149 Iowa 345 | Iowa | 1910
The nature of the former adjudication relied upon by defendant as a bar to this action and held sufficient on demurrer will be apparent by reference to the report of the case on appeal to this court. See Ries v. Hemmer, 127 Iowa, 408. In that case Kies, suing as taxpayer, asked that the officers of defendant be restrained from paying any money under the assumed contracts which plaintiff now sets out in his petition, and this court, holding
It is contended, however, that the firms represented by plaintiff, although not formally parties to the prior adjudication, were bound thereby for two reasons: First, it is said that in the former action Kies, suing as a taxpayer, represented all the taxpayers of the school district, and an adjudication in his favor was binding upon all the taxpayers, including the members of the contracting firms. Many eases are cited in support of this contention, and of these the following may be here mentioned as typical on the proposition presented: Cannon v. Nelson, 83 Iowa, 242; Clark v. Wolf, 29 Iowa, 197; State v. Rainey, 74 Mo. 229; Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122 (13 N. E. 161, 5 Am. St. Rep. 502); Sauls v. Freeman, 24 Fla. 209 (4 South. 525, 12 Am. St. Rep. 190). And see note to Henderson County v. Henderson Bridge Co., 116 Ky. 164 (75 S. W. 239, 105 Am. St. Rep. 213), where other cases are cited. These cases are predicated upon the thought that, where a taxpayer secures an ad
But it is plain that this plaintiff is not suing as a taxpayer, and that neither he nor the firms whom he represents have now, or ever had, any claims wffiich they were asserting as taxpayers either in their own right or in behalf of the public. Certainly it is not true that an adjudication in an action by a taxpayer against a public corporation to which an alleged creditor of the corporation is not made a party can bind such creditor as to the validity of his claim. Town of Lyons v. Cooledge, 89 Ill. 529. The case of Scotland County v. Hill, 112 B. S. 183 (5 Sup. Ct. 93, 29 L. Ed. 692), relied upon by counsel for_ appellee, is not in point, for in that case, involving the right of the plaintiff to recover on county bonds, it was found that there was a prior adjudication, in an action to which a holder of other bonds was expressly made a party, that such bonds were invalid, and the court therefore held that plaintiff, having acquired his bonds with notice of the pendency of the prior suit affecting their validity, could
The case is very well illustrated by those cases in which it has been held that, in a suit by stockholders against a corporation to enjoin its officers from carrying out a contract alleged to be illegal and prejudicial to the stockholders, the other party to the alleged illegal contract is a necessary party to the suit. New Jersey Cent. R. Co. v. Mills, 113 U. S. 249 (5 Sup. Ct. 456, 28 L. Ed. 949); East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Grayson, 119 U. S. 240 (7 Sup. Ct. 190, 30 L. Ed. 382). Thus in Russell v. Wakefield Waterworks Co., L. R. 20 Eq. Cas. 474, a suit by shareholders in an incorporated company to restrain its officers from making alleged illegal payments to the officers of another company, it was said: “If the subject matter of the suit is an agreement between the corporation acting by its directors or managers and some other corporation or some other person strangers to the corporation, it is quite proper and quite usual to make that other. corporation or person a defendant to the suit, because that other corporation or person has an interest, and a great interest, in arguing the question and having it decided once for all, whether the agreement in question is really within the powers or without the powers of the corporation of which the corporator is a member. So that in these eases you must always bring before the court the other corporation.” As illustrating the want of privity between the officers and one who is making a claim against the corporation which a stockholder seeks to enjoin the corporation from paying, it is pertinent to refer to the case of Mexican Ore Co. v. Mexican, etc., Mining Co. (C. C.) 47 Fed. 351, in which it was held that, while an injunction in such a case was binding upon an officer of the defendant corporation acting as such so 'that he might be punished for violating it although not made a party in name, yet, after resignation as an
The only actual connection which the parties represented by plaintiff are alleged to have had with the litigation between Dies and the officers of this defendant is that resulting from the fact that one of the members of each of the firms now represented by plaintiff was called as a witness and testified in behalf of the defendants in that suit in relation to the validity of the contracts involved, and that each of said witnesses was present during a part or all of the trial of said case and fully cognizant of the proceedings therein. No cases are cited by counsel for appellee in support of the proposition that one becomes party to a suit, even though he may have an interest in the result, by appearing therein to testify as a witness at the call of one of the parties carrying on the litigation; and we venture to think that no such eases can be found. The proposition is manifestly unsound and unreasonable. Equally without support in any adjudicated case to which our attention has been called is the contention for appellee that one who is cognizant of litigation, the result of which may affect his interests, and is present at the trial, will be bound by the result. Plainly there must be some obligation imposed upon one who is not party or privy to a suit, and who does not in fact actively maintain or defend it or take some charge or control of it, to see that the prosecution is carried on or the defense made before he will be charged with the result as binding upon him. 1 Freeman, Judgments (4th Ed.), section 189. The case of Tredway v. Sioux City & P. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 663, when considered wdth reference to the issues actually involved, gives no support to the contention made for appellee. That was a case in which a taxpayer of the county asked to have set aside a decree rendered against the county in an action brought by a railroad company awarding specific performance of a contract to convey swamp land, and to have the
Tbe action of the court in overruling tbe demurrer to tbe divisions of tbe answer in which defendant sought to interpose tbe plea of a prior adjudication and in rendering judgment for tbe defendant was erroneous, and tbe judgment is reversed.