Ms. Deborah Jane Lee appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which reduced the spousal maintenance obligation of her former husband, Mr. Randall Jay Gorn-bein, and denied her request for attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and enter judgment under Rule 84.14, reducing the maintenance award from $900 per month to $500 per month.
I. Factual and ProceduRal Background
When Ms. Lee and Mr. Gornbein divorced in October 1999, the trial court awarded Ms. Lee $900 per month in maintenance. At that time, Ms. Lee worked for a Lowe’s home improvement store in Columbia, Missouri. She continues to work there and has since changed jobs, *55 with an increase in pay. The trial court found that Ms. Lee earns $850 more per month than she did at the time of the divorce.
At the time of the original marital dissolution, Mr. Gornbein worked for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) as a salaried manager. After MetLife eliminated his job in April 2000, Mr. Gornbein accepted another job with MetLife as a commissioned salesman. Mr. Gornbein quit that job in March 2002 for personal reasons and now works for the Guardian Life Insurance Company. Since the divorce, Mr. Gornbein has remarried. In June 2001, shortly before remarrying, Mr. Gornbein and his new wife moved to her hometown of Edwardsville, Illinois, from which Mr. Gornbein now commutes to his job with Guardian in the St. Louis suburb of Chesterfield, Missouri.
In May 2001, Mr. Gornbein filed a motion to terminate or reduce his maintenance obligation. As grounds for modification, Mr. Gornbein cited Ms. Lee’s receipt of money following the settlement of a personal injury lawsuit. 1 On January 15, 2002, Mr. Gornbein filed an amended motion to modify, where he cited a substantial involuntary decrease in his income since the divorce and a decrease in Ms. Lee’s reasonable monthly expenses since the divorce. 2
Ms. Lee filed a counter-motion to increase the maintenance obligation and requested that the trial court order Mr. Gornbein to pay her attorney’s fees.
The trial court issued its judgment and reduced the maintenance from $900 per month to $400 per month. The trial court further denied Ms. Lee’s request for attorney’s fees. 3
Ms. Lee raises six points on appeal. In the first five points, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the modification of the maintenance award. In her sixth point, she challenges the denial of her request for attorney’s fees.
II.STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We will affirm a trial court’s order modifying a dissolution decree unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law.”
Draper v. Draper,
III.Legal Analysis
A. General Principles
Once a trial court has awarded maintenance, it may modify that award “only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms [of the original award] unreasonable.” § 452.370.1.
4
The party seeking modification bears the burden of proving such changed circumstances with detailed evidence.
Laffey v. Laffey,
Section 452.370.1 gives the trial court considerable discretion in modifying maintenance, and the appellant must demonstrate an abuse of that discretion.
Id.
The trial court abuses its discretion when its order is against the logic of the circumstances and is “ ‘so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration; if reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said [that] the trial court abused its discretion.’ ”
Id.
at 546-47 (quoting
Nelson v. Nelson,
As a general rule, a “substantial and continuing” change in circumstances is one that renders the obligor unable to pay maintenance at the assigned rate or one that allows the recipient to meet his or her reasonable needs with less maintenance.
Martino v. Martino,
With these general principles in mind, we consider Ms. Lee’s first five points. Four of the points relate in some manner to Mr. Gornbein’s ability to pay the original maintenance award. We consider those'points first. We then consider Ms. Lee’s point regarding her reasonable needs.
B. Evidence Regarding Mr. Gornbein’s Ability to Pay
1 Mr. Gornbein’s Job Changes
The trial court expressly found that Mr. Gornbein’s reduced income “is not because of his voluntary action” and assessed Mr. Gornbein’s ability to pay maintenance based upon Mr. Gornbein’s current rate of pay. In her fifth point, Ms. Lee argues that Mr. Gornbein voluntarily quit his old job for a new one in which he earns less money and that this does not constitute a substantial and continuing change in his circumstances under section 452.370.1. In her third point, she further argues that the trial court should have focused upon Mr. Gornbein’s long-term earning capacity instead of his short-term rate of pay in the new job.
A voluntary reduction in income does not amount to a substantial and continuing change in circumstances.
See, e.g., Draper,
Mr. Gornbein has changed jobs twice since the divorce. The first change occurred in April 2000, when MetLife consolidated three offices and eliminated his job as a salaried manager. By all accounts, this change was involuntary. Afterwards, Mr. Gornbein accepted another job with MetLife as a commissioned salesman. Although the new job with MetLife apparently was not as lucrative as the old one, Mr. Gornbein’s income did not decrease uniformly, in part because of a decreasing incentive plan. In the dissolution year, 1999, he earned $66,121. In 2000, his gross income actually increased to $75,104, before falling to $50,701 in 2001.
