Plаintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting garnishee defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) аnd denying plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (C)(10). We affirm.
This appeal stems from an accident that oc *15 curred in September of 1988 in which Yvette Guthery was injured when her moped collided with a car driven by defendant Rodney Edwards and owned by defendant Erisline Hale. Plaintiff commenced an action against Edwards and Hale in July of 1990, and was granted a default judgment against them in April 1991. In October of 1992, plaintiff filed a writ of garnishmеnt against garnishee defendant. One month later, garnishee defendant responded by filing a disclosure, wherein it admitted a рolicy existed covering defendant Hale. The disclosure also stated it was unknown whether that policy applied to any claim by plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed interrogatories, and garnishee defendant answered in November of 1992. In response to a request to expand on the reasons why the policy did not apply, garnishee defendant stated:
Garnishee Defendant does not know whether the policy is applicable to plaintiffs claims because the plaintiff has nеver bothered to tell Garnishee Defendant what the claim consists of.
In a response to a request to state аffirmative defenses, garnishee defendant stated:
Unable to state any affirmative defenses for the reason that we have no idea what the plaintiffs claim is about. We reserve the right to provide affirmative defense once the plaintiff provides us with some basis for the claim.
Thereafter', the parties filed their motions for summary disposition.
We find the trial court did not err in granting garnishee defendant’s motion for summary disposition because garnishee defendant did not have *16 timely notice of the lawsuit and was prejudiced by the lack of notice. 1
The scope of residual liability insurance сoverage for an accident that occurs in Michigan is determined by the Michigan financial responsibility act, MCL 257.501
et seq.;
MSA 9.2201
et seq.; Kleit v Saad,
The insurance carrier shall not be liable on any judgment if it has not had prompt notice of and reasonable opportunity to apрear in and defend the action in which such judgment was rendered .... [MCL 257.520(f)(6); MSA 9.2220(f)(6).]
The Kleit Court held that the failure of an insured to notify its insurer, the garnishee defendant, of the lawsuit relieves the garnishee defendant of liability. Kleit, supra, 57. Thus, in order for a garnishee defendant insurer to be relieved of liability because of lack of notice, it (1) must not have received timely notice of the lawsuit, and (2) must havе been prejudiced by the lack of notice. Id. at 57-58.
In the present case, it is undisputed that garnishee defendant did not reсeive notice of the lawsuit until the filing of the writ of garnishment in October of 1992, which was seventeen months after the entry of the default judgment and twenty-seven months after the filing of the complaint. Accordingly, we deem the notice untimely.
*17
The affidavits submitted by bоth parties below reveal that a claims adjuster for plaintiffs insurer contacted garnishee defendant and inquired into coverage of defendant Hale in September of 1988, but did not file a claim. Thereafter, in March of 1989, the claims аdjuster contacted the agent of record and was told that defendant Hale was covered by garnishee defendant under a policy different from that about which garnishee defendant informed the claims adjuster. We conclude thаt these March 1989 contacts were insufficient to mitigate the prejudice caused by the lack of timely notice. Dеlays in notification can prejudice an insurer when the insurer is prevented from investigating the accident.
Kleit, supra,
58;
Henderson v Biron,
Plaintiff obtained a valid default judgment against garnishee defendant’s insured. However, because garnishee dеfendant presented a valid defense to liability, specifically, lack of timely notice, the trial court corrеctly denied plaintiffs motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10).
Finally, we find the trial court properly denied plaintiffs motion fоr summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9). In a disputed garnishment action, the garnishment affidavit serves as the complaint and the disclosure serves as the answer. MCR 3.101(M)(2). The issues in a garnishment dispute are to be tried in the same manner as other civil actions. MCR 3.101(M)(1). Plaintiff infers from this rule that a garnishee must plead its
*18
defenses in the disclosure or waive them as dictated by MCR 2.111(FX2). Case law not cited by plaintiff supports this proposition.
See Westland Park Apartments v Ricco Inc,
However, the court rule regarding the contents of a disclosure requires only that the garnishee reveal its liability to the principal defendant and claim any setoff. MCR 3.101(H)(1)(a). Moreover, MCR 3.101(M)(2) provides, "[ejxcept as the facts stated in the verified statement are admitted by the disclosure, they are denied.” Accordingly, a general denial of liability is sufficient to preserve a garnishee defendant’s right to litigate its liability.
Admiral Ins Co v Columbia Casualty Ins Co,
We find that absent an admission to the contrary in the disclosure, the failure to plead specifically a defense does not waive the dеfense. In the present case, the disclosure filed by garnishee defendant acknowledged the existence of a policy covering its insured, but stated, "[i]t is unknown by garnishee defendant whether said policy applies to any claim by the Plаintiff.” Because garnishee defendant could not determine its defenses until the facts underlying the dispute were develoрed and an amendment of the pleadings would have corrected any deficiency, plaintiff’s motion was properly denied.
Affirmed.
Notes
MCR 2.116(CX7) appears to be an inappropriate basis for granting the motion in this matter. However, the trial court reviewed the motion as if it were brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10), and because neither party was misled, we review the motion pursuant to that court rule.
Mollett v City of Taylor,