Lee TALIAFERRO, Samuel Alexander, Beatrice Moore, and Bernice Wilson, Appellants
v.
DARBY TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD, John Dougherty, Individually and as a Member of the Darby Township Zoning Board; Jesse Byrd-Estes, Individually and as a Member of the Darby Township Zoning Board; Lamont Jacobs, Individually and as a Member of the Darby Township Zoning Board; John J. O'Neill, Individually and as a Member of the Darby Township Zoning Board; William Ryan, Individually and as a Member of the Darby Township Zoning Board; Darby Township; Delaware County Redevelopment Authority; United States Department of Housing and Urban Development; Maureen Healy also known as Maureen Diluzio; John Doe; Detective John Ryan, Manager of Darby Township, Individually and as Manager; Secretary Mel Martinez,
Individually and as Secretary of HUD; Milton R. Pratt, Jr., Individually and as Regional Director of HUD, Appellees.
No. 05-2253.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued March 9, 2006.
Opinion Filed August 10, 2006.
Robert J. Sugarman, Esquire (Argued), Sugarman and Associates, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Appellants.
James J. Byrne, Jr., Esquire (Argued), Kelly S. Sullivan, Esquire, Curran & Byrne, P.C., Media, PA, for Appellees Township of Darby, Darby Township Zoning Hearing Board, John Dougherty, Jesse Byrd-Estes, Lamont Jacobs, John J. O'Neill, William Ryan, and John Ryan.
Curtis P. Cheyney, III, Esquire (Argued), Swartz Campbell LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellees Delaware County Redevelopment Authority.
Lee J. Janiczek, Esquire (Argued), Reilly, Janiczek & McDevitt, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, fоr Appellee Maureen Healy.
Before ROTH and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ,1 District Judge.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RODRIGUEZ, District Judge.
On its face, this case presents the Court with the issue of whether neighboring property owners who allege that their property values will be diminished and their neighborhood blighted by the construction of a storage facility have standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The focus of this case is the propriety of the Darby Township Zoning Hearing Board's ("Board") decision to grant a variance, which permitted the construction of a storage facility in a residential zone, and the attendant State court decisions issued in the course of appeal. With the exception of the claim that Appellants' property values will be damaged by the grant of the variance, we will affirm the district court's dismissal of the Amended Complaint because Appellants have not alleged facts clearly demonstrating that they are proper parties to invoke the exercise of the federal court's remedial powers. Insofar as Appellants Taliaferro and Alexander have alleged injuries to their property values and neighborhood arising from the approval of the variance, however, we will reverse the district court's dismissal.
I.
In 1960, Appellee Delaware County Redevelopment Authority acquired by condemnation a nine-acre tract of land in the Township of Darby ("Darby Township"). In furtherance of a twenty-year Urban Renewal Plan, an Agreement was entered into in 1967 by the Redevelopment Authority and a redeveloper, RUPACA, Inc. The Agreement contained a covenant binding the redeveloper and its successors and assigns until April 8, 1980, to devote the property to, and only to and in accordance with, the uses specified in the Urban Renewal Plan, i.e., for residential purposes. There wаs also a covenant, unlimited as to duration, for non-discriminatory use of the property. (App., Vol.II, 000218a.)
The Property was sold in 1969 to First Urban Redevelopers. First Urban subsequently sold the property to Charles Rappa, who sold it to Appellee Maureen Healy in 2002. No development had occurred between 1969 and 2002. Although located in a partially commercial area, (App., Vol. II, 000063a), the Property was still zoned R-1 residential, so Healy made a variance request to allow the construction of an 800-unit self-storage facility. That request was supported by expert testimony, which concluded that redevelopment to residential use was not economically feasible. (App., Vol.II, 000050a, 000136a.) At the behest of Appellants Lee Taliaferro and Samuel Alexander, the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas remanded an original grant of the variance for additional testimony and evidence, but after further hearings, the Board granted the final request for a variance on May 8, 2003. Appellants again appealed the decision to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the Board. Appellants then apрealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the Court of Common Pleas decision. See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
II.
In the meantime, the Complaint in this matter was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on June 9, 2003. Plaintiffs Lee Taliaferro and Samuel Alexander are members of the African-American community in Darby Township and neighboring property owners to the land in question. Plaintiffs Beatrice Moore and Bernice Wilson were residents whose land was condemned pursuant to the Urban Renewal Project. Named as Defendants were the Board and its members, Darby Township and the Manager of Darby Township, the Delaware County Redevelopment Authority, and Maureen Healy.2
An Amended Complaint alleged that Appellants brought suit "as citizens and beneficiaries" of the Urban Renewal Plan and subsequent Redevelopment Agreement, because they were promised the benefits of residential redevelopment of the property. Despite the Redevelopment Agreement, however, Appellants alleged that "Darby Township, in order to perpetuate the white majority in the Township, continuously discouraged residential developments by various means, including without limitation, demanding that the developer construct an unnecessary bridge, refusing housing style modifications and informal discouragement." (App., Vol.II, 000147a.) Appellants complained that the Delaware County Redevelopment Authority failed to enforce the terms of the Redevelopment Agreement. They accused the Appellees of conspiring to inhibit and prevent the residential redevelopment of the Property for the purpose of preventing the African-American population in Darby Township from expanding and gaining political control.
