On trial before tbe court without a jury, plaintiff had judgment for injuries sustained in a collision of automоbiles at the intersection of Twelfth street and Chicago boulevard, in the city of Detroit. Twelfth street was a stop street and had a street car track on it. Chicago boulevаrd was not a stop street. The issues present questions of negligence and contributory nеgligence, both as matters of law and of fact.
Plaintiff was riding in her husband’s car, driven by him north on Twelfth strеet. Mr. Leader testified that, when about 25 feet from the intersection, he looked to the west and saw two cars standing at the edge of the intersection, apparently waiting for the through traffic on Twelfth street to pass; a car, driven by one Serlin, passed him about at the Chicago boulevard line and drove on; he followed it and when from three to fifteeen feet into the intersection, defendant’s car, driven by Mrs. Straver, struck his car at the front lеft side at the bumper, swinging it around to face easterly; he did not see defendant’s car until it wаs about to strike him.
Serlin, a disinterested witness, said that the Straver car was not one of the two stopped at the west side of the intersection; that it appeared suddenly and wаs moving rapidly and would have struck his car had he not accelerated his speed to avoid it; that it passed closely behind him and struck plaintiff’s car.
Neither defendant testified. A disintеrested witness, Mr. Shorter, however, said that his and the *236 Straver car were stopped at thе west edge of the intersection; that a street car went south on Twelfth street and immediately thereafter he saw plaintiff’s car 75 to 100 feet from the crossing and thought he could drivе on; Mrs. Straver also started her car, accelerated her speed more rapidly than Shorter and had almost gotten through the intersection when it was struck by plaintiff’s car аt the rear right fender. Shorter said he stopped at the car tracks because he thought Leader had the right of way and also because he could see that Leadеr’s car would strike defendant’s car unless Leader swerved to the left and, if he did, he would strike Shоrter unless the latter stopped.
•The purpose of a stop street is to afford traffic on it a preference. It is the duty of one arriving at such street not only to stop but sо to remain until a reasonable opportunity to proceed appears. It would be contrary to all custom, general understanding, and the purpose of a stoр street, to hold, as contended by defendants, that, after stopping, the driver immediately acquires the right of way as against all vehicles on the stop street which have not reаched the intersection.
When Leader saw the standing cars he was close enough to the intersection to justify a reasonable belief that they would not proceed until he had crossed, especially because there was another car immediately ahead of him. Assuming that the Straver car was one of the two stopped at the west side of the intersection, it is a fair conclusion, from plaintiff’s testimony, that the proximate сause of the accident was the failure of Mrs. Straver to remain stopped until a reasonable opportunity to proceed appeared.
*237 . The testimony being in dispute, the issue became one of credibility of witnesses and appraisal of circumstances. We cannot say the judgment was against the preponderance of the evidence.
Defendants complain that their motion for directed verdict, made at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, should have been granted on the ground that nо negligence charged in the declaration had been shown. They particularly insist upon this because, after the case was submitted, the court permitted an amendment under Court Rulé No. 19, § 4 (1933), to conform to the proofs. We do not think such amendment was necessary, although permissible, because an amended declaration filed before trial carriеd the appropriate charges of driving in a careless and heedless manner, at a speed not reasonable with due regard to the traffic, and without having the car undеr proper control. It also alleged that Mrs. Straver did not stop at the intersectiоn. When plaintiff closed her case, Serlin’s testimony would justify the latter conclusion.
Affirmed, with costs.