The second job change occurred in March 2002, when Mr. Gornbein quit his job with MetLife and accepted a new job with Guardian Life Insurance Company (Guardian). This change was deliberate and voluntary. As Mr. Gornbein explained, he left MetLife because “[t]he situation at the office had continued to decline, and it was not a pleasant place to work.”
Cf. Forhan,
We disagree with Mr. Gornbein that
Markowski v. Markowski
supports the proposition that such a job change is involuntary.
See
Moreover, the evidence does not show that the decrease in income is permanent.
Cf. Calicott v. Calicott,
Ms. Lee further argues that the trial court should have considered Mr. Gornbein’s earnings history rather than his rate of pay at the time of trial. Ms. Lee correctly reminds this court that “[a] party’s past, present, and future earning capacity can be considered as competent evidence of a party’s ability to pay maintenance.”
Nelson v. Nelson,
And compared to Mr. Gornbein’s current rate of pay, his earnings history paints a broader picture of his ability to pay maintenance. Mr. Gornbein earned $66,121 in 1999; $75,104 in 2000; and $50,701 in 2001. Mr. Gornbein earned $30,604 with MetLife in 2002 before his departure from that company and would have earned another $29,750 with Guardian during that year, potentially giving him a gross income of $60,354 for 2002. At the time of the modification proceeding, however, Mr. Gornbein explained that MetLife was disputing his entitlement to more than $29,000 of the $30,604. He had not returned the disputed money at that time and did not intend to do so, but he could not determine how the matter would be resolved. Because of this dispute with MetLife, it is not clear how much Mr. Gornbein actually earned in 2002. Assuming that Mr. Gornbein was allowed to keep all of the money from MetLife, however, he would have earned $60,354 in 2002, even though his rate of pay dropped to $3,500 per week (or $42,000 per year), when he began working for Guardian in the second half of the year. 6
Ms. Lee cites no case for the proposition that the trial court must consider such evidence instead of the obligor’s actual earnings at the time of modification. We need not resolve this issue, however, because even if Mr. Gornbein has sustained a permanent decrease' in income, the evidence still shows that he has the ability to pay the original maintenance award, given the state of his expenses. We now address that issue.
2. Mr. Gornbein’s Expenses
Ms. Lee’s first and fourth points generally relate to the evidence regarding Mr. Gornbein’s expenditures. In her first point, Ms. Lee contends that Mr. Gorn-bein’s past expenditures belie the claim that he cannot continue to pay the original maintenance award. In her fourth point, Ms. Lee contends that the trial court failed to consider the expenses that Mr. Gorn-bein now shares with his new wife.
a. Past Expenditures
In her first point, Ms. Lee challenges several of Mr. Gornbein’s claimed expenditures. She contends that Mr. Gornbein’s past expenditures establish his ability to pay the original maintenance obligation. According to the point relied on, these expenditures include: (1) the deposit of $4,000 into IRA accounts for Mr. Gorn-bein and his new wife; (2) discretionary education expenditures of $6,769; (3) a one-time job fee of $5,150; (4) $320 per month in life insurance “for others”; (5) increased car expenses; (6) expenses de *59 ducted on tax returns; and (7) the purchase of a new home. 7
A review of the record shows that many of these were one-time expenditures made before Mr. Gornbein took his current job with Guardian in 2002. These include the IRA purchases, the $6,769 in education expenses, and the job search fee of $5,150, all of which date from 2001. Ms. Lee has not directed us to any evidence on this issue beyond the fact that Mr. Gornbein once incurred such expenses. As a result, we cannot say that the trial court erred in its consideration of this evidence as it relates to Mr. Gornbein’s current ability to pay maintenance.
The expenses related to Mr. Gornbein’s car and his home are a different matter, however. As discussed in subsection b below, we agree with Ms. Lee that these expenses and other ongoing expenses suggest that Mr. Gornbein still has the ability to pay the original maintenance award.
b. Ongoing Expenses
The trial court has a statutory obligation to “consider all financial resources of both parties, including the extent to which the reasonable expenses of either party are, or should be, shared by a spouse or other person with whom he or she cohabits.... ” § 452.370.1.
See also Lamont,
Mr. Gornbein’s income and expense statement listed $3,500 in monthly income and $4,896 in monthly expenses. As Mr. Gornbein concedes, and as the trial court acknowledged, he shares some of these expenses with his current spouse. The shared expenses include a mortgage payment of $1,450, utility payments of $355, and homeowners’ insurance payments of $50 per month. Mr. Gornbein did not specify what portion of these expenses was attributable to him and what portion was attributable to his current spouse. 8
As the party seeking modification, Mr. Gornbein had the burden of establishing changed circumstances with detailed evidence.
