Case Information
*1 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
The Edwards Aquifer Authority (“EAA”) is a conservation and reclama- tion district established to regulate the groundwater of the Edwards Aquifer for the benefit of dependent users and species. The League of United Latin American Citizens and its Bexar County members Maria Martinez, Jesse Alaniz, Jr., and Ramiro Nava (collectively, “LULAC”) sued the EAA, asserting that its electoral scheme violated the “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Claiming to be a special-purpose unit of government, the EAA countered that it was exempt from such strictures. The district court granted summary judgment for the EAA, finding that its limited functions disproportionately impact those most empowered in its elections and that its apportionment scheme has a rational basis. We agree and affirm.
I.
The Edwards Aquifer “is a unique underground system of water-bearing
formations.”
Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground Water Conservation Dist.
,
925 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1996). Water enters the aquifer as rainfall and
surface water and exits through well-withdrawals and spring discharges. As “the primary source of water for south central Texas,” it is “vital to the
residents, industry, and ecology of the region, the State’s economy, and the
public welfare.”
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Chem. Lime, Ltd.
,
During the 1980s, overdrafting of the aquifer threatened various species
that “rel[ied] upon adequate and continuous natural flows of fresh water . . . as
an environment for their survival.”
Sierra Club v. Lujan
, No. MO-91-CA-069,
Under the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, [2] the EAA possesses “all of the powers, rights, and privileges necessary to manage, conserve, preserve, and protect the aquifer and to increase the recharge of, and prevent the waste or pollution of water in, the aquifer.” Act § 1.08(a). Those powers include the ability to hire employees; enter contracts; issue grants or loans for water con- servation and reuse; finance, construct, and operate dams and reservoirs; assert the power of eminent domain; and otherwise adopt and enforce rules necessary to execute its functions. See id. § 1.11.
The Act prohibits the withdrawal of aquifer water without a permit,
limits the annual amount of permitted withdrawals, “and gives preference to
‘existing user[s]’ . . . who ‘withdr[ew] and beneficially used underground water
from the aquifer on or before June 1, 1993.’”
Chem. Lime
,
Permit holders “may not violate the terms or conditions of the permit” or use aquifer water outside the boundaries of the EAA. Id. §§ 1.34(a), 1.35(b). They must meter their water usage, avoid waste, and implement conservation plans approved by the EAA. [4] During a drought, the EAA may impose “utility pricing . . . to limit discretionary use by the customers of water utilities” and require further “reduction of nondiscretionary use by permitted or contractual users.” Act § 1.26(a)(3)–(4).
The EAA has adopted rules to preserve the quality of water in the aqui- fer. Specifically, the EAA regulates the construction, operation, and mainten- ance of wells that draw from the aquifer or are drilled through it. See EAA Rules §§ 713.200–203. The rest of its regulations, however, are limited to the recharge [5] and contributing zones, [6] where pollutants are most likely to seep into the aquifer. Within those regions, the EAA mandates the reporting of noxious spills and regulates facilities housing toxic substances for commercial use. Id. §§ 713.400–401, 713.501. It further governs the storage of hazardous substances in large aboveground and underground storage tanks in the re- charge zone. Id. § 713.603. And it proscribes the use of coal tar-based pave- ment sealant products in the parts of Comal and Hays Counties that overlie the recharge and contributing zones. Id. § 713.703.
To ensure compliance with the Act and its regulations, EAA employees “may enter private or public property at any reasonable time,” provided they “observe the establishment’s rules concerning safety, internal security, and fire protection[;] . . . notify any occupant of their presence[;] and present proper identification.” Id. § 717.104. If a violation has occurred, the EAA may sus- pend a permit, assess an administrative penalty, or sue for an injunction or civil penalty. Act §§ 1.36–1.38, 1.40.
