36 Nev. 591 | Nev. | 1913
Lead Opinion
By the Court,
This action grew out of injuries sustained by the respondent while in the employ of the appellant corporation, in the sinking of a mining shaft. The complaint in this cause sets forth that the respondent was injured while descending the shaft of appellant in a mining bucket, in pursuance of his employment in bailing water
This action was brought under the employers’ liability act of this state, and a credit, or set-off, was admitted and allowed by respondent to appellant in the sum of $36, and respondent prayed for judgment in the sum of $1,964.
A demurrer, submitted by the appellant, was overruled by the trial court, following which order the appellant filed its answer, in which answer the appellant set up, among other things, the following allegation in support of its affirmative defense: "That plaintiff ought not and should not have or maintain his cause of action, for on account of the facts set forth in his said complaint, for in that at Tonopah, Nye County, State of Nevada, the said plaintiff, for and in consideration of the sum of $36 to him in hand paid by said defendant in full accord and satisfaction of the facts set forth in plaintiff’s complaint, and of the injury complained of therein, made, executed, and delivered to defendant that certain instrument in writing in full of all account and claims of and for and on account of the pretended facts set forth in plaintiff’s complaint and in accord, relinquishment and satisfaction 'thereof as follows, to wit: 'Tonopah, Nevada, November 18, 1911. Received of the Halifax-Tonopah Mining Company the sum of seventy-six dollars, being in full of all account and claims of and for any injury heretofore sustained by the undersigned, while in the employ of the Halifax-Tonopah Mining Company and the undersigned, for and in consideration of the sum of seventy-six dollars does forever release and discharge said Halifax-Tonopah
Of the sum specified in the foregoing receipt $40 was paid respondent by appellant as wages for services actually performed, and the remainder of the sum, amounting to $36, was paid the respondent by appellant on account of his injuries. To this answer, and especially to that phase of the answer quoted above, respondent demurred on the ground that the affirmative defense did not state facts sufficient to constitute any defense to respondent’s cause of action. This demurrer, on the part of the respondent, was sustained by the trial court, and ten days allowed appellant for amendment. To the ruling of the court in this respect the appellant excepted, and by notice duly given, through its attorney, declined to amend the answer. Thereafter the cause was heard before the trial court without the assistance of a jury, and a decision was rendered in favor of respondent, and judgment entered against the appellant in the sum of $1,174 and costs. From the order sustaining respondent’s demurrer to appellant’s answer, and from the judgment rendered in the cause, appeal is taken to this court.
The employers’ liability act, of which the foregoing section is a part, was enacted by our legislature in 1907, and by the enactment of this statute common carriers and mill and mine owners were made liable to their employees in case of injury, or to the personal representative of their employees in case of death, where the injury or death was the result of negligence of the officers, agents, or employees of the common carrier, or mill or mine operator. By the enactment of this statute this state, speaking through its legislature — the representatives of its people — declared its policy applicable to this all-important subject. By this statute the common-law rule of fellow servants was modified, and, moreover, the common-law rule of contributory negligence was superseded by the statutory rule, which is more or less properly termed the rule of " relative” or " comparative” negligence. In enacting section 5652, the object and purpose of the legislature was manifest and obvious, and the meaning of the words therein contained is to our mind in no wise obscure. By its enactment the legislature manifestly sought to avoid the various and devious contracts and agreements so often required by employers as a condition precedent to the obtaining of employment, and also to guard against the many and devious ways by which employers seek to avoid the consequences of their own acts, or the acts of their agents, by obtaining releases therefrom by the signing of instruments at the hands of the injured party tending to establish a settlement. Section 2071 of the code of the State of Iowa, dwelling
The code of Iowa quoted above is very analogous to ■our own statute, but contains a distinctive provision recognizing and sanctioning settlements for damages between the parties.
Section 5652 invalidates any defense based upon ■contract made to cover the contingency of future injury, and it likewise invalidates a defense based upon the acceptance of insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity accepted by reason of injury already sustained. The acceptance of any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity must necessarily be an act of acceptance done after an injury, and hence it follows that the intendment of the statute was to make nugatory any defense based on ■acceptance of insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity, after
The word "indemnity” means: Protection or exemption from loss or damage past or to come. It also means: Immunities from the punishment of past offenses. One who indemnifies, or enters into a contract of indemnity, thereby agrees to save harmless. The word, generally speaking, carries with it two meanings: First, in the sense of' giving security; and, second, in the sense of relieving a party from liability for damage already accrued.
Laws enacted under the police power of the state, which will in their general nature promote healthful conditions of work and freedom from undue oppression, are always within the scope of the legislative department. The health and safety of the great mass of the employed is a subject with reference to which there has been vast and varied legislation in recent years, and the true aim and object of it all has been to protect life, person, and property where persons are engaged in hazardous vocations. The various legislative acts, dwelling upon this subject in the many states, have been passed upon by the courts in numerous decisions, with the result that the courts of last resort of many states, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States, have upheld the principle that such legislation was within the police power of the state; that power being exercised to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion. It has been generally said that where the health, prosperity, good order, and peace of the people, or of any general class of the people, require legislative regulations, it is within the power of the legislature of the several states to enact such statutes.
