36 N.W.2d 530 | Minn. | 1949
Plaintiffs Charles Lee and Carl Krausmann are owners and operators of the Lee School of Barbering and the Moler Barber College respectively. The other plaintiffs are all students of the Lee School of Barbering. No unregistered teacher employed, or desiring to be employed, in either school is a party to this action. Defendants, other than the attorney general, are members of the state board of barber examiners, hereinafter called the board.
On June 29, 1947, one of two registered teachers employed by plaintiff Lee died. Twenty-seven students were then enrolled in his school. Lee was unable to find another registered teacher or any barber of the qualifications required for certification and approval by the board pursuant to §
Plaintiff Krausmann is himself the only registered teacher in the Moler Barber College. Although the school has all the other facilities for teaching more than 15 students, Krausmann has been instructed and warned by the board not to enroll more than 15 students.
The other plaintiffs, all of whom are students enrolled in the Lee school, were on October 13, 1947, notified by the board that, in determining their qualifications for the practice of barbering, they would thereafter be given no credit for the time spent at the Lee school, for the sole reason that said school had more than 15 students for each teacher. *105
Section
Aside from the facts hereinbefore summarized, the trial court, under paragraphs XI, XII, and XIII of its findings of fact, specifically found:
1-2. An appellate court will not be bound by, and will review, the findings of the trial court, even though they be supported by the weight of evidence, if such findings are manifestly controlled or influenced *106
by errors of law. In re Trust Under Will of Holden,
"* * * The public is interested in his competency and qualifications, and it is eminently proper that there be thrown around the calling protection from intrusion by incompetents, and others inimical to the public good. * * *
"* * * the health of the citizen, and protection from diseases spread from barber shops conducted by unclean and incompetent barbers, fully justify the law. It is a fact of which we must take notice that the people of today come in contact with, and engage the services of, those following the occupation of barber, as much as, if not more than, any other occupation or profession. We must take notice of the fact, too, that the interests of the public health require and demand that persons following that occupation be reasonably familiar with, and favorably inclined towards, ordinary rules of cleanliness; that diseases of the face and skin are spread from barber shops, caused, no doubt, by uncleanliness or the incompetency of barbers. We must take notice of the fact that to attain *107 proficiency and competency as a barber requires training,study, and experience, — training in the art, and study andexperience in the management and conduct of the calling. A design and purpose to protect the public from injurious results likely to follow from such conditions is the foundation of statutes like this. And, as we must take judicial notice of the foregoing facts, the foundation for this law is apparent. And it may be said, further, that there is as much reason for a lawof this kind as to barbers as there is for such a law as todentists, pharmacists, lawyers, and plumbers. It is enacted in the interests of the public health and welfare, and we sustain it." (Italics supplied.)
The importance of technical training from the standpoint of public health is illustrated by the case of Lincoln Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Jensen,
We start, therefore, with the established principle that the trade of barbering, as well as the teaching thereof and the operation or management of a barber school, requires technical training, study, and experience in order to safeguard the public health and welfare, and that the regulation thereof is a proper exercise of the police power. We are concerned with only two issues: (1) Has the legislature by its enactment of §§
3. It is not for the courts to question the wisdom or expediency of a police regulation. The judicial function is merely to determine (1) if the ostensible protective purpose of a purported police regulation relates to the public welfare and not merely to a private interest, and (2) if the remedy adopted is designed to accomplish that purpose without going beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion so as to arbitrarily and unnecessarily interfere with personal and property rights in contravention of either the state or federal constitutions. In recognition of the established proposition that to protect public health — which is here synonymous with the public welfare — the trade of barbering, whether it be in the practice or the teaching thereof, requires a certain technical training, study, and experience, can we say that the regulatory provisions of §§
4. We come to the final provision that a teacher must pass an examination in subjects prescribed by statute for licensed barbers. See, M.S.A.
"* * * scientific fundamentals for barbering, hygiene, practical study of the hair, skin, muscles, and nerves, structure of the head, face, and neck, elementary chemistry relating to sterilization and antiseptics; diseases of the skin, hair, glands, massaging and manipulating the muscles of the face and neck, haircutting, shaving, and trimming the beard."
It is only reasonable that a teacher should be able to pass an examination in the very subjects which he is to teach and a knowledge of which is required before a barber may be licensed, unless the subjects are unreasonable from the standpoint of the trade as a whole. We must therefore consider the reasonableness of the required subjects, not merely from the standpoint of the teacher, but also from *110
that of the barber schools, the students, and the barber trade generally. The subjects may seem extravagant in their scope and implications unless we bear in mind that where a board or commission has been empowered to make regulations and to conduct examinations in the furtherance of the police power, the law is to be interpreted as though it conferred only the power and right to make reasonable regulations and to conductreasonable examinations. See, Sabre v. Rutland R. Co.
5. We have no justiciable issue involving certain provisions of §
6. There is likewise no justiciable issue with regard to the other provisions of §
7. We find nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in the statutory requirement that a barber school may not enroll more than 15 students for each instructor. Obviously, the teaching of a trade such as barbering goes beyond mere theoretical instruction and involves a practical application in which the individual student must be personally supervised. We cannot overlook that barber students practice on members of the public. If the practical instruction is made inefficient by giving the instructor the supervision of too many *112
students, sanitation requirements will suffer, to the detriment of public health. Gillett v. Florida Univ. of Dermatology, Inc.
8. Clearly, the statutory provisions involved herein reasonably tend to accomplish the purpose of safeguarding the public health and welfare without going beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion. We find no contravention of U.S. Const. Amend.
9-10. We come to the final issue. Do the regulatory powers conferred upon the board constitute a delegation of legislative power contrary to Minn. Const. art.
"* * * The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies *114 and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply."
The policy of the law and the standard of action to guide the administrative agencies may be laid down in very broad and general terms. Annotation, 79 L. ed. (U.S.) 489. What is a sufficiently definite declaration of policy and standard obviously varies in some degree according to the complexity of the subject to which the law is applicable.12 The discretionary power to ascertain the operative facts normally carries with it the power to make rules and regulations pursuant to which the power is exercised. Annotation, 79 L. ed. (U.S.) 489-491.
11. In the light of these principles, we find no delegation of legislative power. The statutory provisions indicate clearly the subjects in which both teachers and students must attain proficiency. Obviously, the legislature cannot provide a crystal ball for the automatic determination of the proficiency of each examinee. Certain discretionary powers must be conferred on ministerial officers for the preparation and conduct of examinations. Let us bear in mind again that whenever a law confers upon a board or commission the power to make regulations or to conduct examinations it is to be construed as if it only conferred the power and the right to make reasonable regulations and to conduct reasonable
examinations. We have as a result a statutory standard of reasonable proficiency in certain specified subjects. Much ado has been futilely made about the failure of the board to promulgate rules and regulations as required by the statute and of the possibility that the board might arbitrarily deny a registration certificate for no better reason *115
than that the applicant is suffering from a temporary cold. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability of its abuse or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation. A power may be abused even though exercised directly by the legislature. State ex rel. R. R. W. H. Comm. v. C. M. St. P. Ry. Co.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Reversed.