The judgment at issue in this case arose from an arbitration award in favor of James Grenfell. Grenfell submitted a claim for breach of an employment contract to binding arbitration and was awarded $1,012,500 against LecStar/Corzon, Inc. The court granted Grenfell’s petition for judicial confirmation of the award plus statutory interest on November 4, 2002.
Nearly a year later, Grenfell filed a motion to change the name of the defendant from LecStar/Corzon to LecStar Corporation and LecStar Communications Corporation. 1 The court granted the motion. It is from this order that LecStar Telecom, Inc., who was not a party to the arbitration proceeding below, appeals. 2 For reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in *713 granting the motion to correct the misnomer and affirm.
1. LecStar Telecom argued below and now on appeal that the court should not allow Grenfell to correct the misnomer because Grenfell was trying to substitute defendants after the end of the arbitration process. Specifically, LecStar Telecom claims that Grenfell’s failure to timely seek to modify or to vacate the award within the statutory time periods in OCGA §§ 9-9-11 and 9-9-14 precluded his efforts to change the award.
But, this is not a modification of an arbitration award. The court made no substantive change affecting the merits of the award itself. Compare
Tanaka v. Pecqueur,
The Code section providing for the correction of misnomers provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll misnomers . . . made in writs, pleadings, or other civil judicial proceedings, shall, on motion, be amended and corrected instanter without working unnecessary delay to the party making the same.” OCGA § 9-10-132. The court in
Foskey v. Vidalia City School,
In this case, LecStar Corporation and LecStar Communications Corporation submitted pleadings, defended their interests, participated in discovery, appeared at arbitration, and were represented by legal counsel. Moreover, there is no dispute that LecStar Corporation and LecStar Communications Corporation repeatedly acknowledged the clerical mistake in the caption naming LecStar/Corzon, Inc. as respondent. In LecStar’s response to Grenfell’s amended demand, LecStar Communications Corporation stated that it was: “incorrectly named as LecStar/Corzon, Inc. in Claimant’s Amended Demand for Arbitration, and hereinafter referred to as ‘LecStar.’ ”
Accordingly, there was no change of parties, no new party that had not been served was added to the case, both corporations waived any objections by appearing and pleading to the merits, and neither corporation can show any harm as a result of the correction of the misnomer. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Grenfell’s motion to correct the misnomer. Weaver, supra; Temperature Control, supra.
2. LecStar Telecom also claims the trial court erred by permitting Grenfell to introduce evidence not in the record in support of his motion. Eleven of the exhibits complained of were pleadings entered in arbitration and signed by counsel on behalf of LecStar Corporation and LecStar Communications Corporation. LecStar Telecom cites.no cognizable legal basis for contesting the genuineness or authenticity of any of those documents, and we find none. This enumeration is without merit.
3. Next, LecStar Telecom contends that the trial court erred by allowing post-judgment discovery while a supersedeas was in effect. Although a notice of appeal with payment of costs serves as a supersedeas of the judgment appealed, it does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction as to other matters in the same case not affecting the judgment on appeal.
Cohran v. Carlin,
4. LecStar complains that the trial court erred by enforcing a subpoena and notice of deposition for post-judgment discovery served on W. Dale Smith during the statutory ten-day stay of judgment. We disagree.
After the trial court granted the motions to correct the misnomer and to intervene, Grenfell served a nonparty deposition and document subpoena on Smith. Smith then filed a “renewed motion to quash subpoena to non-party and for protective order” and claimed that he “is not a party to this action.”
After a hearing on the matter, the trial court issued an order directing Smith to appear for his deposition. In finding the subpoena enforceable, the court noted that “Dale Smith... was the former Chief Executive Officer of LecStar Corporation and LecStar Communications Corporation” and “is currently the Chief Executive Officer of LecStar Telecom, Inc.”
After noting that the subpoena issued to Smith on June 16 was within ten days of the order of June 7, 2004, the trial court decided “because the original Order in this case was entered on November 4, 2002, and due to lack of prejudice to Defendants, the Court exercises its discretion and will not enforce the ten-day provision of OCGA § 9-11-62.” The court observed that since December 2003, Grenfell had subpoenaed testimony and documents from Smith three times and that each time Smith had filed petitions to quash. As stated previously, the trial court correctly found that the notice of appeal filed by LecStar Telecom did not act as a supersedeas of its jurisdiction of “discovery-related matters unrelated to LecStar Telecom, Inc.” See
Spalding
County, supra;
Cohran,
supra. Discovery matters are expressly within the sound discretion of a trial court and, absent a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
Sechler Family Partnership v. Prime Group,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Although Grenfell originally styled this motion as one amending a judgment to correct a technical defect under OCGA§ 9-Il-60, the trial court correctly treated it as a motion to correct a misnomer under OCGA § 9-10-132.
The trial court allowed LecStar Telecom to intervene in the proceeding below based on its argument that Grenfell ultimately would be looking to it for payment of the award and no one from LecStar Corporation or LecStar Communications Corporation came forward to oppose Grenfell’s motion.