complaint sufficient allegations to state a cause of action in ejectment, and it is not contended, and could not be, that plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case upon that theory. When Laughery conveyed the land to Longley by deed absolute in form, he placed it within the power of Longley to convey a fee-simple title to anyone who paid value without notice of Laughery’s outstanding claim, and upon the pleadings and undisputed evidence the court had before it, at the close of
' 3. The burden was upon the defendant to overcome this prima facie case, and this he sought to do, first, by an attempt to show that Lee purchased with actual knowledge of the outstanding equity; but upon the conflicting testimony the trial court determined the issue in plaintiff’s favor, and the evidence fully sustains the finding.
4. In the second place, defendant relied upon the recordation of the Longley-Laughery contract as imparting constructive notice. By the terms of that agreement Longley was the party to be charged. He agreed that if a tender was made of a sufficient deed to the Miller ranch, or its cash equivalent, he would accept the tender and reconvey the Laughery ranch. It is
5. It was not necessary for plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that he paid an adequate consideration for the Laughery
6. It is suggested by appellant that there is not any evidence
•7. It cannot be said that this cause was tried as a suit in
The order is affirmed.
''Affirmed.