Laffey,
*60 Even if Mr. Gornbein and his current wife share these expenses equally, 10 his expense statement still would overstate the expenses attributable to him by $927.50 per month. That, in turn, would mean that Mr. Gornbein’s expenses actually exceed his income by $468.50 instead of $1,396.
And the expense statement inflates Mr. Gornbein’s expenses in other ways, as well. The expense statement overstates what Mr. Gornbein actually spends on his vehicle because Mr. Gornbein already deducts vehicle expenses-$485 per month-from his income taxes. Because he is able to deduct the vehicle expenses on his income taxes, his net vehicle expenses would be less than he reported on the expense statement. Without the full amount of these expenses included on his expense statement, Mr. Gornbein’s income appears to exceed his expenses.
Finally, Mr. Gornbein’s income and expense statement listed the original maintenance award itself as an expense. This is not a changed circumstance, however. “In a modification proceeding, the concept of ‘changed circumstances’ entails a departure from prior known conditions.”
Lemmon v. Lemmon,
Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Gorn-bein did not establish with detailed evidence that he no longer has the ability to pay the original maintenance award. That determination does not end our inquiry, however, because we also must look at whether Ms. Lee continues to need maintenance.
Draper,
C. Evidence Regarding Ms. Lee’s Reasonable Needs
In her second point, Ms. Lee argues that the trial court incorrectly calculated her monthly income and improperly reduced her monthly expenses.
1. Ms. Lee’s Monthly Income
First, Ms. Lee argues that the trial court overstated her monthly income by $100 per month when it found that her monthly income is $2,388 per month. Ms. Lee argues that she actually earns $2,288 per month. If anything, $2,288 may be too high. Ms. Lee testified that she earns $12 per hour for the first forty hours that she works during a week. She then earns “approximately” $6 per hour for the next eight hours that she works. She works a minimum of 48 hours per week. Assuming that these numbers are correct, then the formula for determining her monthly income is 40(12) + 8(6) x 52 / 12 = $2,288. But these numbers probably are not correct because, as Ms. Lee said, she earns “approximately” $6 per hour for additional hours over forty per week. Her pay stubs show that she actually earns $1,030.40 every two weeks, which results in a monthly gross income of $2,232.53. 11 To complicate matters, Ms. Lee’s income and expense statement lists a total monthly gross income of $2,065.96. In any event, we agree with Ms. Lee that the trial court’s judgment overstates her income by at least $100 per month.
2. Ms. Lee’s Monthly Expenses
*61 Second, Ms. Lee argues that the expenses listed on her expense statement were uncontradicted and that the trial court, therefore, should not have reduced her expenses. Ms. Lee’s expense statement listed $3,274.07 in total monthly expenses. Among other expenses, this amount included the following:
$125 per month for gas and oil;
$200 per month in federal and state tax liability;
$500 per month for food;
$140 per month for “Laundry, Cleaning & Household”;
$100 per month for home maintenance and repair; and
$300 per month in debt payments
The trial court found that Ms. Lee had overstated her expenses by $530 per month, as follows:
Petitioner’s current expenses show $3,274.07 expenses. Gas & Oil is high for a person who lives in the same town in which she works. Paragraph M, tax liability is a defined sum and will be paid in one year or less and, thus, while a current expense is not on going. $100/ month is a more correct amount for the current expense. $500 for food is excessive for a person of Petitioner’s age, and the Court finds $300 or $10.00/day to be a correct figure. $140/month laundry, cleaning and household expenses is excessive, when considered with $100/ month maintenance and repairs, which was justified. $300 payments seem high for the $2,900 debt shown in her property and debt form filed 8-7-01. That sum would pay the debt in 10 months or less and this is not an accurate, on going expense. Petitioner’s current expenses are more accurately approximately $2,744.07/month, which translates to a shortfall of $360/month.
As a rule, the trial court “is not required to accept a party’s statement of expenses, even when the evidence is uncontradicted.”
Adams v. Adams,
Even with the inflation of Ms. Lee’s income and the reduction of her expenses, however, the trial court still found that her expenses exceed her income by $360 per month. If that number is correct, then the trial court was justified in reducing, but not terminating, maintenance to $400 per month. 12 As noted already, however, the trial court overstated Ms. Lee’s monthly income by $100. Therefore, Ms. Lee’s expenses actually exceed her income by $460 per month. If the trial court had used the proper income number, the result would have been a reduction in maintenance to $500 per month. Under these circumstances, we will “give such judgment as the court ought to give.” Rule 84.14. Accordingly, we enter judgment reducing the maintenance award in this case from $900 per month to $500 per month.
