Leapai v. MiltonLeapai v. Milton
This is an appeal from the Fifth District Court of Appeal‘s decision in Milton v. Leapai, 562 So.2d 804 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), in which that court held
The relevant facts are as follows. In 1986, James Dean Milton was involved in an automobile collisiоn with a vehicle allegedly owned by Denise Leapai and driven by Mabel Ekeroma. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Milton‘s insurance company, paid Milton $2,859.05 for the damаge to his vehicle. In 1988, Milton, for the use and benefit of State Farm, filed a subrogation claim action against Leapai and Ekeroma in the county court. On December 7, 1988, Leapai mаde a one dollar offer of settlement to Milton, which was rejected. Leapai then moved for summary judgment and filed an affidavit asserting that she sold the motor vehicle and endorsed and delivered the certificate of title to Ekeroma for said vehicle on December 6, 1985, approximately two months prior to the accident. Furthermore, Leapai filed an affidavit of the notary public who notarized her signature on the original certificate of title on December 6, 1985.
The county court granted summary judgment in favor of Leapai. Subsequеntly, Leapai filed a motion to tax costs and for an award of attorney fees in accordance with the provisions of
WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE‘S ENACTMENT OF F.S. SECTION 45.061 CONSTITUTED THE ADOPTION OF A RULE OF PROCEDURE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE V, SECTION 2(a) OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION. WHETHER ATTORNEY‘S FEES MAY BE IMPOSED AS SANCTIONS UNDER F.S. SECTION 45.061 WHERE THE OFFER OF SETTLEMENT WAS MADE SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE BUT WHERE PLAINTIFF‘S CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.
In its holding, the district court noted that this Court had previously held in The Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442 (Offer of Judgment), 550 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1989), that “to the extent the procedural aspects of the new
It is a fundamental principle that a statute, if constitutional in one part аnd unconstitutional in another part, may remain valid except for the unconstitutional portion. However, this is dependent upon the unconstitutional provision being severable from thе remainder of the statute. The severability of the statutory provision is determined by its relation to the overall legislative intent of the statute of which it is part and whether the statute, less the invalid provisions, can still accomplish this intent. Additionally, if the valid portion of the law would be rendered incomplete, or if severance would cause results unanticipated by the legislature, there can be no severance of the invalid parts; the entire law must be declared unconstitutional. We conclude that the procedural aspects of sectiоn 45.061 encroach upon the authority of the supreme court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure and these procedural details cannot be “severed” from the substantive aspects of section 45.061. Therefore, we declare the entire law to be unconstitutional.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
We reject the applicability of this principle under thе circumstances of this case. We have consistently held that statutes should be construed to effectuate the express legislative intent and all doubt as to the validity of any statute shоuld be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1974).1 This is particularly so in areas of the judicial process that necessarily involve both procedural and substantive provisions to acсomplish a proposal‘s objective. To strictly apply the nonseverance principle, as done by the district court, would make it increasingly difficult to adopt new judicial рrocess proposals that have both substantive and procedural aspects.
The judiciary and the legislature must work to solve these types of separation-of-powеrs problems without encroaching upon each other‘s functions and recognizing each other‘s constitutional functions and duties. One example of such a cooperative effort is The Florida Evidence Code, adopted by both the legislature, chapter 76-237, Laws of Florida, and the Supreme Court in In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1979). Furthermore, in In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 281 So.2d 204, 204 (Fla. 1973), we held:
During the past session of the Legislature various laws were enаcted which related to practice and procedure. This creates confusion in the judicial branch in that the laws as enacted are in conflict with or supplemental tо various rules of practice and procedure. The Supreme Court has considered these laws as expressing the intent of the Legislature and has formulated rules of practice and procedure that attempts [sic] to conform with the intent of the Legislature and at the same time further the orderly procedure in the judicial branch.
The offer of judgment process is not a new subject to us. We have previously noted that the area of attorney fees and sanctions in the offer of judgment proсess may well be substantive. In The Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442, 550 So.2d 442, 442 (Fla. 1989), we said:
While we agree that this Court has authority to create rules imposing sanctions and requiring payment of costs and attorneys fees when a party violates the rules, it is not so clear that a sanction is “procedural” when it imposes a “fine” based on a percentage of an unaccepted offer, especially when a party may have done nothing more serious than guessing wrong about a jury verdict.
We also acknowledged the legislative policy detеrmination in this subject matter by stating:
We believe it is wiser policy to have a sanction based on costs and attorneys fees. This is what the legislature did in both of the statutes under review in this opinion, and this legislative determination is persuasive.
We reject the district court‘s conclusion that
Having found the statute constitutional as modified by our rule, we next must address the question of whether
For the reasons expressed, we find the procedural aspects of
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.