8 Me. 405 | Me. | 1832
delivered the opinion of the Court.
It seems to be a well settled principle that such contracts of an infant as the court can pronounce to be to his prejudice are void ; such as are of an uncertain nature, as to benefit or prejudice, are voidable, and may be confirmed or avoided at his election, and such as are for his benefit, as for necessaries, instruction and the like, are valid.
The law so far protects him, in the second class of contracts, as to afford him an opportunity, when arrived at full age, to consider his bargain, its probable tendency and effect, to review the circumstances under which it was made, and, having weighed its advanta
The law wisely protects youth from the impositions of those who might be disposed to take advantage of their inexperience, and compels them to the performance of no engagements or the payment of no debts contracted within ago, except such as are for necessaries suited to their condition in life. But wdiile it affords this protection as a shield, it will not sanction its use as an offensive weapon of injustice, by which the unsuspecting and honest community are to be defrauded of their property. The privilege is afforded for no such purpose. The law requires of the infant the strict performance of his engagement, if subsequent to his arrival at age, it has been ratified and confirmed, either by anew promise, or by any act by which an acquiescence is implied. But if there have been no such ratification, and he repudiate the contract, common honesty will not, and legal principles ought not to permit him to retain the consideration, which was the foundation of the promise he thus avoids. He should place himself and the person with whom he contracted in the same situation as if no contract had been made. Surely he ought not to be permitted to keep all and pay nothing.
But itt this case we are not called upon to decide whether the law would afford any remedy for one who had sold his chattels to an infant, by whom they had been converted into cash during infancy, there having been no subsequent confirmation of the contract. If the principles which have been recognized by this court in Hubbard v. Cummings and Dana v. Coombs stand unshaken, as we think they do, and can be applied to contracts for personal as well as real property, as we think they may, the contract, which is the
According to the agreement of the parties, the defendant must be defaulted.