*1
discretion,
true,
being
tutional manner. That
in the exercise
difference
hearing.12
previously
a further
since it has
been decided
Lin-
require
decline
we
are not
County
coln
that counties
immune
AFFIRMED.
Amendment,
Eleventh
from suit under the
(than
reasoning
Bradley)
other
(concurring):
WIDENER,
Judge
Circuit
support
the decision reached
necessary
in the
result
reached
in the
concur
14(e),
19737(e),
here is
U.S.C.
§
§
reasons set forth
for the
majority opinion
Voting Rights
specifically
allows
below.
just
attorneys’
prevailing party
fees to the
case,
the merits of
the instant
“any
voting guaran-
action” to enforce the
such,
and, as
appealed
were not
dispute
involved here.
tees
so, I am of
This
final.
judgment
mind, although
this in
I am not in
With
decision
Supreme Court’s
opinion
many
with
or all of the statements
accord
Board, 416 U.S.
Bradley v. Richmond School
majority opinion, I do not think
made in the
(1974), is
one propriety where the to situation
section pending resolution on
of a fee award the statute became law.”
appeal when at 2015. at injustice statutory
Barring any manifest contrary, the Court conclud- directive WHITTINGTON, Appellant, Lawrence apply is to the law in effect ed that “a court the time it renders its decision.” at Thus, al- at 2016. COMPANY, SEWER CONSTRUCTION ruling court’s though the district INC., Appellee. may matter now before us merits of the No. 74-1234. the time it erroneous have been rendered, us, is closed to its reconsideration Appeals, United Court of States by Brad- opinion am of we are bound and I Fourth Circuit. 19737(e), 14(e), 42 ley apply U.S.C. § so Voting Rights amendments Sept. the 1975 Argued attorneys’ the award of fees. as to sustain 12, 1976. May Decided Young, parte Ex Since L.Ed. 714 affirmative require public has available to relief been duties in a consti- perform their
officials proper carefully Judge percent to act believed Blatt also exercised his dis- because he amount, arriving respect dealing conservatively at the with the disburse- cretion when $5,000 figure public award. He reduced the sub- funds. ment attorneys by by Lytle’s more than 60 mitted
429 *3 Charleston, Maroney, Va.,W.
Thomas P. appellant. Bias, Jr., Charleston, Henry W. Va. C. Bias, Charleston, Va., Light W. (Lively, & brief), appellee. HAYNSWORTH, Judge, Chief Before BOREMAN, Judge, Circuit Senior WIDENER, Judge. Circuit BOREMAN, Judge: Circuit Senior defendant, Con- On motion of Sewer (hereafter Compa- Inc. Company, struction defendant), the district court dis- ny or admi- missed this suit for lack asserted jurisdiction. judgment ralty From Whitting- plaintiff, dismissal the Lawrence (hereafter Whittington plaintiff), ton appeal. prosecutes counts, containing two complaint, Whittington alleged jurisdiction that the under and virtue the district court arises jurisdiction and maritime States; of the district courts of the United or maritime claim that this is 9(h) meaning within the of Rule Procedure; that the Federal Rules of Civil under possession and defendant had in its was in barge its control certain waterways of the navigation the inland is, River in States, on the Elk United that at Virginia; County, West Kanawha complaint all times mentioned barge by the on said plaintiff work of a deck- defendant, “performing seaman”; while the hand and barge crew of said was a member of the River, the terri- Elk within working on the the district the hole torial court as an between a bridge pier and the river in connection with bank. As bridge “able-bodied seaman was dismantled some tasks,” steel, decking, concrete, the defendant of the wood assigned duties portions negligent in that the structure be- were loaded into to be later ing away. lowered from an overhead towed and, lowered, said so In his opening brief stated plaintiff fell into said and was there- involved in the ease as follows: injured. by seriously In the second count Did the Court err in ruling, as a matter Whittington alleged that because of his in- law, that the was not a sea juries duty it became the of the defendant man, and, therefore, the Court did not prompt to furnish the with medical under Admiralty * care, and medicine attention and “the ex- Maritime Laws of the United States? penses of his maintenances and cure.” [sic] In his statement of the case he asserts complaint concluded a demand for complaint his brief that he filed his alleging *4 $150,000 $10,000 injuries, the sum of for seaman, that, such, that he was a as cure, maintenance and court costs and at- was entitled to recover under the admiralty fees, torneys’ by and a jury. trial laws of the United States for sus- defendant, filing After an answer the by by negligence tained caused the of his em- court, leave of filed an amended answer ployer and the unseaworthiness of the ves- alleging, pertinent part, that the district assigned.” Further, sel “which he was he jurisdiction; plain- court was without alleges that on day the he was “he complaint tiff’s fails to state a cause of performing was the work of a deckhand upon granted; action which relief ABL358”; could be Barge and seaman on that the and that is barred from recovery negligent, defendant was and that the by virtue Compensation of Workmen’s unseaworthy, or vessel was and that statute of the Virginia. State West The provide defendant failed proper to denied, generally, defendant the material ingress egress; methods of allegations complaint, of the both in question counts of whether was a seaman, upon plaintiff 1 and and called or doing for strict the work of a proof. the time of question was a fact by