LB v. StateLB v. State
We have on appeal L.B. v. State, 681 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), which declared
FACTS
Petitioner, a minor, was charged with and convicted of possessing a weapon on school property in violation of
“Weapon” means any dirk, metallic knuckles, slungshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common pocketknife.
The trial court found that petitioner‘s knife was too large to be considered a “common pocketknife,” and was therefore a “weapon” within the meaning of
On appeal, the Second District vacated the trial court‘s order and remanded the case for a new trial. L.B., 681 So.2d at 1180. The district court held that
After determining that the term “common pocketknife” was void for vagueness, the district court did not invalidate the entire statute. Rather, it held that the term “common pocketknife” would be excised from
“Weapon” means any dirk, metallic knuckles, slungshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or other deadly weapon except a firearm.
ANALYSIS
It is an established principle of our constitutional jurisprudence that a statute is considered vague if it “does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct.” See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976, 977 (Fla.1997). While we agree that
The legislature‘s failure to define the term “common pocketknife” in
To that end, we note that Webster‘s defines “common” as: “known to the community; occurring or appearing frequently esp. in the ordinary course of events; of, relating to, or typical of the many rather than the few.” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 458 (1986). Webster‘s defines “pocketknife” as “a knife with a blade folding into the handle to fit it for being carried in the pocket.” Id. at 1747. From these definitions, we can infer that the legislature‘s intended definition of “common pocketknife” was: “A type of knife occurring frequently in the community which has a blade that folds into the handle and that can be carried in one‘s pocket.” We believe that in the vast majority of cases, it will be evident to citizens and fact-finders whether one‘s pocketknife is a “common” pocketknife under any intended definition of that term. We need not be concerned with odd scenarios construing smaller but more expensive knives as “uncommon.” As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “[s]uch straining to inject doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt would be felt by the normal reader is not required by the `void for vagueness’ doctrine, and we will not indulge in it.” United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93, 96 S.Ct. 316, 320, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975).
An analogous situation are those penal statutes which measure conduct by a “reasonable person” standard. See, e.g., Manfredonia, 649 So.2d at 1391 (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a statute imposing a duty upon any adult in control of an open house party to “take reasonable steps” to prevent the possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs by a minor at that party). Like statutes which impose a “reasonable person” standard upon the citizenry, the Legislature‘s use of the modifier “common” in
We may assume, for the sake of argument, that in some peripheral cases it may not be clear whether a particular pocketknife is a “common” pocketknife. However, that reason alone is insufficient to strike a statute as unconstitutionally vague, for we have explained:
[L]ack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. “... [T]he Constitution does not require impossible standards“; all that is required is that the language “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices....“... “That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense....”
Manfredonia, 649 So.2d at 1390 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312-13, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). Moreover, even if judges and juries were prone to reach inconsistent conclusions as to which knives are “common pocketknives” under
It is argued that because juries may reach different conclusions as to the same material, the statutes must be held to be insufficiently precise to satisfy due process requirements. But, it is common experience that different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 492 n. 30, 77 S.Ct. at 1313 n. 30.
Since in the vast majority of cases it will be evident whether one‘s particular knife is a “common pocketknife,” and because “all doubts as to the validity of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality where reasonably possible,” Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So.2d 957, 961 (Fla.1991), we hold that
As to the knife at issue here, we hold that petitioner‘s knife plainly falls within the statutory exception to the definition of “weapon” found in
The judgment of the district court of appeal is reversed. We remand this case to the Second District for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur.
GRIMES, J., concurs with an opinion in which WELLS, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion in which KOGAN, C.J., concurs.
GRIMES, Justice, concurring.
In view of the Attorney General‘s opinion and the absence of a more definitive description of a common pocketknife, I concur with the majority opinion. It occurs to me, however, that the legislature may wish to address this issue, particularly as it relates to the possession of pocketknives on school grounds. Even a four-inch blade can do a lot of damage.
WELLS, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, Justice, specially concurring.
While I agree with the majority that L.B.‘s knife is a “common pocketknife” as a matter of law, I write separately to express my belief that the statute at issue here is, contrary to the majority‘s analysis, unconstitutionally vague in its use of the word “common.”
