29 S.W. 1128 | Tex. App. | 1895
Appellant sued appellee in the court of a justice of the peace to recover money alleged to be due for rents and advances, amounting to less that $200. The issuance of a distress warrant to seize the crops raised was asked for by appellee. The warrant was issued and levied upon corn and cotton, stated in the original return of the sheriff to be worth less than $200. Subsequently corn and cotton which had been levied upon in the field were gathered, and the sheriff amended his return, stating the value of it to be greater than $200. No question as to its jurisdiction was raised in the Justice Court, but a trial was had, resulting in a judgment from which appellant appealed to the County Court. In that court appellee presented *584
a plea, alleging that the value of the cotton seized under the distress warrant, and upon which it was sought to foreclose a lien, exceeded $200, and that the Justice Court, and consequently the County Court, on appeal, had no jurisdiction of the cause. Evidence was heard on this plea, and it was sustained and the cause dismissed. There is no statement of facts, and we must assume that the evidence sustained the allegations of the plea that the value of the property sought to be charged with the landlord's lien exceeded $200, and if that fact defeated the jurisdiction of the Justice Court, the judgment must be affirmed. It was not too late to raise the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter in the County Court. In the case of Marshall v. Taylor,
This view is sustained by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Railway v. Allen Humphreys, 1 White Willson, 568. That was a suit in the County Court to recover a debt due for labor done for an amount less than $1000, and to foreclose the statutory mechanic's lien upon personal property worth more than $1000. On the question of jurisdiction, the court said: "The County Court is undoubtedly clothed with power to adjudicate liens on personal property. This jurisdiction, in cases like this one, is not controlled by the value of the property upon which the lien is sought to be foreclosed. The statute which creates the lien in question in this case also settles the jurisdiction of the courts as to that lien. While the lien is given upon the roadbed and equipments of the road, it is contemplated by the statute that it shall be enforced against so much of the property only as shall be sufficient to satisfy the judgment, thus limiting the lien to the amount of the judgment. Acts 1879, chap. 12, p. 8, sec. 2; App. Rev. Stats., p. 4. Marshall v. Taylor, 7 Texas, and Lane v. Howard, 22 Texas, are not considered as applicable to or decisive of the question in this case."
From examination of the statute referred to by Judge Willson, it will be seen that it has no provisions affecting the question of jurisdiction, save that providing that the lien is to be satisfied by sale of the property, or "so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the judgment." Substantially the same provision exists with reference to the landlord's lien.
This decision, in our opinion, states correctly the rule applicable to such cases. It follows, that the ruling of the court below was wrong.
Reversed and remanded. *586