Appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the offenses of aggravated assault and possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of the Georgia Firearms and Weapons Act. He appeals to this court asserting six enumerations of error.
On July 1, 1975, K. A. Garner, an on-duty Clayton County police officer, and his partner responded to a wife beating incident reported by appellant’s neighbor. Mrs. Leach answered the officer’s knock at the door and appeared upset, but her hair and clothing were not disheveled. From his vantage point аt the doorway, the officer could see into the slightly darkened living room and observed appellant lying on the sofa watching television, but hе did not see any indication of a struggle in the room. When asked if she was having problems, Mrs. Leach nodded her head affirmatively. At that point, aрpellant told the officer that he had no right to be there if he did not have a search warrant. As the officer attempted to explain the reason for his visit, appellant raised up on the sofa, repeated that the officer had no right to be there and threatened, "I’ll kill you if you come into this house. If you put one foot in my house I’ll kill you.” The officer responded that he did not want any trouble, but if the couple wеre having problems, he could try to settle it, make a report, and leave. Appellant then reached under a sofa cushion as hе arose, pulled out a sawed-off shotgun, began walking towards Garner, repeated his threats, jacked a round into the chamber of the gun, аimed the gun at the officer, and said, "I’m going to kill you.” The officer hastily retreated to the patrol car and radioed for assistance. Whеn the backup unit arrived, Mrs. Leach appeared from behind the apartment building and urged *599 the officers not to hurt her husband because he nо longer had a gun; he had given it to her after Officer Garner fled and she threw it out the back door. Without further resistance, the officers enterеd appellant’s apartment and arrested him. Mrs. Leach assisted several officers in searching the area behind their patio. A sawеd-off shotgun containing three live shells, including one in the chamber, was found in the area below the patio. At trial, Officer Garner identified it as the wеapon used by-appellant.
1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on thе charge of aggravated assault at the close of the state’s case and at the close of all the evidence. He maintаins that his actions were those of mere preparation rather than consummation of the crime aggravated assault. We disagree; "[aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is completed when a simple assault is committed by means of a deadly weapon.”
Scott v. State,
Appellant argues that if pointing a weapon at another while not attempting to rape, rob, or murder, and not discharging it is sufficient to constitute the crime of аggravated assault, then, by judicial fiat, we have eliminated Code Ann. § 26-2908, "Pointing a gun or pistol at another.” Quite the contrary, former Code Ann. § 26-5107, "Pointing a wеapon at another,” was slightly revised and incorporated in the revision of the Criminal Code of 1968 as § 26-2908. The committee notes for this sectiоn recognize that "[m]any acts of pointing a pistol at another will constitute aggravated assault under § 26-1302, but even if not all elements required fоr that crime are present, the pointing of a gun or pistol at another is so calculated to cause injury or reasonable apprehension of injury that it should be a crime when done without legal justification.” Appellant’s actions and the reaction of the police officer meet all the requirements for an aggravated assault; appellant uttered threatening *600 words, pulled out a gun, jacked а round into the chamber as he walked towards the officer, aimed the gun, and threatened, "I’m going to kill you.” The officer immediately evidenced his fear of harm by retreating.
Appellant contends
that Smith v. State,
2. Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the evidence because any action takеn by him was in defense of habitation as permitted in Code Ann. § 26-903. The trial judge charged the jury on the affirmative defense of justification. There is no evidеnce that the jury failed to consider this defense. Based on the evidence introduced at trial, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find either that the officer did not make an unlawful entry or was not attempting to make one.
Alleged inconsistencies in the police offiсer’s testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress and at trial only go to the witness’ credibility. "Where there is an attempt to impeaсh a witness by proof of contradictory statements, the jury may believe his evidence notwithstanding attempted impeachment and in absence of corroboration.”
Ware v. State,
3. The appellant’s remaining enumerations of error are without merit. The trial court’s charge on aggravated
*601
аssault was not error; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon includes a simple assault.
Smith v. State,
The triаl court has the discretion to permit either the state or the defense to reopen the evidence after resting its case.
King v. State,
The trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress. Mrs. Leach gave her consent to the search after her husband gave the gun to her and she threw it out the back door. Appellant admits giving the gun to his wife. However, he did not give her any instructions as to what she was to do with it, and, therefore, cannot object to her consent. See
Guest v. State,
The trial court did not err in refusing to grant appellant a new trial. "It was the duty of the jury to weigh [the] evidence. Since it found that the defendant was guilty, its verdict must be honored so long as there is any evidence to support it.
Jones v. State,
Judgment affirmed.