85 Va. 880 | Va. | 1889
delivered the opinion of the court.
The suit was instituted on the 20th day of March, 1884, by the appellees, as the heirs-at-law of ODe James O. Moorman, deceased, being at that time aged, respectively, William J. Moorman, twenty-eight years of age; Samuel J. Moorman, twenty-six; and J. C. Moorman, twenty years and ten months— the object of this suit being to set aside a judicial sale of their deceased father’s real estate made by the circuit court of Pittsylvania county to the appellants’ intestate, R. W. Lawson, deceased, who had been substituted as such purchaser in the place of E. B. Keen, the actual purchaser of the land, who was the grandmother of the said appellees, who were then infants, the said sale having been made in June, 1873. They allege that their father, James O. Moorman, the elder, died on the 13th day of October, 1863, leaving their mother a widow, with three infant children, and seized of the real estate in question, and possessed of large personal estate, which went into the hands of their grandfather, W. W. Keen, by whom it was wasted. That the debts of their father were nominal, only, so far as he was a principal debtor, and comparatively nominal so far as he was debtor as security for W. W. Keen. That one of his creditors of the latter class of debts, Thomas O. Soyars, obtained a judgment on his debt in August, 1866. That in July, 1872, the said Soyars instituted his suit in chancery in the county court of Pittsylvania to subject the real estate of the said J. G. Moor-man, deceased, to the payment of his said judgment. This suit was brought against W. W. Keen, as administrator of J. O.
An account was ordered of the transactions of the administrator, and an account of debts, liens, and of the real estate. The report under this order showed W. W. Keen indebted to the estate of Moorman in the sum of $29,986.66, while the debts amounted to only $1,807.78; while the lot of ground in Dan-ville was valued at $5,000, with a rental value of $500, and a lot at Ringgold was valued at $1,000, and the rental value fixed at $200. This resulted in a decree for the renting out of the real estate, and a further account of debts of Moorman. In May following (this being in April, 1873), W W. Keen made affidavit that he was the father of Mrs. Dougherty, who had been Mrs. J. C. Moorman; that the realty was not susceptible of division in kind ; that the infants had no other estate, and that their interest would be subserved by a sale of the land; that their mother desired a sale; that she was their natural guardian, and they had no other guardian. Whereupon the decree for the renting out of the land was rescinded, and a sale of the land ordered, without assigning dower to the widow. In June following, a sale is reported of the Danville lot to W. W. Keen, agent for E. B. Keen, his wife, at the price of $4,000, and of the Ringgold lot at $600 to the same purchaser. This sale was confirmed by the court, and a commissioner appointed to collect the bonds. In November, 1873, following, R. W. Lawson, the appellants’ intestate, became the purchaser of this real estate at the price of $7,000, he buying from Keen, and was
Lawson demurred and answered. He claimed that the corporation court of Danville was without jurisdiction to correct the errors and irregulariti'es of the circuit court of Pittsylvania county; that for these the plaintiffs must either appeal or apply by bill of review for their correction. He denies that the court decreeing the sale was without jurisdiction. He denies all fraud or collusion on the part of W. W. Keen, or of any other person. He says that the personal property of Moorman which came into the hands of Keen was chiefly slaves, which came into his hands during the pendency of the late war, and who were freed by its results; and tobacco, which was sold in Confederate currency, and the money likewise lost by the result of the war; a -horse, which died; and household furniture and cows, exempt from sale for debts. He denies that the lots were very valuable.
Depositions were taken in the cause and filed, and on the 6th day of January, 1888, a decree was rendered in the said court, by which, among other things, the court decreed: First, that the sale of the property to E. B. Keen, on June 17th, 1873, and the sale and conveyance thereof to R. W. Lawson, are void; second, that the plaintiffs do recover the entire lot of land on Main street, in the town of Danville, demanded by the bill, and all original improvements thereon on November 18th, 1873, rents and profits, etc.; third, that the plaintiffs do not recover the additional value of the new improvements, etc.; fourth, certain accounts as to these are ordered. From this decree the appeal is taken to this court.
The effect of this decree is to declare the decree of the circuit court of Pittsylvania county in the suit of Soyars v. Moorman void, and in its legal effect no decree ; and it is therefore wholly disregarded, and all the proceedings under it are set aside. It has been said that by a void judgment no rights are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it, and all claims flowing out of it, are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may he responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress. This inquiry as to the validity of a judgment, says Mr. Freeman, is to he prosecuted only by an investigation of jurisdictional facts, upon whose real or assumed existence every valid judgment must stand. In the case of U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 709, the supreme court of the United States said: “ The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction. It is ‘coram judice’ whenever a case is presented which brings this power into action. If the petitioner states such a case in his petition that on a demurrer the court would render judgment in
The decree, in Soyars v. Moorman, of the circuit court of Pittsylvania county, held to be void by the corporation court of Dan-ville, is claimed to be so on account of the fraudulent conduct of W. W. Keen, as alleged, of which Lawson is claimed to have had constructive notice. The facts disclosed in the record do not establish the charge of fraud against Keen. The charge that he sold the property for a large advance, and then pocketed this for his own benefit, was not made against him until he was dead; while it is shown that the plaintiffs were his fatherless grandchildren, living in his house, of tender years, without any property which they could hope to call their own out of their father’s estate; and that estate is alleged to be hopelessly insolvent in a large sum, and a creditors’ suit pending to subject his property to the payment of his debts. Their mother, who was living, was dying of consumption, and soon died; and the statement that he was acting for the best interest of the children in buying the property in his wife’s name was not at that time contradicted, and does not appear to have been doubted. If the children were without property, and he a bankrupt, whatever he may have owed their father’s estate, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he was without the means of saving the land for them, and a re-sale at an advance may have been his only available resource. But, however this may have been, there is not a particle of proof in the record to show any fraud on the part of Lawson. The land was only valued at $5,000,
It is further insisted that this decree was void because the infant defendants were not made parties; but the bill names them as parties, and prays for process against them, and it appeared by affidavit filed that they were not residents of this State, whereupon there was an order of publication against them. This is authorized by statute. But it is alleged that this affidavit was untrue; that they were not non-residents of this State, but lived within the State. If this be so, they were allowed an opportunity to correct the erroneous proceeding, either then or after they came of full age; but for some cause they did not regard this as desirable, and they cannot deny now the validity of the decree by this collateral attack upon it in another forum, because the record shows that they were not residents of this State, and were properly proceeded against by the order of publication. But it is not denied, in fact, that they were not residents of the State at that time, but it is claimed that they soon returned. It is clear that this was a creditors’ suit, having for its object the settlement of Moorman’s estate,
Decree reversed.