LEE BENTLEY FARKAS, Petitioner – Appellant, v. WARDEN, FCI BUTNER II, Respondent - Appellee.
No. 19-6347
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
August 26, 2020
PUBLISHED. Submitted: May 22, 2020.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (5:18-hc-02046-BO)
Submitted: May 22, 2020 Decided: August 26, 2020
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Keenan joined.
Elliot S. Abrams, CHESHIRE PARKER SCHNEIDER, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina; Samuel B. Hartzell, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Joshua B. Royster, Assistant United States Attorney, John E. Harris, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Congress requires every federal prisoner who collaterally attacks his conviction to employ the motion mechanism provided in
In 2010, federal agents arrested Lee Bentley Farkas for fraud. On the government‘s motion, the district court froze Farkas‘s assets—at first preventing him from retaining his counsel of choice. Eventually, the court released enough resources for Farkas to hire a team of lawyers and pay his court-appointed attorney. Farkas was convicted, and he lost his direct appeal. In 2014, he filed a
Two years later, the Supreme Court determined that the pretrial restraint of a defendant‘s “untainted” assets, if needed to retain counsel, violates the Sixth Amendment. Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (2016) (plurality). After Luis, we reconsidered our Circuit precedent that permitted the pretrial restraint of a defendant‘s “substitute” assets without directly connecting those assets to the alleged wrongdoing. See In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 917 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Chamberlain, 868 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). And in Chamberlain, we held that the criminal forfeiture statute permits freezing only those assets traceable to the charged offense. 868 F.3d at 297 (construing
We disagree. Farkas fails to show that
I. Background
A. Farkas‘s fraud convictions
Between 2002 and 2009, Farkas and his co-conspirators engaged in a multi-stage fraud scheme centered on a mortgage company in Ocala, Florida. Farkas served as the chairman and principal owner of that company. In brief, Farkas‘s company papered over a $100-million funding deficit, sold over $500 million in sham mortgage loans, inflated the value of collateral to the tune of some $1.5 billion, and sought to defraud the federal government‘s 2008-financial-crisis-era Troubled Asset Relief Program of $553 million. See generally United States v. Farkas, 474 F. App‘x 349, 351–52 (4th Cir. 2012).
In June 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Farkas on several fraud charges. The next day, the district court entered a restraining order freezing Farkas‘s assets under
Seven months later, Farkas‘s trial began. And in 2011, the jury convicted Farkas of six counts of bank fraud,
Farkas then made his first attempt at habeas relief, filing a
B. The Sixth Amendment and the changing law of criminal forfeiture
Five years after his conviction, the Supreme Court decided Luis v. United States, which presented the question of “whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant‘s legitimate, untainted assets . . . needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1088 (2016) (plurality) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The Sixth Amendment guarantees, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Luis cast doubt on the law of our Circuit, which had permitted the government to freeze, through a pretrial restraining order, a defendant‘s “substitute” assets in an amount equivalent to that involved in the alleged wrongdoing. See In re Billman, 915 F.2d at 917. So in Chamberlain, 868 F.3d at 291, the en banc court reconsidered our interpretation of
C. The proceedings below
After our decision in Chamberlain, Farkas initiated his third collateral attack on his conviction, filing the habeas application that would lead to this appeal. Farkas did not seek this court‘s authorization to file a successive
The district court dismissed Farkas‘s
II. Discussion
Farkas bears the burden of establishing the inadequacy of
A. The writ of habeas corpus
Habeas corpus, “a writ antecedent to statute, . . . throw[s] its root deep into the genius of our common law.” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). As “the most celebrated writ in the English law,” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 129 (1st ed. 1768), habeas corpus ad subicidendum secured the “natural inherent right” of personal liberty, “which could not be surrendered or forfeited” save for the commission of a crime, id. at 133; see Magna Carta art. 39 (1215). English law required (as ours does today) the government to justify “the causes[] and the extent” of a prisoner‘s detention, and so the “Great Writ” permitted a court to examine the grounds for his confinement. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 133. By the time of our independence, the writ had become “an integral part of our common law heritage,” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973), and would come to “receive[] explicit recognition in the Constitution, which forbids suspension of ‘[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it,’” Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474 (quoting
Although the Great Writ existed before statute, its contours have been molded by the legislature over time, first in England and later in the United States. At times, lawmakers curtailed abuses of the writ: “[T]o avoid vexatious delays by the removal of frivolous causes,” for instance, Parliament limited the issuance of the writ during proceedings overseen by experienced judges. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 130 (citing 21 Jac. I. (Jas. 1) c. 23 (1623) (inferior courts law)); compare Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1707 (2020) (Modern habeas law “prevent[s] serial challenges to a judgment of conviction, in the interest of reducing delay, conserving judicial resources, and promoting finality.”). At other times, legislation expanded the writ in response to abuses by the crown and courts: After the Star Chamber, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640 strengthened the writ and enumerated the grounds for its issuance. See 16 Car. 1 c. 10. Parliament would again reinforce the writ in the famed Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. 31 Cha. 2 c. 2; see generally 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 134–37 (describing the second of these acts as “another magna carta of the kingdom”).
The first Congress continued the legislative tradition of sculpting the writ when it passed the Judiciary Act of 1789. That statute granted the “justices of the supreme court, as well as justices of the district courts, . . . power to grant writs of habeas corpus” for prisoners “in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States.” 1 Stat. 73 § 14. And over the next two centuries, Congress would continue “innovat[ing] in the field of habeas corpus.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795. So in 1800, Congress extended the writ to state detainees for the first time—permitting the writs’ issue to those imprisoned for debts already discharged in federal bankruptcy proceedings. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19 § 38.
