Lee v. DownsLee v. Downs
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Clarke
OPINION AND ORDER
CLARKE, District Judge.
Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to
This matter came to trial before the Court with a jury. Although there was little dispute as to the facts underlying plaintiff’s claims, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff reveals the following events occurred. After plaintiff was assigned to work in the institution kitchen, fellow inmates threatened to set fire to plaintiff’s cell when she refused to steal sugar from the kitchen supplies. The plaintiff’s testimony showed that on one prior occasion an inmate’s room was set on
Immediately following this confrontation with Bryan, plaintiff was moved to a cell in the maximum security building. Upon her arrival at the maximum security building, plaintiff was searched, given a prison dress and placed in a cell. Within half an hour after being placed in the cell plaintiff was found lying on the floor of the cell with an electrical cord loosely wrapped around her neck. Plaintiff either had not donned or had removed her dress and was clothed only in her bra and underpants. Plaintiff admitted that she forcibly resisted the guards’ attempt to remove the cord and to clothe her. Male and female correctional officials then wrapped plaintiff in a blanket and took hеr to the prison clinic.
Upon her arrival at the clinic, the nurse on duty telephoned the prison doctor and told him of the apparent suicide threat. The doctor told the nurse to take away all of plaintiff’s clothing including her undergarments as a precaution against a further suicide attempt by hanging. Plaintiff’s evidence was that she refused tо remove her undergarments in the presence of male officers. At that point, prison officials removed her undergarments. It was undisputed that male guards were present during this disrobing. Plaintiff was then placed in a cell at the clinic. Plaintiff also testified that during the time she was being held in the clinic she began her menstrual cycle and requested from a nurse, but was refused, sanitary napkins. In addition, plaintiff was given some prescription medication prior to her transfer to the Central State mental health institution. 1
Four days later while still confined in the prison clinic, plaintiff removed a paper gown which she was wearing and set the gown on fire while laughing and clapping her hands over the flames. After a prison nurse extinguished the flames with water, plaintiff’s evidence was that she informed prison personnel that she had only the single match which she had already used to set the gown aflame. At that point, two male guards held the plaintiff’s arms and a third male guard held plaintiff’s legs while a female prison nurse, using plastic examination gloves, examined plaintiff’s vaginal сavity to discover if plaintiff was concealing any more matches. No additional matches were found.
Based on the foregoing facts, the case was submitted to the jury on four issues: failure to protect plaintiff from threats of inmate assault; failure to provide plaintiff adequate medical treatment; a claim based on the body cavity search of the plaintiff; and a claim based on the disrobing of the plaintiff by prison personnel. Each issue was separately presented to the jury by means of special verdicts. The jury returned the following verdicts, each in favor of the plaintiff: (1) against defendant Ann Downes in the amount of $5,000.00 on the failure to protect from assault claim; (2) against defendants Ann Downes, D. B. Brooks and W. Q. Patterson in the amount of $4,000.00 on the failure to provide adequate medical treatment claim; (3) against defendant Ann Downes, D. B. Brooks and W. Q. Patterson in the amount of $7,000.00 on the body search claim; and (4) against defendants Ann Downes, D. B. Brooks and
The law in this Circuit with regard to failure to protect prisoners from threats of assault by other inmates is clear. There is no doubt that prisoners need not wait until they are actually assaulted to have an actual claim for a constitutional deprivation. However, it is also clear that occasional isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Woodhous v. Commonwealth, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973). Before a deprivation of a constitutional right is stated, there must be “a pattern of indisputed and unchecked violence or . an egregious failure to provide security to a particular inmate,” Penn v. Oliver, 351 F.Supp. 1292, 1294 (E.D.Va.1972), in a prison “where violence and terror reign.” Woodhous, supra at 890.
Other than the single incident described above, there was no evidence whatsoever of any attack by an inmate upon plaintiff or any other prisoner. Moreover, there simply was no evidence of any other threats directed toward plaintiff by fellow inmates other than the isolated threаt to set her room on fire on the same day that plaintiff complained to prison officials. While under the standards set out above, this situation demands the jury verdict be set aside, the verdict also must be overturned on another ground.
At the close of plaintiff’s case, the evidence was such that the Court ruled that the case could proceed on this claim only against defendant Downes, the prison superintendent. There was, however, no evidence that defendant Downes had any knowledge whatsoever of the threat against the plaintiff. Indeed, the evidence was uncontradicted that Downes was not present or even in contact with the institution at the time of, or for several days after, the threat against plaintiff and plaintiff’s report of the threat to prison officials.
Actions of a subordinate can be imposed on higher officials only when the superior had knowledge or acquiesced in the allegedly unconstitutional acts. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977); Landman v. Royster, 354 F.Supp. 1302, 1316 (E.D.Va.1973); see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). The evidence was completely devoid of any affirmative link to defendant Downes showing the authorization or approval of any failure to protect plaintiff by other prison officials.
Thus, the Court finds as a matter of law there simply was no evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict either that plaintiff’s rights were violated or even if they were, that defendant Downes was in any manner responsible for such a deprivation.