The Act explicitly prohibits the EAA from levying a property tax to finance its operations. Id. § 1.28(a). With the approval of the state attorney general and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”), how- ever, the EAA may issue revenue bonds for the purchase of land or necessary equipment. § 1.28(b)–(c). Moreover, it may “assess equitable aquifer man- agement fees based on aquifer use.” Id. § 1.29(b). Alternatively, other water districts located within its boundaries may contract with the EAA to pay its expenses through taxes collected from water users in those districts. Id. But in any case, the EAA may not charge “more than is reasonably necessary for [its] administration.”
The EAA’s jurisdiction covers eight counties representing three distinct regions: (1) the western agricultural counties of Atascosa, Medina, and Uvalde, where approximately 117,000 persons dwell; (2) the eastern spring-flow coun- ties of Caldwell, Comal, Guadalupe, and Hays, where roughly 435,000 people live; and (3) the urban county of Bexar, which has over 1.7 million residents. Initially, the Act provided that each region would appoint three members to the EAA board of directors. See Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, § 1.09, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2356–57. But the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) denied preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 “due to the appointment method of selecting the board of directors.” Barshop , 925 S.W.2d at 625. In consultation with the DOJ, the Texas legislature amended the Act in 1995 to establish a board of directors comprised of fifteen popularly elected members and two appointed non-voting members. Act § 1.09. Under the current scheme, the agricultural and spring-flow counties elect four directors each, whereas Bexar County elects seven directors. § 1.093.
II.
LULAC sued the EAA in 2012, claiming, inter alia , that its electoral sys- tem contravened the principle of “one person, one vote.” Conceding that its electoral districts were malapportioned, the EAA rejoined that, as a special- purpose district, it was exempt from the “one person, one vote” requirement. The San Antonio Water System filed a complaint as plaintiff-intervenor, and the City of San Marcos, the City of Uvalde, Uvalde County, New Braunfels Utilities, and the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority intervened as defendants. Both sides moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied LULAC’s motion and granted summary judg-
ment for the EAA, noting that its “power and authority [wa]s limited to car-
rying out its narrowly defined statutory purposes to manage, protect, preserve,
and conserve the water in the aquifer.” Given that the per capita usage of
aquifer water was significantly higher in the agricultural and spring-flow
counties than in Bexar County, the court explained that the EAA’s activities
disproportionately affected those most advantaged in its elections. It therefore
held that, under
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District
,
III.
At the heart of democratic society is “[t]he right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice.”
Reynolds v. Sims
,
In
Avery v. Midland County
,
The Court reached a similar conclusion in
Hadley v. Junior College Dis-
trict
,
Such a case arose in
Salyer
. At issue was the Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District, which covered 193,000 acres of California farmland and con-
tained only seventy-seven residents. ,
Equally importantly, “its actions disproportionately affect[ed] land- owners.” Id. at 729. The entire cost of its operations was assessed against the land in proportion to the benefits received, and any delinquent payments be- came a lien on the land itself. “In short, there [wa]s no way that the economic burdens of district operations c[ould] fall on residents qua residents . . . .” Id. Consequently, the Court held that the district was not subject to the strict requirements of Reynolds . Id. at 728. Instead, the Court found a rational basis for permitting only landowners to vote in the district’s elections and for apportioning such votes according to the assessed valuation of the land. [7]
In
Ball
,
After all, the Salt River District could not impose ad valorem property or sales taxes; enact laws governing the conduct of citizens; maintain streets or schools; or provide sanitation, health, or welfare services. Id. Furthermore, the district’s water functions were “relatively narrow” because it “d[id] not own, sell, or buy water, nor d[id] [it] control the use of any water” once distributed. Id. at 367. Rather, it “simply store[d] water behind its dams, conserve[d] it from loss, and deliver[ed] it through project canals.” Id. Moreover, “neither the existence nor size of the District’s power business” was “constitutionally relevant” because “the provision of electricity is not a traditional element of governmental sovereignty” and, in any event, was “incidental” to the district’s primary purpose of conserving and delivering water. at 367–68.
As in , the Court also found that the Salt River District dispropor- tionately affected “the specific class of people whom the system ma[de] eligible to vote.” Id. at 370. Only landowners committed capital to the district, and only they were subject to liens and acreage-based taxes. Id. Hence, the Court upheld the district’s voting scheme “because it [bore] a reasonable relationship to its statutory objectives.” at 371.