The legislature of the State of Nevada, speaking for the policy of the people of this state, has in the past enacted many laws intended to better the conditions of the laboring class,, by laying down rules and regulations in the interest of humanity, and to save the lives and
The state, having the power to enact laws of this general character for the protection of the life and welfare of the individual members of any class, with equal power may declare void any agreement, contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity entered into prior to or subsequent to the injury, the general nature of which would be to destroy the effectiveness of the act itself.
It will be observed that the statute relied upon by counsel in this case differs from that under consideration in the case of McGuire v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L. R. A. n.s. 706, cited by appellant, in that the Iowa statute makes special provision for settlement for damages between the parties subsequent to the injury. In this respect it may be observed that if these safeguards of legislation, enacted for the purpose of enforcing a policy, may be valid in nullifying contracts entered into prior to accident or injury, if legislative enactment may be valid to prevent an individual from entering into a contract while in full possession of his
The power of the state to prevent the individual from making certain kinds of contracts has been passed upon approvingly by many of the courts of last resort, and it has been generally said that if the contract be one which the state, in the legitimate exercise of its police power, has the right to prohibit, it is not prevented from prohibiting it by the fourteenth amendment. The rule has been laid down in state jurisdictions, as well as by the Supreme Court of .the United States, that contracts in violation of the statute, either of the federal or of a state government, could obtain no protection from the federal constitution as coming under the amendment bearing upon the subject of liberty of person and of free contract. When a state by its legislature, assuming to exercise under its police power, passes an act which in its general scope protects the health or welfare of the individual members of any general class, it has the right to enact legislation prohibiting contracts the general nature of which would be to prevent the operation of the law. (McNamara v. Washington Terminal Co., 35 App. D. C. 230.)
We think it unnecessary in this case to dwell upon the inadequacy of the consideration as represented by the receipt given by respondent to appellant and set forth herein. It is our judgment that it was the intention of
By the provisions of the statute any sum contributed toward the relief or indemnity of the party injured constitutes a set-off or a credit to the employer. It follows that the amount contributed would be deducted from any judgment that might be awarded to the injured person, and hence, in our judgment, the employer is deprived of no legal right or benefit by the inhibition of the statute.
In view of the foregoing reasoning it is our judgment that the respondent’s demurrer to appellant’s answer should have been sustained, as it was sustained by the trial court. No question is raised by appellant as to the evidence warranting the court in making the findings and entering the judgment for the sum specified.
It therefore follows that the order and judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I concur in the opinion written by Justice McCarran. Section 5652 of the Revised Laws quoted is a copy of section 3 of the liability act passed by Congress in 1906 (Act of June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 34 Stat. 232, U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1317), except that the limitation to common carriers in the federal statute does not appear in our act. Section 3 of the act of Congress of 1908 (Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 66, U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1323), contains substantially the same provisions relating to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
Among the earlier cases relating to statutes invalidating such contracts, the few which held such laws to be unconstitutional have been criticized or overruled. It was urged that our statute providing an eight-hour day for men working in mines, smelters, and ore-reduction plants was unconstitutional because it deprived the employer and employee of the right of contracting for a longer workday. Notwithstanding this and other objections, this court and the Supreme Court of the' United States held that such an act was valid, and that under the police power the legislature could enact laws for the protection and welfare of men so employed. (Ex Parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 65 L. R. A. 47, 1 Ann. Cas. 66; Ex Parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, 113 Am. St. Rep. 817, 6 Ann. Cas. 893; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780.)
In Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 31 Sup. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed. 878, the act of Congress of March 4, 1907 (Act of March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415, U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1321), regulating the hours of labor of railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce, was held to be constitutional and not an interference with the liberty of
It being settled that the legislature may determine the best public policy regarding employees in quartz mines, smelters, and ore-reduction plants, and pass laws for their benefit and protection, it necessarily follows that any right of contract must yield to statutes passed for these humane purposes. There are numerous decisions holding that conditions of contracts upon telegrams, railroad tickets, and bills of lading are void as against public policy. Statutes have been sustained which make it unlawful to contract to pay miners at quantity rates upon screened coal instead of upon the original weight of the coal as produced in the mine (McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L. Ed. 315), and prohibiting contracts for options on grain or other commodities at a future time (Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 425, 46 L. Ed. 623).
It has also been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the Carmack amendment (Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, sec. 7, 34 Stat. 593, U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1307), by which an interstate carrier voluntarily receiving property for transportation is made liable to the holder of the bill of lading for loss anywhere en route, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, with right of recovery over against the carrier actually causing the loss, is not unconstitutional as infringing the liberty of contract. (Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 31 Sup. Ct. 164, 55 L. Ed. 167, 31 L. R. A. n.s. 7.)
