Ledbetter v. CallawayLedbetter v. Callaway
John A. Callaway and R. J. Brown brought an equitable petition against Ledbetter Construction Company and named individuals as trustees of the Assembly of God Church of East Point. The petitioners, as citizens and property owners, sought to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the building of a church at 717-19 East Cleveland Avenue in the City of East Point. It was alleged that the property on which the defendants proposed to erect the church had been zoned for residential purposes only, under Use U-l, and that a church is zoned under Use U-7, and said property could not be used fоr the purpose of erecting a church except after public notice and a hearing had been provided; that, under city ordinances, petitioners were entitled to notice and a hearing before there could be a variance of the use of said property from residential purposes, and they had not been given an opportunity to аppear before the zoning and planning commission of the city, and in that regard have been denied their rights as citizens and property owners living in the immediate vicinity where the proposed church is to be erected. It was alleged that, unless the defendants be restrained from building the church, petitioners’ property would be damaged in certain particulars set out in the petition. A temporary restraining order was granted on presentation of the petition.
The prayer for an interlocutory injunction was heard upon an agreed stipulation of facts, and the court entered an order restraining the defendants from proceeding with the erection of said church, and also overruled objections of the defendants attacking the constitutionality of the zoning law of 1946 and the zoning ordinances of the City of East Point. The defendants assign error on this order.
The undisputed evidence shows: The City of East Point in 1939 аdopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance, whereby the property in question was classed for U-l use — residential purposes. Under class U-7, provision was made for churchеs, and under the ordinance, before a church could be erected in a district zoned for residential purposes, a special permit was required from the zoning and planning cоmmission, which, after public notice and hearing, was authorized to vary the use and regulation so as to substantially serve the public convenience and “not substantially and permanently injurе the appropriate use of the neighboring property.” The defendants appeared at a regular meeting of the zoning and planning commission on October 28, 1954, and orally rеquested that this described property be zoned for church purposes, and no public notice was given as required by the city ordinance. The commission approved the aрplication of the defendants, and on November 15, 1954, the city building-inspector issued a permit to them to erect a church on said property. The City Council of East Point on November 1, 1948, аdopted a resolution, whereby they declared the act approved January 31, 1946 (Ga. L. 1946, pp. 191-203), to be effective within said city, and that the East Point zoning ordinance of 1939 had been by rеsolution made to comply with the general zoning act of 1946.
It appears from the record that a special permit was issued by the building inspector to the trustees on November 15, 1954, and the equitable petition was filed on November 19, 1954. The petitioners' whole attack complaining of the building of the church is based upon their contеntion that the planning commission approved a variance in the use of the property and issued a building permit without giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard under the prоvisions of the zoning ordinance of 1939. No attack is made on the validity of the act of the building-inspector in issuing the building permit. It is presumed that the building inspector acted within his authority and according to rules and regulations of the zoning ordinance.
New Mission Baptist Church
v.
City of
Atlanta, 200
Ga.
518 (1) (
It follows from what has been said above that it was error for the court to grant an interlocutory injunction.
In view of the foregoing rulings, it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute and ordinances attacked by the defendants in their written objections. In view of the fact that thе trial court did expressly pass upon these objections and overruled them, and since, in view of our rulings, it was unnecessary to pass upon such constitutional questions, direction is given that the trial court, on the return of the remittitur in this case, vacate the order complained of in its entirety.
Judgment reversed with direction.