The EAA does not contest that its electoral scheme dilutes the voting power of Bexar County residents. Instead, the parties dispute whether the Salyer-Ball exception extends to an electoral scheme that enfranchises all voters and, if so, whether the EAA satisfies the two prongs of the exception.
A.
LULAC maintains that the exception is limited to cases such as Salyer and Ball in which the franchise is restricted. LULAC reasons that where, as here, the franchise is open to all, LULAC contends that the electoral scheme must conform to the fundamental principle of “one person, one vote.” To hold otherwise, LULAC insists, would be to invert the narrow exception for the gen- eral rule.
Nevertheless, both
Avery
and
Hadley
contemplated that the exception
could apply to an election open to all. Although
Avery
, 390 U.S. at 483–84, involved an open-franchise election, the Court observed that if the Commis-
sioners Court were a special-purpose district, it “would have to confront the
question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give greater
influence to the citizens most affected by the organization’s functions.” Simi-
larly, in
Hadley
,
Relatedly, in
Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the
Local Level, Inc.
,
LULAC rejoins that, in
Board of Estimate v. Morris
,
At least two circuits have so held. In
Pittman v. Chicago Board of Edu-
cation
,
We therefore decline LULAC’s invitation to cabin the Salyer-Ball excep- tion to cases in which the franchise is restricted. LULAC claims that “[t]o read this exception any more broadly [would] divorce the rule from the unique fac- tual moorings of Salyer and Ball ” and would permit the rare exception to swal- low the general requirement of “one person, one vote.” But notably, the Court in those cases upheld an electoral system that not only weighted votes differ- ently, but also denied the franchise entirely to certain voters. In contrast, all voters may participate in elections to the EAA board of directors, albeit with unequal voting power. Consequently, this case represents a narrower depar- ture from the principle of “one person, one vote” than in Salyer or Ball .
B.
Under the
Salyer-Ball
framework, we must first consider whether the
EAA serves a “special limited purpose.” ,
As LULAC concedes, the EAA largely accomplishes its statutory pur- poses by regulating fewer than two thousand permit holders. LULAC avers that, in issuing permits and imposing conditions thereon, the EAA not only “decid[es] who can access the groundwater” in the first instance, but also con- trols the use of the water once withdrawn. But contrary to LULAC’s depiction, the EAA’s discretion to grant a permit is quite limited. The Act itself caps the total amount of permitted withdrawals each year. Act § 1.14(c). Additionally, the Act “entitle[s]” an existing user to a permit upon filing a declaration of historical use, paying an application fee, and establishing a beneficial use for the water. [12]
Similar to the district in
Ball
,
The EAA’s obligation to prevent the pollution of the aquifer, however, is
more characteristic of the powers exercised by a general governmental entity.
[13]
LULAC maintains that the EAA serves broad and significant purposes in pro-
tecting the health and sanitation of the region and in governing a natural re-
source “vital to the general economy and welfare of the State of Texas.”
See
Barshop
,
That theory is unavailing. In
Ball
,
As in Ball , the parties agree that the EAA’s main function is to preserve the quantity of aquifer water by regulating permit holders. What’s more, the EAA’s powers are secondary to the plenary environmental authority of the TCEQ and subject to its supervision. [14] Hence, the EAA’s regulation of pol- lutants does not render it a general governmental body because such conduct is incidental to its primary task of administering the permit process.
Indeed, aside from the construction and operation of aquifer wells, the
EAA’s regulation of water quality is confined to the recharge and contributing
zones, which present the highest risk of water contamination. Within those
specific zones, the EAA requires the reporting of toxic spills, EAA Rules
§ 713.401; prohibits the use of coal tar-based pavement sealant products,
id.
§ 713.703; and regulates the storage of hazardous substances for commercial
purposes,
id.
§ 713.501, or in large aboveground and underground storage
tanks,
id.
