21 Iowa 271 | Iowa | 1866
It appears to have been the earlier practice-of courts of equity to specifically enforce such contx-acts, axid to require the husband to procure the conveyance by the wife and to imprison him until he did perform his covenant by so doing. Hall v. Hardy, 3 Pierre Williams, 189; Morris v. Stephenson, 7 Vesey, 471 and cases cited. This ruliixg was based upon the presumption that the husband had, before he entered into the covenant, first gained the wife’s consent fox- that purpose. Story’s Eq. Jur., § 731-735 and authorities cited.
The true rule, we apprehend, in cases like the present, is, to give to the vendee the option of accepting performance by the husband to the extent of his ability, and the retention of so much of the purchase-money as shall be proportionate to the utmost possible outstanding or contingent interest not certainly conveyed to him without interest, until the title is perfected; or to refuse such partial title and have his damages for the breach of contract. Troutman v. Gowing, 16 Iowa, 415. If the vendee accepts the partial title,' the vendor ought to have the proportionate consideration therefor.- Nor ought the vendee to be compelled to part with his mpney, except upon receiving the title; he ought not to be required to accept the personal covenant of any person in lieu of the title, though he may do so if he choose, and the defendant consents to give it; and in this case we do not understand the plaintiff as objecting.
The transcript in this case -shows that the defendant was married at the time of the coritract of sale arid at-the date fixed for conveyance. As no subsequent statute can enlarge* the dower interest in' this particular real estate, to the prejudice of the purchaser, the plaintiff, and as
The judgment of the District Court will be modified so as to accord with this opinion, and will be remanded, to afford plaintiff-' an opportunity to- elect his relief.
The appellees will pay,costs in this court.
Modified and affirmed.