Lee v. Florida High School Activities Association, Inc.Lee v. Florida High School Activities Association, Inc.
Plaintiff-appellant appeals an order dismissing with prejudice his complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. We reverse.
In essence, plaintiff in his complaint alleged the following: that in September 1969 he entered the ninth grade in a high school in California and continued there until November 1971 at which time he and his family moved to Florida; that upon arriving in this state, it became necessary for him to obtain employment to financially aid his family; that in September 1972 he enrolled in Hialeah Miami Lakes High School whose principal, defendant Russell Wheatley, is a member of the defendant Florida High School Activities Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as FHSAA) and thereby plaintiff is subject to the by-laws thereof; that the FHSAA is a non-profit association, the members of which are the principals of almost every public and private high school in the State of Florida, and through its by-laws the association controls all inter-scholastic athletic activities of Florida high school students; that in order for a Florida high school to participate in inter-scholastic activities, the principal of said school must be a member of the FHSAA and thereby the FHSAA assumes control and supervision
It is axiomatic that for the purpose of passing on a motion to dismiss, all material allegations are taken as true as well as all reasonable inferences therefrom.
Reviewing the complaint in the case sub judice in light of the above principle of law, it becomes readily apparent that the defendant FHSAA has the exclusive authority and responsibility for supervising and controlling all phases of interscholastic athletics in both the public and private high schools in the State of Florida. Hence, the conduct of the affairs of FHSAA undoubtedly is state action in the constitutional sense. Cf. Louisiana High School Athletic Association v. St. Augustine High School et al., 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.1968); Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.1970). See also Sullivan v. Florida High School Activities Association, et al., Cir.Ct. 1972, 38 Fla. Supp. 18. But for the four year rule, plaintiff was and is eligible to participate in interscholastic athletics, which will enhance complainant‘s chances of being admitted to college and the possible winning of a needed athletic scholarship. Neverless, the executive committee of the defendant FHSAA without establishing any uniform standards or affording the plaintiff an opportunity to present evidence, refused to declare the complainant a hardship case and failed to offer any reasons therefor.1 Thus, we conclude that the complaint on its face sufficiently alleges the harshness of the executive committee‘s action and the denial of due process in that it denied the plaintiff an opportunity to establish his eligibility, by relying upon the four year rule which was applied arbitrarily in the instant action. Cf. Pocklington v. Duval County School Board, 345 F. Supp. 163 (M.D.Fla. 1972). We hold that upon complaint of a citizen the court has the power and the duty to determine whether the citizen has been deprived of due process of law by the
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed hereinabove, we hereby reverse the order dismissing the complaint of plaintiff-appellant and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded with directions.