The issue presented by this case is whether the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the defendant, the City of Gadsden ("the City"), against the plaintiff, Larry Joe Lee, in a breach of contract action based on an alleged implied employment contract for a specified term.
After a careful review of the record, we are convinced that Lee failed to meеt his burden of showing that his employment contract was other than one terminable at will. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, due to be affirmed.
In January 1985, Lee was hired by the City as an "Equipment Operator I"1 for the City's "Nuisance Abatement Department."2 In October 1985, Lee was injured while on the job, and was told by his doctor that he could return to work only on a light-duty basis. In order to help Lee return to his normal duties sooner, and to keep Lee gаinfully employed, Lee's supervisor, Marion Wise, wrote Lee a letter offering him a job as a night watchman at a joint Recreation and Parks Department-Nuisance Abatement Department equipment storage facility. Lee was to be paid at the same salary level, and the term of employment was until "you [Lee] are able to return to [the] Nuisance Abatement work force."
In December 1989, Gadsden's city council passed an ordinance adopting a budget that effectively eliminated the Nuisance Abatement Department. All of the Nuisance Abatement Dеpartment positions, except one, were left unfunded. The Department's work was either assigned to other City departments or contracted out to private companies.
City offiсials then offered Lee the same position he held, as night watchman, but at a lower rate of pay. Lee sued, claiming that he had relied upon the letter from his supervisor, Wise, and that the lеtter constituted an implied contract of employment.3
Following substantial discovery, Lee filed a motion for summary judgment, with supporting affidavits. Soon thereafter, the *1038 City also filed a motion for summаry judgment. After considering the evidentiary submissions and oral arguments of counsel, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the City. The trial court stated in its order:
"The Court has reached the conclusion that, even when examined in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the communications which took place between the defendant and plaintiff were insufficient to create a binding contrаct of employment for a definite time, or of permanent employment, such as would prevent the defendant from taking the actions it took in respect to plaintiff's employment."
Lee appealed to this Court.
Initially, we note that our review of a summary judgment isde novo; that is, wе must examine all the evidentiary submissions that were presented to the trial court. Tolbert v.Gulsby,
The party moving for a summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there are no genuinе issues of material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.Fincher,
In Alabama, an employee must show three elements to establish that an employment relationship is one other than one terminable at will:6
"(1) thаt there was a clear and unequivocal offer of lifetime employment or employment of definite duration, Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc.,Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell,(Ala. 1982); (2) that the hiring agent had authority to bind the principal to a permanent еmployment contract, Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 418 So.2d 903 , 237 Ala. 296 (1939); and (3) that the employee provided substantial consideration for the contract separate from the services to be rendered, United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 186 So. 699 , 281 Ala. 264 (1967)." 201 So.2d 853
As to the first element, that there was a clear and unequivocal offer, our case law reveals that the offer mаy be one for lifetime employment, employment for a definite *1039
or specified duration, "permanent employment,"7 or employment "so long as the employee desires." See, id. at 728; AlabamaMills, Inc. v. Smith,
"However, we are able to offer you work that would provide you with forty hours per week, at your present rate of pay, as Night Watchman for the grounds located at 301 North 5th Street, City Park Shop. You will hold this position until you are able to return to [the] Nuisance Abatement work force."
We find that a fair-minded person would interpret this language as offering Lee a night watchman position, at his then-presеnt rate of pay, until Lee was physically able to do nuisance abatement work. The offer, then, would be clear and unambiguous. Thus, Lee met the first element of showing an employment relationship other than one terminable at will.
As to the second element, the authority of the agent to bind the principal, our case law establishes that the employee can rely on either of the three normal types of authority: express, implied, or apparent. Alabama Mills,
Finally, as to the third element, that there was substantial additional consideration for the contract separate and apart from the services to be rendered, prior case law shows two acceptable forms of such сonsideration: the employee's relinquishment of a prior claim against the employer, or the employee's relinquishment of prior "substantial"8 employment with knowledge of such relinquishment by the еmployer. AlabamaMills,
We conclude that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment in favor of the City. We conclude, after a carefulde novo review of the evidence, that Lee failed to substantiate two of the three elements of his cаuse of action.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
SHORES, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
HORNSBY, C.J., concurs in the result.
In addition to Lee's implied contract theory, Lee's complaint included an "employment handbook" count. Since Hoffman-LaRoche, such a theory is viable in Alabama. However, this theory was not pressed on appeal, so we assume that it was voluntarily abаndoned by Lee. Even if this theory was not abandoned, however, the City, in its brief, has established that it complied with all pertinent sections of the applicable handbook.