170 A.2d 734 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1961
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that one John R. LaFemina, while in an intoxicated condition, was sold alcoholic liquors by the defendants; that thereafter, in consequence of his intoxication, LaFemina drove his automobile at a high rate of speed and caused injury to the plaintiff while he was crossing the street. This is an action under the Dram Shop Act, General Statutes §
The plaintiff claims that when suits for recovery of damages for injuries are based on independent causes of action, and the parties are not joint tort-feasors, a settlement or recovery from one does not relieve the other in whole or in part. There has not been universal accord in defining joint tort-feasors, but the following is acceptable in most situations. "At present persons whose independent tortious conduct contributes to a tort are in most cases regarded as joint tortfeasors, without distinction between such persons and those who co-operate in producing a tortious result." Restatement, 4 Torts § 885, comment c. Under this definition, a complete release of LaFemina would seem to inure to the benefit of the defendants. "It is an ancient and *299
familiar legal proposition that a release or discharge of one or more of several tort-feasors, given for a consideration, is a release of all." Dwy v.Connecticut Co.,
A complete release has not been pleaded in the instant case, but rather the payment of a sum of money in exchange for a covenant not to sue. "When the right of action is once satisfied it ceases to exist. If part satisfaction has already been obtained, further recovery can only be had of a sufficient sum to accomplish satisfaction. Anything received on account of the injury inures to the benefit of all, and operates as payment pro tanto. This is the familiar rule where consideration has been received in return for covenants not to sue or in part payment, and it is the logical and reasonable one." Dwy
v. Connecticut Co., supra, 95. The plaintiff recognizes this holding of our court but urges that the instant situation is different. He cites and relies on Playford v. Perich,
The Connecticut Dram Shop Act, on the other hand, provides for the payment of "just damages." General Statutes §
The Minnesota Dram Shop Act, while penal in nature, has, as in Connecticut, been held to be a remedial statute, since the remedy provided is compensation for damages. Minn. Stat. §
"Payments made by one tortfeasor on account of a harm for which he and another are each liable, diminish the amount of the claim . . . whether or not it was so agreed at the time of payment and whether the payment was made before or after judgment; the extent of the diminution is the amount of the payment made, or a greater amount if so agreed between payor and the injured person." Restatement, 4 Torts § 885(3).
This is a case of first impression in Connecticut in so far as any reported decision is concerned. In the opinion of the court, to permit the plaintiff in this action to be the beneficiary of a windfall which might result in double damages would be contrary to sound principles of law and public policy. It was not the intention of the legislature that anything more than "just damages" be recovered. This means simply compensatory rather than exemplary or punitive damages. The plaintiff points to the suggestion by the court in Pierce v. Albanese, supra, 261, that the action under the Dram Shop Act and the negligence action against the operator of the motor vehicle should be tried separately and that this raises certain questions. Which action should be tried first? What effect would entering of a judgment in one action have as to the other action? What effect would satisfaction of a judgment against one have upon a judgment against the other? These questions may in due course require a *302
determination. See, for example, Burkhardt v.Armour,
Demurrer overruled.