jury, to be determined and not a The defendant Whittington’s took dis- question of law to be determined and, covery deposition at the time it moved court. jurisdiction, for dismissal for lack of The sole here is the very narrow discovery deposi- defendant moved that the one admiralty jurisdiction of the of the part tion be made a of the record and the district court. undisputed factual dis- accomplished motion to This dismiss. was closures lead us to conclude that this con- by a formal order. troversy not within the district court’s Whittington At the time was he admiralty jurisdiction. Consequently, we years employer, was 47 or 48 old. His judgment affirm the dismissing the suit. defendant, engaged was in the demolition Turning discovery deposition of bridge spanned the Elk River in Whittington, glean we from the questions County, Virginia, Kanawha West and one asked and his answers thereto certain facts section near the east bank of the river had which will following be shown in the four In that partially collapsed. section a hole paragraphs. approximately square twelve feet had been bridge flooring cut in open and an At various times twenty- and for about years was moored the water underneath one of his adult life he had worked as * discovery deposition The case was decided the district court of counsel and the of the granting deposition the defendant’s motion to dismiss himself which was made a jurisdiction. lack of The court based its con- of the record formal order without briefs, pleadings, arguments objection. clusion the choker line. In operator preparing for different to lowered crane
an overhead he manufacturing plants standing and he had labored at was east side the hole bridge including seasonal work for and a short distance under- jobs, different there with a Virginia Department. flange neath was a steel beam Highway the West bridge on which across it went below he the defendant employed by When flooring. one flange He had foot on the operator” on a crane and backhoe hired “as beam foot put other job. Whittington bridge demolition free, eye of the choker which was swinging approximately a crane for two checked out to preparing barge. descend into the He went work for the hours when first had descended about five feet when the put and then he was defendant against hook on the end of the rubbed cable jack hammer operating pick, shovel piece of steel. As described bridge deck. tearing up the concrete it, down, as I going trying “Well bridge intact end of the west push myself flange bridge, off gained bridge access to the workmen caught the flange bridge hook possible end it was from that drive eye and rubbed the choker off—rubbed the help carry away trucks out on hook, just off is all. fell the rest Referring to the hole in the the debris. way.” A workman was on top of bridge flooring Whittington stated “You push out whipline so that dropped through truck could have down plaintiff could descend into the barge but you up.” if had backed apparently pushed the line was not out far There was a the river under- enough flange avoid the of the steel *5 bridge which neath the hole in the was for injured beam. Plaintiff was when he land- “hauling away” the disman- purpose the ed on the debris and dismantled materials bridge portions. the was tled Stationed already placed which had been barge. in the equipped a motored winch with drum and the his deposition Whitting- Near end of line, running from the a cable line drum ton stated that when he was he pulley superstructure on the through supposed was to have been the skilled lowering bridge which was used for bridge, “operator,” craftsman on the an but through bridge materials the hole in effect, up, he doing wound laborer work barge. There was a hook on the into the which was what most the other men on day end the cable and on the before job did. was demolition He asked the injured plaintiff was he and another work- time, question whether, any he con- were, turn, through man lowered sidered himself an able-bodied seaman. He hole into the means was his not to instructed counsel answer. they cable so could detach of the whether, He was asked at any further time cable On that materials from the hook. from the he was until time hired he was he Whittington thought worked occasion injured, he was understood that he to work day.” as half of On the there as much “a such, on a boat as and again his counsel day was following directed objected. concluded, deposition His how- means, go barge again by the same into the ever, interrogation by with his own counsel with riding cable down a “choker on questions. answers His counsel explained end.” As the chok- —“A day asked whether he understood' end, two eyes er is cable with a steel other; day before he and the on which one in the one in one end and he was that he was to work on loops.” would be two The choker was he day answered “The long; feet before —I piece steel cable about five phrase way: day I put foot the will On before and he stated that he his hurt, choker, got upper loop Gary Backland come me and loop lower of the said, ‘Larry, need a they guy on the work down fastened to hook end said, cable, grasped barge.’ right; the cable ‘All I don’t the winch’s ” hook, top line above the end of mind.’ above 432 inju jurisdictional to recover for time nexus. For who seeks purposes
One
we
jurisdic
upon admiralty
place
in a suit based
must
look to the
ries
where the incident
(1)
injuries
occurred
must show
tion
occurred which ultimately gave rise to the
and had a maritime
upon navigable waters
Son,
cause of action. T. Smith &
Inc. v.