§ 713.603. Such functions, however, are hardly “general enough [or]
have sufficient impact throughout” the jurisdiction to warrant the strictures of
“one person, one vote.”
Hadley
,
The holding in
Kessler v. Grand Central District Management Associa-
tion, Inc.
,
Finally, LULAC complains that the EAA can “raise billions in revenue” through aquifer management fees, utility pricing regulation, and civil penal- ties. Although those “powers are not statutorily labeled as” a tax, LULAC posits that “the lack of any such label is legally insignificant.” Invoking National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , 567 U.S. 519, 564 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB ], LULAC insists that the EAA’s statutory powers share “the essential feature of any tax” in that they “produce[] at least some revenue for the Government.”
That reasoning stretches
NFIB
to its breaking point. There, the Court
held that the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 was functionally a tax despite its statutory label as a “penalty.”
See NFIB
,
Conversely, aquifer management fees are not calculated or collected in the same way as is an income tax. Instead, such fees are “based on aquifer use” and may not exceed what “is reasonably necessary for the administration of the [EAA].” Act § 1.29(b) . Although other water districts located within its boundaries may contract with the EAA to pay expenses “through taxes in lieu of user fees,” id. , the EAA itself lacks the ability to tax, id. § 1.28(a). The same is true of its utility pricing regulation. Though the EAA may require water utilities to increase their pricing to limit discretionary use by their customers, it cannot collect higher fees directly from water users. See id. § 1.26(a)(3). And in any event, the EAA may engage in utility pricing regulation only during “critical period[s]” of drought. § 1.26(a).
Additionally, should a violation of the Act occur, the EAA can suspend a
permit, assess an administrative penalty, or sue for an injunction or civil pen-
alty of up to $10,000 per day of a continuing infraction.
See id.
§§ 1.36–1.38,
1.40. Unlike the individual mandate, those measures “attach[] negative” and
“prohibitory” legal consequences to wrongful conduct and are explicitly de-
signed to deter violations of Texas law.
See NFIB
,
C.
We next ask whether the EAA’s activities disproportionately impact the
western agricultural and eastern spring-flow counties, whose residents are
most empowered by its elections.
See Ball
,
First, per capita usage is significantly higher in those counties than in urban Bexar County. Between 1992 and 1994—just before the adoption of the EAA’s current electoral scheme—the average user in the western counties pumped three to eight times more water than did the average user in Bexar County. Similarly, the average user in the eastern counties consumed twice as much as did the average user in Bexar County. Aquifer usage has remained constant over the years. Between 2010 and 2012, the western counties had a per capita usage that was roughly six to twelve times that of Bexar County, whereas the eastern counties averaged two times the per capita usage of Bexar County. Such disparate usage shows that residents of the agricultural and spring-flow counties are more dependent upon the aquifer and thus are disproportionately affected by the EAA’s regulation thereof.
Second, under Texas law, landowners enjoy “a constitutionally compen- sable interest in groundwater . ” Day , 369 S.W.3d at 838. Notably, property owners in the agricultural and spring-flow counties collectively possess seventy-six percent of the land overlying the Edwards Aquifer. Consequently, they own an outsized share of aquifer water and are disproportionately im- pacted by the EAA’s efforts to manage it.
Third, the EAA’s regulation of water quality has little bearing on resi- dents of Bexar County. Its rules relating to toxic spills and facilities storing large volumes of hazardous materials apply solely to the recharge and contrib- uting zones. See EAA Rules §§ 713.401, 713.501. Yet only twenty-one percent of those regions fall within Bexar County. The EAA further regulates large aboveground and underground storage tanks in the recharge zone. § 713.603. But only ten percent of that zone intersects Bexar County. Like- wise, the ban on coal tar-based pavement sealant products applies exclusively in Comal and Hays Counties. § 713.703. Hence, residents of the western and eastern counties disproportionately feel the weight of the EAA’s regulatory power.
