Thе origin of this lawsuit reaches back in time and across jurisdictional boundaries. Plaintiffs were members of a class in an action originally filed in fedеral district court
The federal district court certified the case as both a plaintiff’s and defendant’s class action, but only as to the claims under Title VII. Thompson v Bd of Ed of Romeo Community Schools, 71 FRD 398, 418 (WD Mich, 1976).
In an opinion issued on October 19, 1979, the federal court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add claims under Michigan law which related back to the filing of the original complaint. The district court certified the classes as to the state claims.
In a subsequent ruling, the district court refused to decertify either the plaintiff or defendant classes.
Thompson v Bd of Ed of Romeo Community Schools,
On October 12, 1983, the present plaintiffs filed this cause of action in the circuit court, alleging violations of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101
et seq.;
MSA 3.548(101)
et seq.;
the
Defendants filed an answer stating that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and filed a motion for accelerated judgment. In an opinion issued September 14, 1984, the circuit court granted defendants’ motion for accelerated judgment. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.
The issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the stаtute of limitations or whether they were tolled during the pendency of the federal court action. The trial court opined that the issue wаs settled by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mair v Consumers Power Co,
In Mair, the Supreme Court held that a proceeding before a federal administrative agency doеs not toll the operation of the statute of limitations as it relates to a subsequent lawsuit in a Michigan state court. Mair involved a claim brought in а state circuit court subsequent to the dismissal of a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, filed pursuant to §706 of Title VII of thе Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq.
However,
Mair
can be distinguished from this case in several respects. First, in
Mair,
the defendant did not receive notice of the plaintiffs state clаims until the filing of the action in the circuit court. The Supreme Court specifically noted,
"Here, defendant was on notice of an administrativе investigation under federal law, but was at no time during the period of the running of the statute of limitations put on notice of the possibility of having to defend a lawsuit under state law.” (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.)
In this case, defendants received notice of the state claims against them four years prior to the filing of this action. It will be recаlled that this case was filed in 1983, and the complaint in the federal court action was amended in 1979 to add the state claims (which related back to the filing of the original complaint in 1975).
Second, in
Mair,
the plaintiffs administrative complaint was dismissed on the merits. Then, instead of filing a lawsuit in federal court within 90 days after such a dismissal, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court after the 90-day period had expired. The Supreme Court commented as to thе apparent election of the plaintiff,
"Plaintiff made a deliberate choice of that forum, and she had the opportunity to have her case decided on the merits both before the EEOC and in federal court had she filed a timely complaint there. If, indeed, plaintiff nоw simply wants her case decided in a different forum under different law, then that, in and of itself, would defeat the purpose of the tolling statute.”
In this cаse, there has never been a ruling, either by the federal court or the circuit court, on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.
Third, and most obvious (although in an analytical sense the least significant) is that
Mair
was concerned with federal
administrative
proceedings, rather than with federal lawsuits. We could distinguish
Mair
solely on that ground if we wished. However, wе choose to distinguish
Mair
on the
Thus, without any Supreme Court decision to constrain our holding in one direction or another, we reconsider the question as to whether plaintiffs’ claims should be barred by the statute of limitations. The concerns of the Supreme Court in Mair —forum shopping and notice — are not present here.
We conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims under the Fourteenth Admendment and 42 USC 1983 are, neverthеless, barred by the statute of limitations. It will be recalled that when the federal district court certified the case as a class action, it оnly certified the claims under Title VII. In
Crown, Cork & Seal Co, Inc v Parker,
Therefore, pursuant to
Crown, Cork & Seal Co,
the federal district coúrt’s refusal to certify plaintiffs’ Fourtеenth Amendment and 42 USC 1983 claims on May 27, 1976, caused the period of limitation on those claims to begin to run. The applicable period of limitation is only of three years duration,
Gilbert v Grand Trunk Western Railroad,
However, the result is different for the claims under state law. It will be recalled that, although the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 USC 1983
This Court has previously held that the filing of a federal lawsuit tolls the operation of the statute of limitations,
Ralph Shrader, Inc v The Ecclestone Chemical Co, Inc,
Affirmed in part; reversed in part. No costs.