34 Fla. 302 | Fla. | 1894
The Lawyers’ Co-operative Publishing Company, a corporation, brought a suit in equity against W. H. Bennett and J. C. Anderson, as sheriff of Orange county, on November 6th, 1889. The bill alleged substantially that an execution issued out of the Circuit Court of Orange county on April 27th, 1889, upon a judgment obtained August 21st, 1888, by the complainant against one J. H. Allen, and was leyied upon a tract of land described therein. That this levy was inade'in pursuance of art agreement between the complainant and said Allen, that such levy should be made, but that no sale should be made thereunder until November or December, 1889, as an earlier sale would be a great hardship upon the said Allen because of a scarcity of purchasers and money in the county. That the land was by the complainant and said Allen estimated to be worth at least $800. That an extension
The bill further alleged that the land sold was worth $350 to $400; that $15 was a grossly insufficient price for the same, and that said J. H. Allen was wholly insolvent and had no other property out of which the-aforesaid judgment could be satisfied. The prayer of the bill was that the said sale to the defendant be vacated and set aside, and declared null and void, and for general relief; also for temporary injunction: against the defendant Anderson, as sheriff, to restrain Mm from making a deed to the defendant for said land.
A number of affidavits appear in the record, as attached to the bill of complaint and filed therewith.. One of these affidavits was by the defendant J. CL Anderson, sheriff, and supports the material allegations-, of the bill in regard to the levy and instructions given, him by the complainant’s attorneys not to sell the land levied upon until some time mentioned not definitely named*; that he left the execution in Ms office and left for Georgia on a visit and did not return until about October 12th, when he learned that the land had been sold by Ms deputy in Ms absence; that the affiant had forgotten to mention the instructions to his deputy, and the land was sold by mistake. This affiant also stated that the agreement was made between the complainant’s attorneys and the defendant Bennett that no
W. L. Palmer, one. of complainant’s solicitors, also filed an affidavit supporting the material allegations of the bill of complaint and fixing the date of the levy mpon the land therein alleged as July 23rd, 1889. The .affidavit of S. S. Puckett, deputy sheriff, confirmed the allegations of the bill of complaint as to sale •of the land by him; and further stated that he had no instructions to sell the land, that he had sold, as a matter of course, finding the execution with the levy endorsed thereon in the sheriff’s office. He further stated that he made diligent search for the attorneys •of the complainant on the day of the sale, but was .informed that neither of them were in town; that other smaller bidders were at the sale and bid upon the property. The affidavits of various parries were taken as to the value of the land. Henry S. Chubb testified that it was worth 8300 or $400. T. H. Ewans and P. Clippinger testified that it was worth $10 or $15 per acre, there being about 35 acres in the tract. ‘VY. R. Speir and J. S. Rogers testified that it was worth $20 per acre. The defendant Bennett demurred to this bill of complaint, but the demurrer was overruled; after which, on the •3rd day of December, 1889. he filed his answer. The .answer admits the sale of the land, and the purchase by that defendant, and alleges that he (said defendant) had no knowledge or information on the day of said .sale that any instructions had been made to the sheriff, and that his only information upon such subject was the allegations of the bill of complaint; that the •agreement alleged in the bill of complaint between the complainant and said J. H. Allen were void as to said •defendant, because prior to the making of the alleged
. On the same day that .the answer was filed the solicitors for the respective parties made an agreement in writing “to submit '* the * case to the court on the bill and answer and affidavits attached therewith. ’ ’ It is not entirely clear from the - record what was the exact purpose and intention of this agreement, but upon consideration of the action of the parties and the court in reference thereto, we are constrained to the opinion that it was-its purpose to consider the affidavits filed evidence in the case. It is upon this view of this agreement that our conclusions are reached in this case. The case-being heard, the court dismissed the bill of complaint, and the complainant appeals.
In this case it clearly appears that the sale which is-sought to be vacated was made against the wishes and instructions of the plaintiff in execution. The writ of execution was issued for the benefit of the plaintiff, it had a right to control and direct what proceedings should or should not be taken thereunder, and its wishes and instructions when made known to the officer holding the writ should at all times have been respected and obeyed. Freeman on Executions (2nd ed.), vol. 1, sec. 108; Rorer on Judicial Sales, sec. 1086. The-
Counsel in this case have, by an agreement filed ih this court, sought to have us pass upon alleged rulings of the court below which do not appear in the transcrijit of the record filed, and which are not even claimed to appear of record in the court below. The matter set up in the agreement really contradicts the transcript of the record before us. We can not consider a matter presented to us in this manner.
We think it useful to note another point in this case, though perhaps not strictly raised by the record before' us, as it may save further litigation. This is a case where neither the complainant nor defendant Bennett can be charged with any wrong. The plaintiff had a perfect right to postpone the sale under his execution, and the defendant is an innocent purchaser without knowledge of the instructions given by complainant to the sheriff. The only jjerson guilty of any laches or negligence is the shei iff in not communicating the complainant’s instructions to his deputy. This negligence of the sheriff has been the sole cause of this-, litigation. It is not right that the other parties should be taxed with any costs where they were not at all at fault, but all the costs to date, including the costs of' the appeal in this court, should be paid by the sheriff..
For the reasons stated the decree is reversed and the canse remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.