nexus,
injuries were caused
(2) that
or
Taylor,
276 U.S.
72 L.Ed.
navigable
ap
waters or an
by a vessel in
(1928);1 Hastings
Mann,
520
vessel,
(3)
purtenance
(4
1965).2
910
In the instant case the
seaman, a member of
person injured was a
tortious
plaintiff’s
act which caused the
in-
vessel, injured in the course of
crew of a
juries occurred while he
suspended
v. Marra
employment.
See Swanson
from the shore-based winch. There is no
1, 4-5,
Brothers, Inc.,
allegation of negligence
respect
(1946); Executive Jet Avia
433 vessel, dropped Whittington that the winch line course his employ- than onto the shore is onto the rather Whittington ment. appears to base his con- injuries qualify as occur- insufficient clusion that admiralty may ex- upon navigable jurisdiction- waters for ring upon ist theory this case that Whit- v. 460 purposes. al Bible Chevron Oil tington suffered his while “doing 1972).5 (5 Since alleged F.2d 1218 Cir. the work of a seaman” in the service of a upon tort did not occur is, therefore, vessel and entitled to waters, it fails to meet the first of the the status of a “seaman” the purpose conditions necessary above-stated estab- invoking admiralty jurisdiction ground admiralty jurisdiction. lish that federal argument courts. We find the not, therefore, We need consider whether presented support proposition this wholly the resultant tort and had unpersuasive. It represents confusion of nexus. maritime admiralty principles and constitutes sub- departure accepted stantial jurisdic-
It would seem equally clear that
tional standards.
Whittington
injured by
was not
a vessel
appurtenance
navigation
thereof.
There is a failure on the
Whittington
The winch from which
fell was
distinguish
“seaman” from
bridge
located on the
which was
de
“one
does the
who
a seaman.” The
It
is well established that a
molished.
jurisdiction
term “seaman” when used in a
admiralty jur
is not
vessel within
sense
to one who
al
refers
“member of
v.
&
Rodrigue
Casualty
isdiction.
Aetna
the crew” of a vessel.
Chicago
South
Coal
360,
1835,
Surety Co.,
352,
395
89 S.Ct.
U.S.
Bassett,
251,
& Dock Co. v.
60
U.S.
Thus,
S.Ct.
(1969).
limits
Whittington’s discovery deposi
.
tial
tion before
court below demonstrates
long-
was
Garrett
Since the
was not a “seaman” and that
ashore, he could
injured while
shoreman
his assertion
support
he had no basis to
only by show-
admiralty jurisdiction
invoke
laborer,
admiralty jurisdiction. He was
unseaworthy
an
ing that he was
bridge.
demolish a
Prior
help
navigable
of a vessel
appurtenance
plaintiff’s
to the accident
contact with
predi-
that case was
waters.