Fourth, one of the EAA’s central purposes—and, indeed, the impetus for its creation—was the protection of endangered species. See Act § 1.14(a)(6)– (7). A disproportionate number of those species, however, reside in the eastern counties. Because that region lies downstream from the western and Bexar counties, resident human and animal populations are directly and adversely affected by reduced spring flow. The eastern counties and the wildlife they contain therefore rely most on the EAA’s conservation efforts.
In response, LULAC highlights that Bexar County residents finance almost seventy-five percent of the EAA’s operations through the payment of aquifer management fees. That is so largely because they purchase water at significantly higher rates than their rural counterparts. Whereas the statute caps fees at $2 per acre-foot of water actually withdrawn for agricultural use, municipal and industrial users pay $84 per acre-foot of water authorized to be pumped. See id. § 1.29(e). LULAC thus maintains that Bexar County resi- dents, “who have the least voting power within the EAA, are disproportionately burdened by the fees used to support it.” According to LULAC, that “inverse relationship of burden and voting strength is the exact opposite of what” oc- curred in Salyer and Ball , where “the groups that were electorally advantaged . . . [also] bore the burden and reaped the benefit” of the districts’ operations.
Yet LULAC overlooks that the burden of those costs does not fall directly
on Bexar County residents. Instead, aquifer management fees are assessed to
the San Antonio Water System which, as the permit holder, chooses to draw
water from the aquifer and to pass on such expenses to the citizens of Bexar
County. Such indirect effects are insufficient to subject the EAA to the “one
person, one vote” requirement where residents in the eastern and western
counties are directly and disproportionately impacted by its activities. The
advantaged class of voters for a special-purpose district need not “be the only
parties at all affected by the operations of the entity,” nor must “their entire
economic well-being . . . depend on that entity.”
Ball
,
LULAC yet emphasizes that the Act requires water utilities to raise their prices to limit discretionary use during a drought. See Act § 1.26(a)(3). LULAC therefore maintains that the passing along of operation costs from municipal permit holders to their customers is “not incidental or indirect” but “is expressly contemplated by the text of the . . . Act.”
That claim is unpersuasive. In ,
Lastly, LULAC advances that the EAA’s efforts to conserve aquifer
water and to protect endangered species benefit all residents, regardless of
whether the water is used for agricultural irrigation, recreational springs, or
human consumption. Citing
Hellebust v. Brownback
,
D.
Because the EAA therefore qualifies as a special-purpose district, we ask
only whether the apportionment scheme “bears a reasonable relationship to its
statutory objectives.”
Ball
,
The EAA’s electoral scheme is rationally related to the legitimate goal of
protecting the aquifer because it equitably balances the rival interests of the
agricultural, spring-flow, and urban counties to ensure that no one region can
dominate the aquifer’s management. Legislative history confirms that the leg-
islature sought to achieve regional parity on the EAA board of directors. For
example, Representative Robert Puente stated that the board was “structured
to . . . even out the three different interests” of the competing regions. Debate
on Tex. S.B. 1477 on the Floor of the House, 73d Leg., R.S. 84 (May 24, 1993).
Senator Kenneth Armbrister likewise remarked that the legislature “w[as]
trying to provide a mechanism” that would prevent the board from being
“skewed one way or the other.” Hearing on Tex. S.B. 1477 Before the Senate
Comm. on Nat. Res., 73d Leg., R.S. 13 (May 6, 1993). That concern persisted
even when, in 1995, the legislature replaced the appointed nine-member board
region controlled a majority of the directors or if the statute lacked the ap-
proval of all three regions. LULAC does not contest that political reality but
retorts that “legislators may not bargain away the constitutional voting rights
of citizens . . . in order to get legislation passed.” Citing
Romer
,
Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly found that a special-purpose district
passes constitutional muster where its electoral scheme was reasonably neces-
sary to the formation of the district.
See, e.g.
,
Ball
,
AFFIRMED.
No. 18-50655
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, concurring:
Lacking the requisite indicia of general governmental powers, the Aquifer Authority is plainly a single purpose entity, yet it is here urged that in choosing to select its directors by election than by appointment, the Texas Legislature stepped on the trip wire of one person one vote—an unnecessary mechanical reflex that would here undo the underpinnings—and virtues—of the single purpose doctrine.