As noted by the majority, the general test to determine whether a statute is vague is whether the statute “does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct.” Muller, 693 So.2d at 977. Most “persons of ordinary intelligence” presumably know what a “pocketknife” is. Yet the modifier “common” makes this otherwise clear concept nebulous and vague. Pocketknives are manufactured in an almost infinite variety of sizes and styles.5 Determining which knives are “common”
In 1951, the Attorney General of Florida opined that a folding knife with a blade of four inches in length or less is a “common pocketknife.” Op. Att‘y Gen. Fla. 051-358 (1951). In comparison, the trial court in the instant case ruled that L.B.‘s knife, which had a 3 3/4 inch blade, was not a “common” pocketknife. Thus, it seems apparent in reality that “persons of ordinary intelligence“, i.e., the Attorney General in 1951, and the trial judge here, may, indeed, differ as to what constitutes a “common” pocketknife. Moreover, since pocketknives with blade-lengths in excess of four inches are not uncommon (in that numerous such knives exist), the uncertainty does not lie exclusively in the “marginal” or “peripheral” cases referred to by the majority. Not only is there a difficulty in determining whether a particular knife is “common” as to its blade-length, but there doubtless exist smaller pocketknives that the Legislature did not intend to prohibit the possession of, yet could be considered “uncommon” in light of unique features such as gold inlays or titanium blades. Clearly then, it may not always be evident to “persons of ordinary intelligence” whether one‘s particular knife is a “common” pocketknife.
While the majority is correct in stating that “all doubts as to the validity of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality where reasonably possible,” Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So.2d 957, 961 (Fla.1991), we also have held that “when there is doubt about a statute in a vagueness challenge, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the citizen and against the state.” Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 843 (Fla.1994).6 For that reason, and because the statute “delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis” in all cases, and not just those that can be characterized as “marginal,” see Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235, 238 (Fla.1995), I would hold that
REMEDY
By excising the term “common pocketknife” from
Of the many varieties of knives, none has been a more constant or enduring companion to man than the pocket knife. Specimens of folding pocket knives have been discovered in Roman archeological sites, indicating that such knives were popular at least from the first century A.D. They have been manufactured for their utility as both instruments of labor and combat....
It is clear, then, that knives have played an important role in American life, both as tools and as weapons. The folding pocketknife, in particular, since the early 18th century has been commonly carried by men in America and used primarily for work, but also for fighting.
State v. Delgado, 298 Or. 395, 692 P.2d 610, 613 (1984). In another Oregon case, the Court of Appeals recognized that:
There are many types of pocketknives, with varying combinations of blades and sizes, handle styles and other features, designed for various uses and users. Some pocketknife features might have been designed primarily to make the knife more lethal when used against another person, but other features which would make one knife potentially more dangerous than another (such as the locking blade and the blade length of the knife involved here) are designed to make it useful for lawful purposes and possibly safer. The legislature is capable of clearly stating the scope of a prohibition against knives whose design creates unreasonable chances of unlawful use.
... A pocketknife which may be considered “ordinary” in one set of circumstances may be considered highly unusual or uncommon in other circumstances.5
State v. Pruett, 37 Or.App. 183, 586 P.2d 800, 802-03 (1978) (footnote omitted).
I believe the appropriate remedy to be that fashioned by the Court of Appeals of Oregon in State v. Harris, 40 Or.App. 317, 594 P.2d 1318 (1979). The court in Harris excised the term “ordinary” from a statute excluding from prosecution the possession of an “ordinary pocketknife” and left “pocketknife” as an exception. Id. at 1320.8 As noted by the court in Harris:
Everybody can recognize and immediately name a knife with a folding blade that fits in a pocket a “pocketknife” and until a defendant arrives with a folding machete and a long pocket, the term is not likely to be a primary cause of concern.
594 P.2d at 1320. To be sure, “pocketknife” is a fairly clear concept that can be looked up in a dictionary.9 The term is essentially taken to mean any knife that folds into its handle and that can easily be carried in one‘s pocket.
This Court has the authority and obligation to devise an appropriate and just remedy,10 especially under the circumstances
KOGAN, C.J., concurs.