Count I of the Amended Complaint sought enforcement of the Redevelopment Agreement, by way of an injunction in order to prevent the use of the property for purposes other than the residential use specified in the Urban Renewal Plan and Redevelopment Agreement.3 Count II alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Appellants' rights of equal protection, substantive and procedural due process, and protection of property. Count III alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for intentional racial discrimination by Appellees "preventing the growth of the community and introducing improper uses into the community to decrease property values and diminishing or curtailing the voting power of the community," as well as "by denying them contracts which were required to protect and promote the [Appellant]s' community [and] by limiting the [Appellant]s' rights as parties before the Board." (App., Vol.II, 000154a.) Count IV alleged conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and Count V alleged a violation of the Fair Housing Act. Count VI, which attacked the Board's decision to grant the variance, was dismissed by Order of the district court dated September 22, 2004.
III.
In response to Appellees' motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) аnd 12(b)(6), the district court concluded that the Appellants lacked standing to bring the claims asserted, and dismissed the Amended Complaint.
Lee Taliaferro and Samuel Alexander, as members of the African-American community in Darby Township and neighboring property owners, alleged they were injured: (1) by the racially discriminatory policies of the Appellees in curtailing the voting and political power of the African-American community, because the Appellees allegedly made a land use decision granting a variance to allow the construction of an 800-unit self-storage facility instead of the promised residential redevelopment in order to limit the effect of the African-American vote in Darby Township; (2) in that their property values would be diminished and their neighborhood blighted by the construction of an 800-unit self-storage facility; and (3) because African-Americans have been denied equal treatment under the law in government hearings and meetings in that, at a hearing before the case was remanded by the State court, Board members "discriminately, repeatedly shouted down the protestants who were African-Americans and threatened to expel them from the hearing," (App., Vol.II, 000149a), allegedly based on racial bias. The district court dismissed Taliaferro's and Alexander's claims, and noted that these Appellants had not alleged what, if any, benefit they would receive if the Urban Renewal Plan were implemented. Thus, they neither alleged nor demonstrated that they, as individuals, suffered a concrete injury as a result of Appellees' alleged actions that would be redressed by the relief sought in this action.
Beatrice Moore and Bernice Wilson were residents who were removed pursuant to the Urban Renewal Plan with thе alleged promise of an opportunity to return. The district court dismissed their claims because they had not alleged they desired, or would be eligible, to move into residences that might have been constructed under the Urban Renewal Plan.
In summary, the lower court determined that Appellants had not contended that they had been injured personally by Appellees' conduct. Accordingly, because none of the Appellants would receive an actual benefit if the court granted the requested injunction, it found that they lacked standing to bring the Amended Complaint filed in this matter. See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., No. Civ. A. 03-3554,
IV.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from a final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over a district court's order dismissing a complaint for lack of subjеct matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Group Int'l Inc.,
Similarly, our standard of review of a distriсt court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is plenary. Evancho v. Fisher,
V.
Article III of the Constitution restricts the "judicial power" of the United States to the resolution of cases and controversies. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
The three elements necessary to satisfy the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing are:
(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and
(3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
United States v. Hays,
Thus, whether asserting first party standing or third party standing, a plaintiff must state an injury in fact. Storino,
"[A] plaintiff who seeks to challenge exсlusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Warth v. Seldin,
Further, we have found that a claim that a building project would increase traffic, pollution, and noise in the area residents' neighborhood was sufficiently concrete and particularized. Society Hill Towers Owners' Assoc. v. Rendell,
Id. at 176-77.
In addition to alleging actual and specific injury, plaintiffs must demonstrate a causal connection to a defendant's alleged conduсt. Warth,
Finally, the injury alleged must be redressable by the remedy sought. For example, in Rizzo, we found that granting the relief sought would produce "at least a `substantial probability' that the [housing] project [would] materialize, affording (plaintiffs) the housing opportunities (they) desire."
VI.
In this case, accepting as true the material allegations of the Amended Complaint, Appellants have failed to allege an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, or actual in order to confer standing upon them in regard to a denial of equal treatment as a result of the Appellees' alleged conspiracy to block the construction of residential housing on the Property. Such a claim is generalized, and does not allege any aсtual injury to the Appellants.5 Thus, to the extent Taliaferro and Alexander have alleged that Appellees made land use decisions in order to limit the effect of the African-American vote in Darby Township, they have not asserted an actual injury that would confer constitutional standing upon them. That is, Appellants have not demonstrated that they, as individuals, have suffered a concrete loss as the result of Appellees' actions, even if Appellees had acted to ensure that the Property would not be used for low-to-moderate income residential hоusing.