Jurisdiction
navigation
spent
was that he had
a vessel
solely upon evidence
cated
tied
day
pier
one
on board
appurtenance of the ves-
was
helping
scrap
while
to load
Assuming in the instant case
sel.
bridge.
day
On
the demolition of
was,
law,
doing
as a matter of
accident, plaintiff was being
lowered
that fact
the work of
would
loading
winch onto the
to continue
pertinent to a determination of the
scrap.
opinion
We are of the
that a mere
warranty
of seaworthiness
of whether
worker,
as the
shore-based
him,
but would not determine
extended
case,
who
incidental and intermit
has
jurisdictional question.
nonnavigational
tent
duties aboard
in a
A “seaman” as the term
used
moored to a
is not
“seaman” for
“per
jurisdictional sense means one who is
jurisdictional
following
purposes. The
ex
manently
employed by
attached to and
particular
cerpted statement
interest:
aas member of its
[a vessel]
argues
further
that he was
Dredging Corp.,
Plaintiff
crew.” Senko v. LaCrosse
370, 372,
415, 417,
jury
entitled to a
determination concern
ing
surrounding
jurisdictional
A “member of the
facts
L.Ed.2d 404
however,
longshore-
argued,
if a
It is
occurred on
waters. And in Guti-
may
errez,
admiralty jurisdiction
recover
unseaworthiness
if in-
supra,
man
federal
ship
jured
unloading
Admiralty
in the course
clearly present
Ex-
since
Sieracki,
process,
Shipping
Seas
Co.
[328
injury
face
tension Act on its
reached the
(1946)],
90 L.Ed.
there
The decision in Gutierrez
involved.
has an unseaworthiness
claim for
and if he
turned, not on the “function” the stevedore
pier
and caused
sustained
but,
performing
injury,
at the time of his
gear,
ship’s unloading
Gutierrez
[v.
rather, the fact
that his
Corp.,
Steamship
Waterman
*8
by
appurtenance
ship
caused
an
of a
1185,
(1963)],
F.2d
Cir.
360
less
“However,
permanently
dent was not more or
claimant
stated,
if the
court
specific fleet
a vessel or a
of
attached to
single phase
in
of
substituting
a
simply
not
meals
neither
took his
or
vessels. He
of the
duties,
is a member
but
a seaman’s
barges
towing
or
slept
any
on
of the
their
crew,
.
. he
why
we see no reason
perform any
did he
function
vessels. Nor
employer on
may
.
.
. sue his
not
either the
operation
to the
of
necessary
Act.”
Jones
barge
any
which he was
has held
The
Court
barges upon which
the other numerous
Longshoremen’s
passage of
that the
loading/unloading
in
he assisted
(33
Compensation Act
Workers’
Harbor
.
.
.
pipe.
Congress
shows that
seq.)
901 et
U.S.C. §
entry
a
court
Burns affirmed
The
of the
“to confine the benefits
intended
for the defendant
verdict
directed
a
the crew of
to the members of
Jones Act
claim, holding
Act
Jones
.
. .”
navigable waters
plying in
vessel
not a
as that term is used in
“seaman”
Inc.,
Brothers,
v. Marra
Swanson
the Jones Act.
accord,
(1946);
L.Ed. 1045
oath,
discovery deposition,
In his
under
Co., 319 F.2d
Dredging
v. Norfolk
Lawrence
a part
made
of the motion to
1963);
v. Diamond
(4 Cir.
McKie
record,
part
and a
without
dismiss
(5
Co.,
135-136
Cir.
204 F.2d
Marine
opportunity
had
objection,
1953).11
qualify as
“member of the
To
general
support
allega-
state facts to
one must be
under the Jones Act
crew”
complaint
respect
tions
attached to
permanently
less
more or
jurisdiction.
district court’s
fleet;12
one whose
he must be
vessel or
order
In its memorandum decision and
“naturally
primarily as an
duties serve
the district court discussed the
dismissal
sense,13
in the
navigation”
aid
broadest
met
which must be
requirements
normal
navigation.14
be in
vessel must
order to
and maritime
establish
The
jurisdiction.
the instant case
court noted
case,
who,
particularly
plain-
in the course of his
was a laborer
record
assigned
deposition,
to work on a
tiff’s own
that Whit-
employment, was
discloses
tington
employed by
one
and did work
defendant as a
operator
duties related
day prior to his accident. His
crane
and laborer in the demoli-
bridge;
bridge;
primary
not to the
tion of
work was
to the demolition
wholly
bridge,
barge.
not an
navigation of the
Such
instrument or structure
navigation
navigation;
wrong
negli-
tort or
unrelated
Act
gence
as
Jones
which resulted in his
was com-
qualify
does not
Corp.,
bridge;
Oil
474 mitted on the
he fell
the barge
See Ross Mobil
onto
“seaman.”
1973).