The Aquifer Authority is charged with protecting an extraordinary asset of the state—one that can be depleted and lost to contamination and misallocation. The Legislature did not choose to create an appointive board. It rather chose to engage the three geographical areas with the greatest incentive to protect this unique resource, each with its own perspectives. These competing interests are defined by their proximity to the Aquifer—and distinct in their draw upon it. Its balancing allocation of members to the three distinct interests demands accommodation in the governance of the Aquifer Authority, spinning self-interest to the common objective of asset protection. It bears emphasis that this governance comes with no disenfranchisement of voters— only a dilution of voter strength essential to the very structure of the special purpose entity, a dilution essential to its core purpose. And to these eyes, dilution looks past the binary liability metric of impact attending disenfranchisement. The inquiry does not end with a finding of vote dilution. Here, dilution in service of preserving a common resource results not in disenfranchisement but in effective governance of the state’s single purpose entity.
Notes
[1] Chem. Lime , 291 S.W.3d at 394 (citation omitted); see also Barshop , 925 S.W.2d at 624 (“The [EAA] supersedes the [EUWD], which previously possessed limited power to govern the aquifer.”).
[2] Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, amended by Act of May 16, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 524, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3280; Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 261, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2505; Act of May 6, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 163, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 634; Act of May 25, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1192, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2696; Act of May 28, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, §§ 2.60–2.62, 6.01–6.05, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2021, 2075; Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1112, § 6.01(4), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 3188, 3193; Act of May 23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 510, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 900; Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, §§ 2.01–2.12, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4612, 4627; Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1430, §§ 12.01–12.12, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 5848, 5901; Act of May 21, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1080, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 2818; Act of May 20, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 783, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1998 [hereinafter the “Act”].
[3] Id. § 1.16(b), (d). “Beneficial use” is defined broadly to mean “the use of the amount of water that is economically necessary for a purpose authorized by law, when reasonable intelligence and reasonable diligence are used in applying the water to that purpose.” Id. § 1.03(4).
[4] §§ 1.23, 1.31(a), 1.35(c); see also E DWARDS A QUIFER A UTHORITY , E DWARDS A QUIFER A UTHORITY R ULES § 715.106 (2013) [hereinafter “EAA Rules”].
[5] The recharge zone refers to the area where caves, sinkholes, or other permeable features allow surface water to enter the aquifer, risking potential pollution. See EAA Rules § 702.1(162).
[6] The contributing zone encompasses the area “where runoff from precipitation flows downgradient to the recharge zone.” § 702.1(52).
[7] ,
[8] Two features distinguished
Lockport
from
Salyer.
First, unlike the Tulare District
in , the county government in
Lockport
,
[9] LULAC likewise misreads
Vander Linden v. Hodges
,
[10]
Pittman
,
[11] See Act § 1.08(b) (“The [EAA’s] powers . . . apply only to underground water within or withdrawn from the aquifer. This subsection is not intended to allow the [EAA] to regulate surface water.”).
[12]
See Chem. Lime
,
[13]
See Ball
,
[14] See T EX . W ATER C ODE A NN . § 5.013(a) (granting the TCEQ “general jurisdiction” over the issuance of water rights permits and pollution regulations, as well as “continuing supervision” over conservation districts—such as the EAA—that were created under article XVI, section 59 of the Texas Constitution).
[15]
NFIB.
,
with an elected fifteen-member board.
[17] Additionally, the apportionment scheme was likely necessary to ensure the creation of the EAA. In their declarations before the district court, both Puente and Armbrister reflected that the Act would not have passed if any one
[16]
Heller
,
[17] See Debate on Tex. H.B. 3189 on the Floor of the House, 74th Leg., R.S. 55 (May 9, 1995) (“Senate Bill 1477 was passed out with an appointed authority with roughly one third from each geographic region. The bill before you still stays [true] to that compromise . . . .”).