D. The Trial Court’s Decision Not To Award Attorney Fees
In her final point, Ms. Lee argues that the trial court abused its discretion by *62 refusing to grant her request for attorney’s fees. Ms. Lee contends that the trial court should have awarded her a total of $4,575 in attorney’s fees. In refusing to award attorney’s fees, the trial court said:
Attorney fees should be borne by the party incurring same when there is no compelling reason otherwise, and the Court finds same here. Further, as Respondent has prevailed on part of his case, he should not be obligated to pay Petitioner’s fees, when the evidence shows he has no excess income and her ability to pay is as good as his ability to pay.
The trial court may award statutory attorney’s fees “after considering all relevant factors including the financial resources of both parties, the merits of the case and the actions of the parties during the pendency of the action.... ” § 452.355.1. The trial court’s ruling on this issue is presumptively correct.
Adams,
Ms. Lee’s point is somewhat confusing. Initially, she seems to complain that the trial court erred because it misapplied the law regarding attorney’s fees. But then she argues that the evidence shows that Mr. Gornbein has a greater ability to pay the fees. To the extent that Ms. Lee argues that the trial court misapplied the law in considering Mr. Gornbein’s status as the prevailing party, we disagree. That the trial court found Mr. Gornbein to be the prevailing party reflects the trial court’s belief about the “merits of his case.”
The trial court also considered the other statutory criterion — the financial resources of both parties — when it concluded that “the evidence shows [Mr. Gornbein] has no excess income and [Ms. Lee’s] ability to pay is as good as his ability to pay.” Even if the trial court was wrong in this conclusion, it does not necessarily render the judgment an abuse of discretion.
See Adams,
IY. Conclusion
The trial court erred when it concluded that Mr. Gornbein cannot pay the original $900 maintenance award. Even assuming that Mr. Gornbein has sustained a permanent decrease in income, the record shows that Mr. Gornbein improperly overstated his expenses. Absent those improperly *63 included expenses, he still has the ability to pay the original award. While the trial court appropriately concluded that Ms. Lee’s expenses exceed her income, the trial court overstated her income by $100 per month when it reduced maintenance from $900 per month to $400 per month. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment modifying the maintenance award and enter judgment under Rule 84.14, reducing the maintenance award in this case from $900 per month to $500 per month.
Because Ms. Lee has not shown that the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney fees was against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one’s sense of justice, we affirm that portion of the judgment.
ROBERT G. ULRICH and PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JJ. concur.
Notes
. In its conclusions of law, the trial court later ruled that “settlement of the accident case does not justify modification as such was contemplated in the dissolution. Judgment was a known issue, even if the sums were not fully known.” Neither party disputes this ruling here and we do not address it.
. After the trial court dismissed the amended motion because it was not verified, Mr. Gorn-bein filed a verified version of the same motion on May 29, 2002. The grounds set forth in this motion are identical to those set forth in the motion filed on Januaiy 15.
. Although the court apparently did not rule upon Ms. Lee’s countermotion, the court’s ruling on Mr. Gornbein’s motion effectively denied her countermotion to increase maintenance.
. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2000.
. As this court has noted before, "[t]he principles relative to reduction and imputation of a spouse’s income in child support cases are equally applicable in modification of maintenance cases.”
Momiig v. Monnig,
. Ms. Lee wrongly contends that Mr. Gorn-bein testified that his current rate of pay is $3,815 per month. Actually, Mr. Gornbein testified that $3,815 was his rate of pay based upon his income in 2001.
. In the argument portion of her brief, Ms. Lee questions other miscellaneous expenses. Her failure to identify these expenses in her point relied on precludes us from considering them.
See, e.g., Pearman v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
. Mr. Gornbein testified that while it was difficult to pay the $900 maintenance amount, he had been doing so and explained, "Unfortunately, my present wife is bearing a large percentage of-of that load.”
.The trial court likewise did not indicate what portion of the shared expenses was attributable to Mr. Gornbein. In its findings on this issue, the trial court said: "Respondent claims expenses of $4,896/month with resultant shortfall of $1,396 — inclusive (in expenses) of $900 maintenance. He includes some expenses which are shared by his wife; (ie [sic] mortgage, utilities, and insurance).”
. Mr. Gornbein testified that his new wife was expected to earn approximately $60,000 in 2002.
. $1030.40 x 26 pay periods / 12 months = $2,232.53 per month.
. In his brief, Mr. Gornbein mentions the emancipation of Ms. Lee’s son since the divorce. It is certainly proper for the trial court to consider the effect of emancipation on a party’s expenses.
See, e.g., Zalmanoff v. Zalmanoff,