After the Civil War, Congress made the writ available in “all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.” Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385 (emphasis added). And in 1948, Congress codified the general grant of habeas jurisdiction to the federal courts at
Recognizing this history, the Supreme Court has affirmed that “judgments about the proper scope of the writ are ‘normally for Congress to make.’” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996)). But although “the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States must be given by written law,” Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 94 (1807), the Constitution requires Congress to affirmatively provide for the writ (or a writ substitute), unless it follows the requirements of the Suspension Clause, see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
B. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Congress’ latest pronouncement on the writ of habeas corpus comes to us in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (explaining that AEDPA is “well within the compass of this evolutionary process”). For this appeal, we note three core properties of AEDPA.
First, all convicted federal prisoners must generally use the remedy-by-motion mechanism provided in
Second,
Third, Congress provides one exception to the general rule that convicted federal prisoners must proceed under
Farkas claims that this “savings clause” permits his
C. The Fourth Circuit‘s “savings clause” jurisprudence
This appeal turns on the scope of
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained . . . unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
To begin, two features of this clause must be noted. First, the text “juxtapose[es] the terms ‘inadequate or ineffective’ with the phrase ‘to test the legality of [a prisoner‘s] detention.’” Prost, 636 F.3d at 584. From this, we think it beyond question that “
Second, the “savings clause” is structured as an exception to AEDPA‘s comprehensive limitations on the scope of habeas review. Thus, to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule, we have interpreted the “savings clause” narrowly, reasoning that it must encompass only “limited circumstances.” In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333. “A contrary rule,” we have explained “would effectively nullify”
We are not the first panel to confront the “limited circumstances” that may justify resort to
1. The two “savings clause” tests
We first considered the kinds of collateral attacks that may trigger the “savings clause” in In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 329. In that case, petitioner Byron Jones was convicted of using a firearm during a drug offense in violation of
Given Jones‘s predicament, we asked whether the “savings clause” permitted him to proceed under
To resolve this tension, the Jones Court devised a three-part test defining the “limited circumstances” under which
Eighteen years later, we revisited the “savings clause” in Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415. In that case, Gerald Wheeler filed a
Wheeler‘s prior drug conviction had a potential sentence of more than one year, but his actual sentence was for less than a year. Because he was sentenced under the pre-Simmons rule, Wheeler‘s prior drug conviction was classified as a “felony drug offense” and triggered a ten-year-mandatory minimum. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 420. Had Wheeler been sentenced after Simmons, his prior offense would not have been considered a “felony drug conviction,” he would have faced no mandatory minimum, and the bottom of his Sentencing Guidelines’ range “would have been five years – half of the sentence to which he was subjected.” Id. at 430. Wheeler moved to challenge his sentence given our decision in Simmons, but he had already filed an initial
Our Court then asked whether the “savings clause” required us to extend the Jones test—governing convictions—to Wheeler‘s collateral attack on his sentence. In so asking, our analysis centered on
For these reasons, Wheeler announced, “The New Savings Clause Test for Erroneous Sentences.” 886 F.3d at 428. That test has four parts. First, “at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of a sentence.” Id. at 429. Second, after the prisoner‘s direct appeal and previous
Based on the “savings clause” and these precedents, Farkas asserts that he may challenge his conviction under
2. Farkas does not satisfy this Court‘s “savings clause” tests
(a) Construing Farkas‘s claims
To begin with, we must pin down the substance of Farkas‘s claim before we can evaluate whether it passes either test. Because different rules apply to different avenues of habeas relief, AEDPA “elevate[s] the degree of caution that courts must exercise when determining how to classify prisoner pleadings.” United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2015); see Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 97 (1st Cir. 2008) (In habeas cases, “courts must be guided by the precept that substance trumps form.”). AEDPA‘s strict statutory requirements “may not be circumvented through creative pleading.” United States v. Lambros, 404 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005).
In his
Seizing on the latter characterization, the government contends that Farkas‘s claim is constitutional and that
But in reply, Farkas doubles down on the supposed statutory nature of his
(b) Farkas‘s Sixth Amendment claim does not satisfy the “savings clause”
Farkas‘s Sixth Amendment claim fails our “savings clause” tests—neither permit constitutional claims. See In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 334 (factor three); Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429 (factor three). As Jones and Wheeler respect,
(c) Farkas‘s statutory claim does not satisfy the “savings clause”
Farkas‘s statutory claim similarly fails our “savings clause” tests. First, we consider the Jones test for challenges to convictions. Jones‘s second factor requires the substantive law to change “such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal.” 226 F.3d at 334. But here, there is no question that Farkas‘s illegal conduct—bank fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud—remains criminal. See
Second, we turn to Wheeler‘s “New Savings Clause Test for Erroneous Sentences.” 886 F.3d at 428. But Farkas does
Contrary to Farkas‘s claims, Wheeler did not displace Jones for
Since Wheeler, we have policed the line between Jones and Wheeler, applying the former to claimed
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The writ of habeas corpus holds a foundational place in our Republic. At heart, it secures the fundamental right of personal liberty from unlawful government action. When a prisoner seeks the Great Writ, the federal courts have a key role to play in confirming that the causes and the extent of his detention are justified. But our review must be performed as statutorily prescribed. AEDPA requires all convicted federal prisoners seeking habeas relief to proceed under
AFFIRMED.
