Rakeen Lawson brought this action in the Superior Court of Wilcox County for assault and battery against Clint Bloodsworth, alleging that Bloodsworth, who was his high school history teacher, deliberately and maliciously threw a chair at him. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Bloodsworth’s motion for summary judgment, and Lawson appeals. For the reasons explained below, we reverse.
Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met. In our de novo review of the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 624 (1) (a).
Viewed in this light, the record shows the following. During class on May 11, 2010, Bloodsworth became suspicious that Lawson had copied an assignment from a student in an earlier class and directed Lawson to go out into the hallway. As Lawson walked away from Bloodsworth and toward the door, Bloodsworth threw or pushed a chair toward Lawson, saying, “You’re going to need this,” or words to that effect. Lawson deposed that the chair hit him in the back of the leg, although he was not physically injured. According to Lawson, Bloodsworth then screamed in his face, “acting furious.” Lawson was embarrassed by this incident and afterward felt he was the object of other students’ ridicule because a teacher had thrown a chair at him. Bloodsworth deposed that, as Lawson was leaving the classroom, he tried to make the chair slide toward Lawson and unintentionally made it take “a bad bounce” in his direction and that the chair “just barely nicked him, if [it touched him] at all.”
The trial court determined that it was undisputed that Bloods-worth did not intentionally try to hit Lawson and that Lawson was not physically injured. Referencing Georgia’s impact rule,
A cause of action for battery will lie for any unlawful touching, that is, a touching of the plaintiffs person, even if minimal, which is offensive. Ellison v. Burger King Corp.,
In this case, Lawson’s deposition testimony provides evidence that a furious Bloodsworth intentionally threw the chair at him, that the chair hit his leg, and that Bloodsworth’s conduct caused him to suffer the emotional pain of humiliation. Thus, the facts are disputed regarding whether the chair physically touched Lawson and whether Bloodsworth pushed the chair toward him with a tortious, rather than an innocent, intent.
Given the relatively low threshold required to prove battery, we must conclude that [Lawson] has created a factual issue as to whether a battery occurred. To hold otherwise here would run contrary to [controlling] precedent and to our mandate to view all evidence in the light most favorable to [Lawson] as the nonmoving party.
Ellison v. Burger King Corp.,
Furthermore, because Lawson seeks to recover damages for emotional distress resulting from an intentional tort, rather than from merely negligent conduct, Georgia’s impact rule does not bar his claim, despite the absence of any physical injury. Clarke v. Freeman,
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Bloodsworth. Ellison v. Burger King Corp.,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”).
We note that Bloodsworth’s motion for summary judgment, and Lawson’s response, were based solely upon the depositions of the two parties. There is no evidence in the record from any of a number of other students who witnessed the incident.
Georgia applies the impact rule to cases in which a party seeks to recover for emotional distress in a claim involving negligent conduct. The impact rule has three elements: (1) a physical impact to the plaintiff; (2) the physical impact causes physical injury to the plaintiff; and (3) the physical injury to the plaintiff causes the plaintiffs mental suffering or emotional distress. A party claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress must therefore show a physical impact resulting in physical injury. ... In addition to alleging facts that could show that [the defendant’s] behavior was malicious, wilful, or wanton, to meet this exception to the impact rule, [a plaintiff] also must allege sufficient facts that could show that the [defendant’s] behavior was directed at [the plaintiff, or at a group of people that included the plaintiff].
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Clarke v. Freeman,
In general, the question of an alleged tortfeasor’s intent is reserved for the finder of fact. See Stephens v. Adkins,