This is аn eminent domain proceeding by the Arkansas State Highway Commission to condemn an easement for a right-of-way to cross appellant’s lands, and the principal question involved relates to the competency of evidence.
The appellant-defendant, Emma Louise Lazenby, owned 14.2 acres of land adjacent to the corporate limits of the Town of Marvell. The Arkansas State Highway Commission, appellee, filed suit to condemn an easement for right-of-way purposes in 1.94 acres of lаnd running in a curve across appellant’s lands in such a way as to leave approximately 9 acres on one side and approximately 3 acres on the other side of the right-of-way. Appellee’s appraisers had fixed the value of subject land at $950.00, which amount was accordingly deposited in the Court. Mr. Lazenby, husband of appellant, was the only witness who testified, regarding the value of the condemned land. At the conclusion of his testimony appellee moved for a directed verdict. Thereupon the court, in sustaining the Motion, made substantially the following statement: “The court is of the opinion that no substantial testimony was offered by the landowner upon which you could base a verdict and fix damages'in excess of $950.00 . . .” Under the instructions of the court the jury returned a verdict in that amount in favor of appellant. From such verdict and judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal.
Mr. Lazenby testified substantially as hereafter set out. Appellant owned 14.2 acres of land on Highway No. 20 adjacent to the Town оf Marvell and suited particularly for industrial use; the Highway Department took a strip 120 feet wide through the property in a curved shape leaving 2.7 acres on one side and about 9 acres on the other side — the Highway Department figures show that 1.94 acres werе taken. The witness testified that 20 years ago they sold 2 acres to a gin company for $1,000.00 per acre and that the value of the land had since increased more than 20% recently the Federal Compress Company bought twenty acres within 100 yards of the subject lаnd and paid $1,000.00 per acre for it and in addition paid $5,280.00 to build up the ground where they could use it; subject lands are higher than the land purchased by the Federal Compress Company; there is a railroad track along the side of subject land but there was no track on the above mentioned Compress land. The witness further testified that he was familiar with the value of lands in that community; that he had tried to buy land but was unable to do so; that he and his wife had had opportunities to sell their land but wanted to hold it for industrial purposes; that in his opinion he could sell subject land for more than $1,000.00 per acre; and in his opinion the land was worth more than $1,000.00 per acre.
“Q. What do you value your land, that is, what do you value this land?”
In response to an objection by the Highway Department the Court made this statement: “Thе court will permit him to say what value he puts on the land, for whatever that is worth. The jury will be told that he has not yet qualified as an expert”.
It is our conclusion that the trial court was in error in'directing a verdict for appellant in the sum of $950.00. In fact, we are unable to hаrmonize the action of the trial court directing the verdict with its previous statement, as shown above, that “The court will permit him to say what value he puts on the land (referring to the witness) for whatever that is worth”. Likewise the trial court, in directing the verdict, stated: ‘ ‘ The cоurt is of the opinion that no substantial evidence has been offered by the landowner upon which you could base a verdict and fix damages in excess of $950.00”.
It appears to us that appellee, and perhaps the trial court erroneously thought the proper way to fix the value of the condemned land was to show the market value of the entire tract of land before the taking and the market value of the remaining land after the taking. This rule would be correct if appellant was seeking severаnce damages to the remainder of the land because of having been divided by the right-of-way. It will be noted, however, that the witness did not attempt to establish this kind of damages but was only seeking to show the value of the land that was actually taken.
Mr. Lazenby, the husband of аppellant, had a right to testify as to the value of the land even though he did not qualify as an expert witness in the matter of appraising lands. In numerous cases we have allowed non-expert witnesses, and even the owners of the land, to testify regarding the markеt value of land if the testimony shows that they are familiar with such matters. In the recent case of Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Muswick Cigar and Beverage Company, Inc.,
Neither do we agree with appellee’s contention, heretofore mentioned, that it was necessary for the witness to testify as to the value of the land before and after the taking. Since appellant was оnly seeking to recover the value of the land actually taken it was proper to show the market value per acre. This having been done it was only necessary to multiply that amount by the number of acres taken. There is a long line of cases in support of this rule.
In the case of Little Rock-Fort Smith Railway Company v. McGehee,
Although not argued by appellee it has been suggested that the action of the trial court could be affirmed on the ground that even though the testimony tended to show the subject land to be valued at approximately $2,000.00, the court had the right to deduct from that amount benefits which accrued to appellant by reason of bordering on a good highway. We see no merit in. such, a contention for two very good reasons. First, there is no testimony in the. record to show that the rest of appellant’s land was in any way benefited either generally or especially. In the second place, although it may be considered common knowledge that a good highway incrеases the value of the adjoining land yet the benefits which are deductible are the benefits which are peculiar and special to the land involved. Many decisions of this court sustain that view as shown below.
In the case of Cribbs v. Benedict,
Nor are we convinced by apрellee’s argument that the trial court had the discretion to find Mr. Lazenby was not a competent witness. True he was not an expert witness but he did show that he was familiar with land values in that vicinity.
In view of the foregoing it is onr conclusion that the judgment of the trial court must be, and it is hereby, reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.