(5
is the with
had
permanent
Pertinent
which he
no
relation or
F.2d
Cir.
connection;
following passage
Burns
Anchor-
he was not a member of a
(5
1972):
Co.,
navigation;
Cir.
crew aboard in aid
Wate
469 F.2d
complaint
(5
forth a claim
also sets
12. Burns v. Anchor-Wate
by the
*11
bridge
Inc.,
the
in
demolition
pany,
plaintiff
prior
Since the
asserted no claim
Charleston, West
the Elk River
crossing
appeal
the
the
to
as to
unseaworthiness of
any question
us is
Not before
Virginia.
appliances,
vessel or
we
have no
its
should
the Elk River
or not
whether
occasion to consider whether or not admi-
barge
the
involved
whether or not
water
ralty
might be defeated as to
Barge ABL 358
navigation.
in
a vessel
was
claim, assuming
the
unseaworthy
sole
the control
and under
possession
the
was in
appliance
have been
to
the shorebased
alongside
was moored
and
the defendant
of
winch
its attendant choker. McGowan
and
river,
the
bridge, in
of the
piers
the
one of
Gillenwater,
1970);
(4th
v.
Thus, Supreme Court’s deci- given they appear way in their Grimes, limited before us in that a sions seems Senko now would seem to make as working strong a case showing employed a man in jurisdiction in our in that of barge, admittedly purposes Grimes, to, waters, navigation is at above referred as well as in jur- Bridgeman, Butler 356 78 U.S. S.Ct. least sufficient invoke 2 court, further L.Ed.2d 754 a Jones Act case isdiction of the and warrant which around inquiry. factual
441 wharf, question States, morning and on Bank the United it my opinion cleaning boiler of engaged had been that the court proceeded should have to the merits, tug and, been out which had of service if the case were dismissed, later prior without months the acci- crew for it should merits, have been on the not for dent. jurisdiction. This, want of it appears to me, is procedure consistent with the out- here, In the I think pleadings case lined Court in Smith v. discovery deposition enough show Sperling, U.S. prevent the dismissal of the case for want (1956). L.Ed.2d 1205 There the court re- jurisdiction. is simi- This case versed district court determination that a enough lar class of to that federal corporate defendant ain stockholders deriv- jurisdictional cases in which the facts and ative suit realigned should be party as a recovery depend the facts which must plaintiff since corporation was antago- comingled, are to some extent same and nistic the defendant posi- stockholder’s warrant a rule courts should slow evidence, After taking tion. the district jurisdiction, want dismissing for for so court ruled on the of antagonism fact deprive to do may very party well of his destroyed the diversity See, day Hood, Bell in court. U.S. court and resulted in dismissal of the 678, 682, (1946); L.Ed. 939 complaint. The Supreme Court found that States, Osborne v. Bank of the United gist of the district court’s findings went 738, 818, (9 Wheat.) seq. et L.Ed. 905 as well as to the merits of the underlying “admiralty Because dispute as to the question jurisdiction. over the to the suit” as Jones Act claim “as out, pointed As was there the proper course in the case for maintenance and cure” does of conduct would been try the case depend place where on the merits rather than denying par- was inflicted “but on the nature of the ties their day delving court into the relationship operation service and its *14 merits of the underlying dispute in an at- vessel,” O’Donnell Great Lakes tempt to resolve preliminary jurisdictional 36, 42-43, U.S. matter. L.Ed. I judgment submit the dismissing the court the case lack of I am thus opinion jurisdiction should vacated and the case Whittington’s status as being one remanded proceedings. for further goes only to merits of the controversy but jurisdiction also to the Whether was a seaman is a court, should not be decided upon the suggest matter of fact which should not preliminary summary motion for judgment, adversely conclusively have been decid- since, if all factual inferences were taken ed against him on the basis of mere favorably plaintiff, pre-trial deposition. It is well established the court would been established ruling summary judgment “[o]n the extent necessary warrant further inferences to underlying be drawn inquiry. factual facts [support- contained in materials ing light must be viewed in motion]
most the party opposing favorable to Diebold, Inc.,
motion.” United States v. 654, 655, 993, 994, then,
L.Ed.2d 176 Whittington,
entitled to all favorable factual inferences
which I do not think has been accorded.
Moreover, his status as a seaman is a com-
mon -fact going to both the merits of the
ease as well as to
court. Under Bell v. Hood and Osborne