The question of the constitutionality of legislation invalidating contracts which provide for release from liability for damages is answered most clearly by the
Although the Iowa act exempted settlements made after the injury was received, it is apparent that it would be fully as much within the province of the legislature to provide that contracts made after the injury should not be binding as contracts made before, and that if a statute nullifying such contracts made before injury is properly sustained, laws invalidating settlements made after the injury are not unconstitutional. The employee who is injured by defective machinery or appliances, or by some negligence for which the employer is liable, may, after the accident, be more impelled by disability which prevents him from earning his support, or by the destitution of himself or his family, or stress of circumstances, to accept in satisfaction an amount much less than the damage he has actually sustained. Equitably the statute is in accord with the decisions holding that when a solvent debtor pays only a part of the amount he owes on a clear, undisputed, liquidated demand, with a receipt or agreement that the part payment is in full, the remainder may be collected.
In Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & Hartford R. R. Co., N. P. Railway Co. v. Babcock, and N. Y., N. H. & Hartford R. R. Co. v. Walsh, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. n.s. 44, it was held that the act of Congress, with terms similar to ours, and which invalidates contracts
The state courts are bound by the construction of the federal courts given to acts of Congress, but are not required to follow the construction given to a state statute by the federal courts, or the Supreme Court of the United States, unless a federal question is involved. The federal courts follow the construction given to a state statute by the state court of last resort, notwithstanding such construction may not be in accord with the views of the federal court. Although the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States sustaining the act of Congress relating to the liability of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce may not be conclusive or binding as to the construction of our act, which contains similar provisions relating to the liability of employers, when it dobs not appear that our statute is vitiated by any provision of the state constitution which is different from the requirements of the federal constitution, the opinion in that case, and the one upholding, as not in conflict with the federal constitution, the Iowa statute, which is substantially the same as ours in relation to such contracts made before injury, are entitled to the highest consideration, and, being in accord with the principles enunciated by this court and the Supreme Court of the United States sustaining the right of the legislature to enact laws for the protection and benefit of. men employed in mines and ore-reduction plants as not an unwarranted encroachment upon the liberty of contract, may be regarded as adjudicating the principles which control this case, and as justifying the upholding of our statute.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I dissent from the order denying a rehearing. The importance and far-reaching effect of the legal questions discussed and determined by the opinions of the majority members of the court warrant, in my judgment, further hearing and consideration before the views expressed in those opinions be determined to be the law.
I am unable to agree upon the construction placed by my learned associates upon section 5652 of the Revised Laws. Our statute of 1907 (Stats. 1907, p. 487) which was incorporated into the new civil practice act of 1912 (Rev. Laws, 5649-5652) is modeled after the act of Congress of June 11, 1906 (34 Stat.-at-L. 232, c. 3073, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1148). Section 3 of the act of 1907 (Rev. Laws, 5652) is in all essentials identical with section 4 of the federal act, supra. While there is no direct authority upon the question of settlements made between an injured employee and his employer after injury, the provisions of section 3 of the federal act was under consideration by the Court of Appeals of the District of- Columbia in the case of McNamara v. Washington Terminal Co., 35 App. D. C. 230.
That case involved the validity of an agreement entered into at the time of employment, which exempted the company from any liability other than was provided for in certain relief benefits agreed upon at the time of employment which were to accrue to the employee in the event of injury. It was held that this agreement was in violation of the statute, and was not a bar to further recovery.
The court, however, said: "If it [the employer] honestly desires to effect a settlement with the employee, irrespective of this contract of employment and upon a new consideration, it may do so, and such a settlement, if free from duress, will be sustained. What it here seeks to do, however, is to be relieved of liability without the payment of a new consideration. Mr. Justice Stafford, in a well-considered opinion (Potter v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 37 Wash. L. Rep. 466), sustaining this section, said: 'What Congress evidently intended to do was to cut up, root and
Whether the above quotation from the opinion in the McNamara case is or is not dicta, I believe it to be the correct construction to be placed on the federal act, under consideration in that case, and likewise it would be the correct construction to be placed upon the statute of this state. The purpose of the act is accomplished by this construction, and any other construction would render it of doubtful constitutionality, to say the least. Both the language and the constitutionality of an act should be clear before it is held that a valid agreement in settlement for personal injuries may not be entered into between employer and employee after injury. Such a construction means that, no matter how much the parties may be desirous of effecting a settlement or how advantageous such a settlement may be, a resort must be had to litigation with its attendant delay and expense — a result which would be alike injurious to both employer and employee, with no compensating advantage. The reasons which justify the legislature in holding void agreements entered, into as a condition of employment do not apply in matters of settlement after injury.
The courts have never hesitated to set aside agreements in settlement for personal injuries, where the consideration was inadequate and where .the circumstances virtually prevented freedom of contract. It was upon this view of the present case that I concurred in the judgment.
I am still of the opinion that the judgment could be affirmed, notwithstanding I think the court erred in sustaining the, demurrer to the answer. The fact that the plaintiff was induced to accept a grossly inadequate consideration for his injuries, shortly after the accident and
Rehearing
On Petition for a Rehearing
The petition for a rehearing is hereby denied.