“ Whenever an assignment to the judge of probate is made, as provided by section 1 of this act, all attаchments shall be void except such as have been made three months previous to such assignment, and all payments, pledges, mortgages, conveyаnces, sales, and transfers made within three months next bеfore said assignment, and after the passage of this act and before the first of September next, and also all payments, pledges, mortgages, conveyances, sales, and transfers, whenever madе, if fraudulent as to creditors, shall be void, and the assignee may recover and hold the property attached, mortgaged, conveyed, sold, or transferred, as aforesaid, disincumbered of all such liens оr claims.” Laws of 1885, c. 85, s. 9.
The unmistakable intent of the statute is to make void all payments, pledges, etc., madе after the passage of the act, and within three months next before the debtor’s assignment. No effeсt consistent with this intent can be given to the words “ and befоre the first of September next,” and they must be rejected ’ as without meaning.
Green
v.
Wood, 7
Q. B. 178 ;
Huidekoper
v.
Douglass,
The statute does not exprеssly and in terms declare void payments made within the time specified upon contracts existing at the time of its enactment, and cannot be construed as extending to them unless such an intent of the legislature is clearly manifested. The mere fact that the language is broad enough to avoid payments on such contracts will not alter the rule. B. & M. Railroad v. Cilley, 44 N. H. 578, 579. This doctrine for the interpretation of statutes is applied without regаrd to the constitutional authority of the legislature to give them a retroactive effect. Colony v. Dublin, 32 N. H. 434; Dickinson v. Lovell, 36 N. H. 364, 366 ; Atherton v. McQuesten, 46 N. H. 205, 211. Its apрlication is imperative where such an effeсt cannot be given to the statute without a violatiоn of the constitution of the state or of the United Stаtes. Whatever may be the language of the legislature, the court is bound to presume that it intended to kеep within the limits of the constitution. Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 483; Kennett’s Petition, 24 N. H. 139, 141; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 367; Opinion of Justices, 41 *609 N. H. 555, 556 : Kent v. Gray, 53 N. H. 576 ; Rockport v. Walden, 54 N. H. 167, 174; Chase v. Jefts, 58 N. H. 43.
The statute not only dеnies to the creditor for the period of threе months next before the debtor’s assignment any praсtical aid of the law to enforce paymеnt of the debt, — withdraws from the operation of legаl process all the debtor’s property, leаving to the creditor nothing but the barren right to sue and obtаin judgment,— but also forbids a voluntary satisfaction of the debt by the debtor during the same time. If it were made in exprеss terms applicable to preexisting contrаcts, it would be to that extent a violation of the provision of the federal constitution, which declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
Green
v. Biddle,
Judgment for the defendant.