Ledesma v. StateLedesma v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Clarke
Appellant appeals from her conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (
1. Lédesma contends that the trial court erred in overruling her motion for a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence. In Georgia, where exclusive possession of an automobile is shown, the presumption is that the owner has possession of the property contained therein. This presumption is rebuttable and does not apply if it can be shown that a defendant has not been in possession or control for a period before discovery of contraband or where others have had equal access to the automobile.
Farmer v. State,
152 Ga. App. 792 (264 SE2d 235) (1979). Ledesma’s entire defense rested upon a theory of equal access to the car by others, primarily her husband and her driver. The car had been purchased just over a month before the arrest. There was testimony by the arresting officer that she said that her husband, the co-owner of the car, had left her about a month prior to the arrest. She testified on direct examination that her husband was not presently living with her but that he had been living with her at the time of the arrest. As for the others who had had access to the car, her testimony was that the driver and her sister had driven the car on
“a
couple” of occasions and that her son had driven it. On the day of the arrest the driver and a real estate agent had been in the car. There was testimony that the pills were found in the ash tray and visible from the driver’s seat. Ledesma testified she smoked and used the ash tray on the day of the arrest. It is for the trier of fact, in this case the jury, to judge the credibility of witnesses and to weigh their testimony.
Young v. State,
232 Ga. 176 (205 SE2d 307) (1974);
Redd v. State,
154 Ga. App. 373 (268 SE2d 423) (1980);
Blanton v. State,
152 Ga. App. 205 (262 SE2d 476) (1979). In this case Ledesma was the sole occupant of the car of which she was the co-owner. She never testified that the gun and drugs were not hers. The jury decided that she had possession. The evidence was
2. In her second enumeration of error, Ledesma claims that the court erred in overruling her motion to suppress the gun and pills confiscated from her car. The motion to suppress was properly denied. The gun was found in a lawful search incident to the arrest of Ledesma and was proper for that reason. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (89 SC 2034, 23 LE2d 685) (1969). The pills were discovered during an inventory search conducted after the arrest. This search was also properly conducted without the requirement that a warrant be first procured. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (90 SC 1975, 26 LE2d 419) (1970).
3. Ledesma assigns error to the trial court’s overruling her challenge to
Ledesma further contends that her arrest was invalid under the statute because at the time the teletype arrived from Missouri saying that Miriam Ledesma was wanted for violation of the Missouri Controlled Substance Act, and at the time she was arrested in Fulton County, no warrant had been actually issued in Missouri for her arrest. In Georgia, if probable cause to arrest exists, a warrantless arrest is lawful.
Durden v. State,
250 Ga. 325 (297 SE2d 237) (1982);
Vaughn v. State,
247 Ga. 136 (274 SE2d 479) (1981). The arresting officers testified at trial that they believed that a warrant had been issued in Missouri. This belief was based on reliable information from Missouri officials that the issuance of a warrant was imminent charging her with a violation of the Missouri Controlled Substance Act. When they received the message that Miriam Ledesma was wanted, they interpreted this to mean that the warrant had been issued. Even if this mistaken interpretation did not meet the requirement of the statute that the officers have reasonable information that she was charged in the courts of another state with a crime punishable by death or a prison term exceeding one year, it does amount to probable cause to arrest which is the applicable
4. The constitutional attack on
5. Ledesma’s fifth enumeration of error is that the court admitted over objection a statement made by the defendant which was not furnished to defendant even though she made a proper request. She argues that the state did not meet the requirements of
6. The enumeration of error complaining that the state did not prove chain of custody of the pills found in Ledesma’s car is without merit. A review of the transcript reveals that any discrepancy between the testimony of the officers who had custody of the evidence is inconsequential. The state established a “reasonable assurance” of the identity of the pills. Dent v. State, 243 Ga. 854 (257 SE2d 241) (1979); Painter v. State, 237 Ga. 30 (226 SE2d 578) (1976). Ledesma, on the other hand, has shown no more than the bare possibility of tampering.
7. Ledesma’s complaint as to the court’s allowing the state to address questions propounded by the jury after the close of the evidence was not raised below and cannot be raised on appeal.
8. Since closing arguments of the attorneys were not reported, and since Ledesma has not supplemented the record by any of the approved methods,
9. There was no error in the court’s charging the language of
10. The last enumeration of error deals with the failure of the court to order exculpatory material be turned over to defendant. At the hearing on Ledesma’s motion to suppress she requested as part of a Brady motion that the court inspect the file of the Fulton County Sheriffs office as to the communication between that office and authorities in Missouri. The trial judge agreed to inspect the file. If the appellant desires to have this inspection reviewed by this court, she must point out what material she believes to have been suppressed and show how she has been prejudiced. Since Ledesma has not made this showing, we find this enumeration to be without merit. Welch v. State, 251 Ga. 197 (304 SE2d 391) (1983); Burke v. State, 248 Ga. 124 (281 SE2d 607) (1981); Wilson v. State, 246 Ga. 62 (268 SE2d 895) (1980).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who concurs in the judgment only.