129 Minn. 137 | Minn. | 1915
On February 12, 1908, defendant, a fraternal beneficiary association, issued a benefit certificate to Bernard A. Ledy in wbicb plaintiff, bis wife, was named as beneficiary. Tbe contract provided that tbe insured should be bound by tbe laws of tbe order then in force or thereafter enacted. On December 10, 1912, Ledy committed suicide. Tbe laws of tbe order, in force in 1908, provided that, if tbe assured committed suicide within two years after receiving bis certificate, tbe association should be liable for only one-fifth tbe amount of such certificate. By an amendment to such laws wbicb went into effect in September, 1910, tbe time during wbicb tbe above provision should be in force was extended to a period of five years from tbe issuance of tbe certificate. Ledy died by suicide about two months before tbe five years expired. Plaintiff sued for tbe full amount of tbe certificate. Tbe trial court held that she was entitled to recover one-fifth thereof and no more. She moved for a new trial and appealed from tbe order denying ber motion.
Tbe only controversy is whether she is entitled to recover tbe full amount of tbe certificate, or is limited to one-fifth thereof by tbe above provision. In either event, certain deductions are to be made for tbe benefit of tbe reserve fund, but these amounts were agreed upon and are not in controversy. Tbe statute in force when tbe contract was made provided that:
“Any changes, additions or amendments to said charter or articles of association, constitution or laws duly made or enacted subsequent to tbe issuance of tbe benefit certificate shall bind tbe member and bis beneficiaries and shall govern and control tbe contract in all
■ It is contended that the amendment, extending the period during which the suicide provision should remain in force, is unreasonable and void as against contracts entered into before its adoption, unless the rule announced in Thibert v. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Honor, 78 Minn. 448, 81 N. W. 220, 47 L.R.A. 136, 79 Am. St. 412; Tebo v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 89 Minn. 3, 93 N. W. 513; Olson v. Court of Honor, 100 Minn. 117, 110 N. W. 374, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 521, 117 Am. St. 676, 10 Ann. Cas. 622; Rosenstein v. Court of Honor, 122 Minn. 310, 142 N. W. 331; Ruder v. National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security, 124 Minn. 431, 145 N. W. 118, has been changed by the above statute; and that the present case turns upon the construction to be given to that statute. We cánnot assent to this proposition.
Where a fraternal beneficiary association, in the contract for insurance entered into with its members, stipulates that they shall be subject to,' and bound by, the subsequently enacted laws and regulations of the order, the rule is well nigh universal that the association must exercise the power so reserved in a reasonable manner, and that a law of the order, enacted under such power, which would make an unreasonable change in the terms of prior contracts, is void as against such contracts. While the courts differ little as to the general rule, they differ much as to what amendments are unreasonable within the meaning of the rule. They agree quite generally, however, that an amendment, which relieves the association, in whole or in part, from liability in case the assured intentionally ends his own life, is not forbidden by the rule and is valid. Supreme Commandery of Knights of Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 46 Am. Rep. 332; Fraternal Union of America v. Zeigler, 145 Ala. 287, 289, 39 South. 751; Scow v. Supreme Council Royal League, 223 Ill. 32, 79 N. E. 42; Knights of Maccabees v. Nelson, 77 Kan. 629, 95 Pac. 1052; Daughtry v. Knights of Pythias, 48 La. Ann. 1203, 20 South. 712, 55 Am. St. 310; Domes v. Supreme Lodge, K. of P. 75 Miss. 466, 23 South. 191; Lange v. Royal Highlanders,
“We, therefore, hold upon what we regard as the safer, sounder,*141 and more reasonable rule upon this question, - that the after enacted by-law before us is not binding upon the plaintiff, if her husband took his own life while insane j but that it is binding upon her, if he committed suicide while sane.”
In Plunkett v. Supreme Conclave, 105 Va. 643, 55 S. E. 9, it did not appear affirmatively that the insured was insane. The court held that he must be deemed to have been sane and that the by-law was therefore valid and binding, but say they do not determine whether it would be binding in case the member had been insane. In Olson v. Court of Honor, 100 Minn. 117, 110 N. W. 374, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 521, 117 Am. St. 676, 10 Ann. Cas. 622, this court held that the by-law, there under consideration, was not valid or binding in a case where the member was insane, and under treatment for insanity, at the time he took his own life. Whether an amendment enacting a suicide provision is valid and binding in a case where the insured committed suicide while sane, does not appear to have been considered or determined by this court. A few courts have held such amendments void (Lewine v. Supreme Lodge, K. of P. 122 Mo. App. 547, 99 S. W. 821; Sautter v. Supreme Conclave, 72 N. J. Law, 325, 62 Atl. 529) ; but, as shown by the cases herein-before cited, the great majority of courts hold them valid. The reasons assigned are various. Attention is frequently called to the fact that, at common law, suicide was a crime which entailed forfeiture of property; that, while the successful perpetrator is beyond the reach of the law, he commits an act which is malum in se and which the law tries to prevent by all the means in its power; that he has no moral, legal or other right to commit such an act; that the law cannot say that a provision which prevents him from fastening liability upon the association by his own criminal act voluntarily committed is unreasonable; and that such a provision not only invades no legal or vested right, but takes away a possible incentive to commit a heinous offense.
In the instant case there is no claim that the insured was insane, and he is presumed to have been sane. 2 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. § 4516. The fact that he committed suicide is not, in itself, sufficient to establish insanity. Wilkinson v. Service, 249 Ill. 146, 94 N. E. 50,
Order affirmed.