To the extent Taliaferro and Alexander have alleged injuries to their property values and neighborhood arising from the approval of the variance, however, we conclude that they have alleged a constitutionally cognizable injury. This injury is not conjectural; they contend that the construction of the storage facility will lower their property values, reduce the aesthetics in their community and create excess noise and traffic, including heavy truck traffic on their residential streets. (App., Vol.II, 000140a-000161a.) As in Society Hill, these injuries are sufficiently concrete and particularized. See also Sierra Club v. Morton,
Taliaferro and Alexander also meet the causation and redressability prongs of Article III standing. The injury alleged would result directly from the construction of the proposed storage facility and would be redressed if the variance were denied. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to decide this claim of the neighboring property owners.
Beatrice Moore and Bernice Wilson were residents who left the neighborhood in question pursuant to the urban renewal projeсt with the alleged promise of an opportunity to return. They have not alleged, however, that they were ready, willing, and able to move back to the area at this time, decades after leaving in 1960. They also have not alleged that their land was taken from them without compensation. (App., Vol.II, 000079a.) Therefore, Moore and Wilson have not suffered any concrete injury; they have only an abstract interest in seeing the Property developed. See Hous. Investors, Inc. v. City of Clanton,
Finally, Appellants seek to assert a claim as members of the African-American community allegedly injured by Appellees' policies of curtailing the voting and political power of the African-American community. Essentially, they argue that they should have standing to assert that the African-American population is being minimized. But the remedy sought is an injunction prohibiting the land in question from being used for anything other than residential purposes. This would not redress Appellants' complaints of the Appellees' failure to implement the Urban Renewal Plan. This Court cannot direct the Appellees to implement the Urban Renewal Plan, even if it had not expired over twenty-five years ago. As the district court observеd, an injunction preventing the storage units from being built does nothing to put into place construction of housing that would draw only African-American residents.
VII.
Having determined that the district court has jurisdiction to decide the claim of the neighboring property owners because it meets the constitutional standing requirements under Article III, we also find that abstention would be not be appropriate under either Younger or Rooker-Feldman. In general, federal intervention in ongoing state proceedings is precluded in accordance with the abstention theory articulated in Younger v. Harris,
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a district court is prеcluded from entertaining an action, that is, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, if the relief requested effectively would reverse a state court decision or void its ruling. Whiteford v. Reed,
In explaining the jurisdictional bar, this Court has described the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as precluding lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated or those "inextricably intertwined" with adjudication by a state court. Parkview Assoc. P'ship v. City of Lebanon,
The state courts reviewed, for abuse of discretion, the Board determination that granting the variance would not alter the essential character of the neighborhood nor be detrimental to the public welfare. Throughout the state court process, determinations rested on the decision that because Healy satisfied the criteria necessary to obtain a zoning variance, the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence. The due process claims of Taliaferro and Alexander, that their properties will be devalued in violation of their constitutional rights, were not аctually litigated in state court during the appeal from the Board's decision. Thus, the state courts did not consider the claims of potential damage to property values and the neighborhood that would arise from approval of the variance. Even though such claims could have been raised during the appeal process, we find that they are not inextricably intertwined with the appellate review of the Board's decision. Federal relief on the property value claims would not necessarily require a finding that the state court judgments were erroneous. See Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre,
VIII.
The Court is mindful that this case has presented a sensitive issue, with allegations of a policy of perpetuating a white majority in local government, and resultant racial tensions. We cannot allow those allegations to have us take on the "abstract questions of wide public significance," however, especially those already addressed by governmental institutions competent to provide redress. Warth,
Thus, we reverse the district court's dismissal of thе Amended Complaint insofar as Taliaferro and Alexander have alleged that their property values will be damaged by the grant of the variance because such a claim meets the constitutional standing requirements under Article III and because abstention would be not be appropriate. In all other respects, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes:
Notes
The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez, United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and two of its officials were originally named in the Complaint but are no longer involved in the case
This count was dismissed as against Defendant Healy on September 22, 2004
Litigants may bring an action on behalf of third parties only in limited circumstances, when: (1) the litigant has suffered an injury in fact, giving him a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue; (2) the litigant has a close relation to the third party; and (3) there exists some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his own interestPowers v. Ohio,
There is no indication in the record that any developer was injured by a zoning decision blocking construction efforts or took steps to appeal an аdverse ruling
Further, any claim in the nature of a breach of contract regarding the condemnation of these Appellants' land surely would be barred by the statute of limitations, rendering appropriate dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Moreover, any claim that there was a breach of the Redevelopment Agreement cannot be sustained because the Appellants were not parties to the contract and because the terms of the contract expired in 1980. Any argument that Darby Township discouraged residential development of the Property and the Redevelopment Authority acquiesced by failing to enforce the terms of the Redevelopment Agreement should have been raised long ago