151 Pa. 646 | Pa. | 1892
Opinion by
The question raised in the court below and in this court is over the sufficiency of the affidavit of defence. The contract sued on is what is commonly called an oil lease, made by the plaintiffs to the defendant, which covers one hundred and fifty-five acres of land; and which was to continue for five years “ and as much longer as oil or gas should be found or the
In considering the legal effect of the anomalous provision in the lease before ús, two well established rules of construction should be borne in mind. One of these is, that words should be taken most strongly against him whose words they are. The other asserts, that between two or more conflicting constructions of an instrument, that one should ordinarily be adopted that will sustain most of its provisions. Turning now to the lease, we find it contains a plain, unequivocal promise or covenant to complete a well on the premises within six months from the date of the contract, “ or in default thereof to pay to the party of the first part for further delay an annual rental of five hundred dollars.” Under the express words of this promise, the rental is payable quarterly in advance, and the first payment fell due at the end of six months from the date of the contract, unless a well had been completed on or before that
The clause relied on by the defendant provides,,first, that, if no well is drilled, and the rent remains unpaid for ten days after it is due, the agreement shall be null and void, and shall not be renewed, except by mutual consent. This, as we have repeatedly said, is for the protection of the lessor, and not of the defaulting lessee: Galey v. Kellerman, 123 Pa. 491; Wills v. The Gas Company, 130 Pa. 222; Ogden v. Hatry, 145 Pa. 640. The lessor may, in this way, rid himself of a lessee who will do nothing; or he may, at his election, resort to his legal remedies upon the contract. The words mainly relied on by the defendant are those that assert that “ no right of action shall, after such failure, accrue to either party on account of a breach of any promise or agreement herein contained.” To what do the words “ after such failure ” relate ? They must relate to the failure described in the preceding sentence, and that is not the failure to drill a well within six months, or to pay the rent on the day it falls due, but a continued failure to make such payment for ten days after it fell due.
The lessor cannot re-enter and treat the rights of the lessee as forfeited or abandoned on the day the default happens, but he must give the lessee ten days of grace, in which to come in and make payment, before he can take advantage of the default to terminate the lease. When the ten days have expired, if the lessor asserts the forfeiture, the contract becomes null and void from that day forward. It can only be revived by agreement. Out of this now extinguished relation, created by the contract, no right of action can accrue. The covenants have ceased to bind. The agreement itself is at an end.
But the lessor in this case did not choose to insist on the forfeiture, when the ten days expired. No one could assert it for him, except under his direction. No one could compel him to assert it. Certainly the defendant, who had promised to drill a well or to pay the rental of five hundred dollars per year, if he failed to complete a well within six months, and as against whom a right of action had accrued upon the happening of his default, could not compel his lessor to re-enter for his, the lessee’s, benefit. He might surrender. He could di vest himself of his interest in the lease, but he could not strip
The judgment of the court below is for these reasons affirmed.