The evidеnce with regard to the claim that plaintiff was denied adequate medical treatment suffers the same two deficiencies as the issue of inmate threats. There was neither any evidence of a denial of medical treatment sufficient to constitute a constitutional deprivation nor any evidence showing any connection of the three defendants with the medical assistance that was rendered.
Under the evidence adduced at trial, the issue of the adequacy of medical treatment may have been raised as to three separate, but partially related, incidents: (1) the response to plaintiff’s apparent suicide attempt; (2) medication presсribed and given to the plaintiff; and (3) the failure to provide plaintiff with sanitary napkins during her menstrual cycle. As to the latter two incidents, the Court need not decide whether such events amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of medical assistance
With regard to the response to plaintiff’s apparent attempted suicide, there was evidence of participation in that response by the defendants. Officers Brooks and Patterson did participate in transferring the plaintiff from the maximum security building to the prison clinic when plaintiff was found lying on the floor with the electrical cord loosely wrapped around her neck. In addition, Superintendent Downes testified that it was her policy that her staff should treat all suicide attempts, real or feigned, as actual attempts. In light of the potential repercussions of any other course of action, the Court holds as a matter of law that such a procedure dоes not amount to a constitutional deprivation.
There was no evidence on which the jury could properly find a denial of adequate medical treatment under
With regard to plaintiff’s contention that the body cavity search constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 2 there can be no question that body cavity searches normally represent an extremе invasion of a person’s right to privacy. However, in a prison context, such matters are not so clear cut. In a prison environment, body cavity searches are not per se unreasonable. Penn El v. Riddle, 399 F.Supp. 1059 (E.D.Va. 1975); see Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978); Hodges v. Klein, 412 F.Supp. 896 (D.N.J.1976). Rather, such searches lie within the sound discretion of prison officials. Penn El, supra at 1062.
Under the undisputed circumstances in which the present search occurred, the Court would have little difficulty in finding a search of the plaintiff was justified as a matter of law. Indeed, plaintiff’s actions would seem to demand such a search for materials with which she might have possibly harmed herself. See McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1978). The difficulty arises, however, due to the presence of male correctional officers during the search and their participation by restraining the plаintiff.
Notwithstanding the presence and limited participation by male guards, the Court finds as a matter of law that defendants’ actions did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. It is noted that the evidence showed that at no time was the plaintiff ever left alone with male guards.
Plaintiff, however, suggests that the search could have been delayed until enough female correctional officers could be assembled to participate in the search. However, in addition to the undisputed testimony that it was not feasible to remove other female officers from their posts for this purpose and the obvious difficulty in restraining the plaintiff, the exigent nature of the search was critical.
. [Pjrison guards must have discretion to act quickly and decisively, and other reasonable procedures in everyday disciplinary problems should not be employed to handcuff prison guards.
Gettleman v. Werner, 377 F.Supp. 445, 451 (W.D.Pa.1974). Finally, there was no evidence of any аbusive language during the search other than by the plaintiff herself and no suggestion that plaintiff was physically harmed in any way by the search or the restraint required to conduct it.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds as a matter of law that the evidence as to the claim based upon the body cavity search and the manner in which it was conducted was not sufficient to sustain a verdict that such acts constituted cruel or unusual punishment.
The final issue involves the forcible removal of plaintiffs clothes upon her arrival at the prison clinic following her apparent suicide threat. Again this was accomplished in the presence of male correctional officers. However, construing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, the presence of male guards was not mandated by plaintiff’s actions on this occasion. There can be little question that the removal of plaintiff’s clothes was a necessary precaution against a further possible suicide attempt by the plaintiff. See McMahon, supra at 173. Plaintiff’s evidence, however, was such that the jury could have properly inferred that plaintiff would have voluntarily removed her undergarments if the male guards would have left the room. Under such a situation, the Court does not find that the presence of the male officers was required. In addition, the evidence was such that the jury could have properly determined that defendаnt Downes had acquiesced in such a procedure by her failure to promulgate specific guidelines to assure this type of incident would not occur. Based on that finding, the Court deems the evidence was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether such action was sufficiently shocking or arbitrary, unreasonable or unnecessary so as to amount to cruel and unusual punishment. See Penn El, supra at 1062; Lilly, supra at 1244-47.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that as to the issues of: (1) failure to protect plaintiff from threats of inmate assault, (2) failure to provide plaintiff adequate medical treatment, and (3) the claim
Notes
. The evidence regarding medication given to plaintiff was sketchy. Plaintiff stated only that she refused medication offered to her following her arrival at the prison clinic. Defendant’s evidence and clinic records indicated that plaintiff subsequently did receive some antidеpressant and tranquilizing medication. Regarding any type of adverse reaction by the plaintiff to any medication, the evidence was limited to a description of plaintiffs “paralyzed” state when she was confined at the Central State Hospital. Plaintiff, however, has stipulated that she was making no claim for any events that might have occurred at the Central state facility.
. In her brief in opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff attempted to distinguish several of the cases cited below on the basis that those decisions involved claims under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures rather than a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Under the facts of the present suit, the Court does not see any material difference between the applicable standards under either the Eighth or Fourth Amendments. Cf. Penn El v. Riddle, 399 F.Supp. 1059, 1061-62 (E.D.Va.1975).