delivered the oristoh.oi' the court.
This controversy is between Louisa Leaf, who' was at one time the wife of Peter Leaf, and his children by a former wife, Alexander, Reuben and Miss Nellie Leaf, who-are the appellants in this court. It originated as follows:
. Peter Leaf, during his life, was a member of the order known as the Knights of Honor, and what is termed a benefit certificate for $2,000 was issued upon his life in March, 1881, and by his direction made payable to the appellee, Louisa Leaf, who was then his wife. In the year 1887 Peter Leaf obtained another benefit certificate in lieu of the one payable to his wife issued by the Supreme ■ Lodge, Knights of Honor of Missouri, and made that" certificate payable to his son, Alexander. In a few months thereafter the certificate making his son the beneficiary was surrendered and another one issued by the Supreme Lodge of Missouri made payable to his son (the beneficiary in the second certificate) and his brothers and sister, who were all children by his first wife. The appellee, Louisa Leaf, retained the first certificate and her husband, Peter Leaf, obtained the second certificate upon an affidavit made that his wife, Louisa, refused to surrender to him the
Some years after deceased joined the order he became improvident and addicted to the use of liquor, so much so that his wife, Louisa, was declared a feme sole that she might manage and control the property, consisting of realty of the value of two or three thousand dollars, the title to which was in her, but the accumulation was doubtless the result of their joint efforts. He gave to his wife the benefit certificate as her property and she held and claimed it as her separate estate; not only so, but when her husband had lost all interest in his family by reason of his dissipated habits, she took from the earnings of her daily labor a sufficient sum in every month during the period of two or more years to pay bis assessments or dues so as to prevent a forfeiture of the policy. After this the wife, Louisa, by a proceeding in equity, procured a divorce from her husband and was restored to all the rights of a single woman and her children left to her care and keeping. She surrendered to her husband a moiety of the realty, the title being in her
. This is not a controversy between the lodge and these parties. If they had paid the money over to the last beneficiaries with or without notice of the equity on the part of the wife, the lodge would, doubtless, be protected, as all must subordinate themselves, when members, to the rulés and laws of the lodge when made in pursuance of its charter, and when certificates are issued the lodge will not be required to .ascertain that some other is entitled than the one named as the beneficiary. No such question arises here, and the Chancellor, in his judgment,
In the case of Manning v. Ancient Order United Workmen, 86 Ky., 136, the certificate remained with the lodge. The beneficiary mentioned never paid an assessment. lie was not a member of the family. The change was made in favor of the wife, and this court held that the first object of the beneficiary feature of the charter was to aid the family of the assured, and the claim of the widow should not be viewed with disfavor. Here the wife and children, or .at least the children who are dependent on the member, are asked to be excluded, and the widow and orphan benefit fund applied to a stranger or to adult children not dependent on the member. Such a ruling, it seems to us, would be in violation of the intent and purpose of every provision of the charter, as the order was incorporated that a fund (this widows’ and orphans’ fund) might be on hand at .the death of the member for the benefit of bis family. Does this family include the adult children, who are net dependent and not living in the immediate household in a case where the certificate is payable to the
It is argued that there is no widow surviving the deceased by reason of the divorce granted by the Chancellor, by which the marriage tie was severed. It has been held that a policy of insurance on the life of the husband for the benefit of the wife was not forfeited by reason of a divorce subsequently obtained, but that the right of the wife still continued. (Goldsmith v. Union Mutual Life Insurance Company, 17 Abbott’s New Cases, 15.
Whether this is the correct doctrine is not necessary to be determined, as in this case the appellee, although
Judgment affirmed.
To a petition for rehearing filed by counsel for appellants Judge Pryor delivered the following response of the court:
The counsel filing the petition for rehearing misconceives the meaning of the opinion.
That Peter Leaf could have had a certificate issued in favor of any member of his family by the consent of the order is not denied; that he could have the name of the beneficiary changed is equally certain, and the fact that the original certificate had been lost or where it could not be obtained by him authorized the order to issue another certificate for the benefit of others than those named in the original certificate. Counsel is right in the suggestions on these points, but they fail to reach the question presented here. It is assumed in the petition that no equities can arise as between parties in the distribution of this widows’ and orphans’ fund, but the one named in the certificate is entitled to it and no one else. The order seemed to have had trouble in determining to whom this money should be paid, and left it to the Chancellor. This court said in the original opinion that in settling the rights of this family it would be a perversion of the very object of the order to give the money to the adults, excluding the widow.. This is a case where the widow has a superior
This case has gone to an associate judge as the rule requires.